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Abstract 
This thesis is a history of protest practice in Australia during the ‘long 1960s’. It begins with the 
coordinated protests against nuclear proliferation in the eastern states in 1961 and 1962, and ends 
with the Vietnam Moratorium Campaigns. It examines the intersections between anti-war and 
anti-conscription protest, the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, and the anti-Apartheid 
protests that emerged during the 1971 South African rugby team tour of Australia.  
Rather than offering a history of Australian activism as an organisational network or 
monolithic, homogenous ‘movement,’ it treats protest as an exercise in political meaning-
making, and traces the development of protest practice over time. This focus contests the 
characterisation of the arrival of the New Left in Australia after 1966 as a watershed or moment 
of rupture, and draws out long-term continuities in Australian activism. It also provides for an 
analysis of the transnational influences on Australian protesters without falling into the 
contemporary trap of labelling protest derivative. 
This methodological approach reveals that Australian protesters in the Vietnam epoch shifted 
between two major ideological explanations for their protest. One framed protest as a 
representative activity on behalf of an imagined Australian public, on behalf of whom protesters 
critiqued government policy and held the government to account. Protest organisations attempted 
to position themselves as representatives of the public, and used public opinion to legitimate 
their ideas. By contrast, liberalism’s concentration on individual sovereign rights especially 
nourished anti-conscription activists, whose protests made much of the principle of non-
interference in the private lives of citizens as a foundational model of citizenship. 
This thesis will chart the development and evolution of these two explanations of protest, their 
interactions and fusions. Through their careful articulation of protest as a democratic process and 
an individual right, and their sustained presence in public conversations about commitment and 
conscription, Australian protesters helped to change the meaning of the Vietnam War in 
Australian public political life. 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
Where acronyms are not in common usage a brief description has been provided. 
AATTV Australian Army Training Team Vietnam. A small team of military advisers sent 
to Vietnam in 1962. 
ABC  Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 
ACND Australian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Notional peak body made up of 
state CND groups. Met only once in late 1963. 
ACTU  Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
AICD Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament. The major NSW 
peace organisation between 1964 and the early 1980s. Originally the organising 
committee for the 1964 Sydney Peace Congress, this group superseded the NSW 
Peace Committee. 
ALP  Australian Labor Party. 
ANU  Australian National University. 
ANZCICD Australia and New Zealand Congress for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament. Used to refer both to the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress and to 
the organising committee, which became the CICD. 
APC Australian Peace Council. Peak body of Australian Peace Councils between 1949 
and the mid-1960s. Affiliated with the World Peace Council. 
BCND  Brisbane Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
CDNSA Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act. A committee formed to 
protest conscription by the AICD in NSW in mid-1969. Also used to refer to a 
similar committee in Victoria. 
CICD Congress for International Cooperation and Disarmament. Usually used to refer to 
the Victorian state peace committee that succeeded the VPC after 1959. 
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Refers specifically to the British anti-
nuclear protest organisation in operation from the mid-1950s onwards. All other 
CND groups are identified by an additional letter. 
CPA  Communist Party of Australia. 
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CPV Campaign for Peace in Vietnam. South Australian protest organisation. 
Responsible for the Moratorium protests in Adelaide. 
DRM Draft Resisters’ Movement. A short-lived organisation of Victorian draft resisters 
formed in late 1967. 
DRU Draft Resisters’ Union. Could refer to any of the state organisations of draft 
resisters operating between 1969 and 1972. 
GPO  General Post Office. 
HCC Hiroshima Commemoration Committee. A committee formed by AICD in NSW 
in 1961 to organise the Easter and Hiroshima Day marches in Sydney. 
MP  Member of Parliament. 
NCC National Coordinating Committee. A liaison committee for the various state 
Vietnam Moratorium organising committees. 
NLF  The South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. Also known as the ‘Viet Cong’. 
NSWPCICD New South Wales Peace Committee for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament. The name of the NSW Peace Council from 1959 until it was 
replaced by the AICD in 1964. 
PVC Project Vietnam Committee.  A committee formed by AICD in NSW in 1966 to 
organise protests against the war. Took over the work of the HCC. 
QPC  Queensland Peace Council. 
QPCICD Queensland Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament. 
Alternative name for the QPC. 
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force. 
RMIT  Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. 
SANE  Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. American anti-nuclear organisation. 
SCND  Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
SDS Students for a Democratic Society. Could refer to the American student 
organisation formed in Berkeley in 1960, or to Australian student organisations 
sharing its name.  
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation. 
SMH  Sydney Morning Herald. 
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SOS Save Our Sons. Women’s anti-conscription organisation formed in Sydney in 
1964. Spread to all states except South Australia and Tasmania. Operated until 
1972. 
UAW  Union of Australian Women. 
UNSW The University of New South Wales. 
VAC Vietnam Action Committee. Ad hoc protest organisation formed in Sydney in 
mid-1965. 
VCND  Victorian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
VDC Vietnam Day Committee. Could refer to the committee responsible for the first 
‘Teach-in’ at UC Berkeley in 1965, or to the Australian group in Melbourne that 
operated in late 1965. 
VMC Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Refers to one of the state committees that 
organised Moratorium protests in 1970 and 1971. The peak body was the NCC. 
WACND Western Australian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
WILPF Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. 
YAC Youth Against Conscription. An anti-conscription organisation formed in 
Queensland in late 1965. Equivalent to YCAC. 
YCAC Youth Campaign Against Conscription. Australian anti-conscription organisation 
formed in NSW and Victoria in late 1965. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a history of protest practice in Australia from 1961, when the first major 
coordinated protests against nuclear proliferation took place in the eastern states, until 1972, 
when the Vietnam Moratorium Campaigns came to an end. Though protest against involvement 
in the Vietnam War and conscription dominates the period, I also examine the intersections 
between these campaigns, the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, and the anti-Apartheid 
protests that emerged during the 1971 South African rugby team tour of Australia. Treating 
protest as an exercise in political meaning-making, this thesis interprets activism in Australia in 
the 1960s as an effort to contest the prevailing discourses of Australian citizenship and of 
international relations and Australia’s place within them. This is not a comprehensive survey, as 
the range and diversity of protest organisations and campaigns is too vast. Rather it is an 
exploration of how protest is inextricably linked to broader public political culture. As a point of 
departure it challenges key discursive elements of this culture, namely the easy rhetorical 
coherence of ‘movements’ and the ontological link between publics and their governments. 
Through this lens this thesis offers a substantial interpretation of Australian protest in the 1960s 
as a critical intervention by Australians into Australian public political life. 
The literature on the Vietnam War in Australia thus far lacks a synoptic history of protest 
during this epoch. The existing literature can be divided into two broad categories: survey 
histories of the Vietnam War, and work on activism specifically. The former category consists of 
a small number of academic books and a growing number of popular histories, which include 
protest as a colourful episode in a broader history of the home front during the war. These 
histories generally, and often usefully, situate anti-war and anti-conscription protest in the larger 
context of the Vietnam War itself, Australian-American relations, and Australian electoral 
politics. In one of the more analytical and insightful studies, John Murphy’s Harvest of Fear, the 
focus is on relationship between the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Communist Party of 
Australia (CPA), and the broad coalition of protest organisations arrayed against involvement in 
the War and conscription. Murphy places the war and protest against it in the context of the 
unfolding Cold War, arguing that Vietnam War and protest against it formed part of the collapse 
of the anti-communist logic of containment so prevalent in the 1950s and the realignment of left 
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wing politics around the ideologies of the ‘New Left’.1 Peter Edwards’ volume of the Official 
History takes a similar if more conventional approach, arguing that protest organisations took 
place in a broader social debate alongside political parties, universities and trade unions, that 
slowly resolved against commitment and conscription.2 In the context of the reinvigoration of 
ANZAC in the public political culture of Australia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Paul 
Ham and Michael Caulfield have focused more closely on the experience of Vietnam Veterans in 
their public histories of the war and its effects in Australia. Caulfield is dismissive of protest as 
misguided youthful passion, while Ham spends considerable time discussing the ways protesters 
mistreated veterans. Both books devote considerably less space to protest than to the experiences 
of soldiers and veterans.3  
When protest, rather than Vietnam, is the central subject of historical inquiry, the scope is 
often narrow and limited to either anti-war or anti-conscription protest, and most commonly to 
protest after 1967. It is mostly written by ex-protesters, and much of it is autobiography, 
interview collections, and memoir. In his recent book, like many ex-protesters, Clive Hamilton 
characterises the 1960s and 70s as a moment when a “powerful wave of dissent” broke over 
Australia, credits the New Left with transforming both conservative and old left thought, and 
frames the Moratorium as a moment where the “tide had turned”. He explicitly describes his 
work as a “story” rather than a “history”. Tacitly recognising the complex politics of memory, he 
describes the act of remembering as a “wistful return” to a moment where “protests defined us”.4 
Curthoys has more explicitly questioned the difficulties of using the historian’s voice when 
writing about her own past, and the ethics of using her professional authority to cement her own 
sometimes distorted recollections as fact.5 As she points out, Curthoys is only one of several ex-
                                                 
1 John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia’s Vietnam War (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993). 
2 Peter Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975 
(St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997). 
3 Michael Caulfield, The Vietnam Years: From the Jungle to the Australian Suburbs (Sydney: Hachette, 2007); and 
Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2007). 
4 Clive Hamilton, What do we Want? The Story of Protest in Australia (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 
2016): Preface, chap. 1. 
5 Ann Curthoys, “History and Reminiscence: Writing about the anti-Vietnam-war Movement,” Australian Feminist 
Studies 7:16 (1992): 116-136. 
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participants who have produced scholarly accounts of protest events they took part in or helped 
organise, including Verity Burgmann, Ralph Summy and Malcolm Saunders, and Barry York.6 
The prevalence of participants shapes this body of work in three distinct ways. First, it tends 
to make protest before 1966 invisible, privileging the role of radical students in Australian 
protest in the period. This is unsurprising given the experience of many of those academics in 
radical student organisations in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, it tends to represent 1966 as a 
generational watershed between the ‘dour decade’ of the 1950s and the vibrant and radical late 
1960s. Finally, there is a lingering question in much of this work over whether Australian protest 
in the 1960s was a genuine expression of Australian political interests and desires, or whether it 
was simple mimicry of American, and to a lesser extent European, protest. 
In addition to the academic ex-participant histories listed above, several ex-student radicals 
have also published popular histories, while researchers and participants have produced a 
                                                 
6 Curthoys was a member of the Eureka Youth League prior to 1964 and a participant in the NSW ‘Freedom Ride,’ 
of 1965. Burgmann participated in anti-conscription protest and has written on Australian political movements.  
Summy was active in anti-war protest as a postgraduate student at the University of Sydney until 1971, writing his 
masters’ thesis on anti-war activism, and thereafter a member of the faculty at the University of Queensland. 
Saunders was a member of the South Australian Campaign for Peace in Vietnam. York was a student at Latrobe in 
the 1960s. See Curthoys, “The Anti-war Movements”, in Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle eds., Vietnam: War, Myth and 
Memory: Comparative Perspectives on Australia’s War in Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992): 90-1; Curthoys, 
“‘Shut up, You Bourgeois Bitch’: Sexual Identity and Political Action in the anti-Vietnam War Movement” in Joy 
Damousi and Marilyn Lake, eds., Gender and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 311-341; 
Curthoys, “Vietnam: Public Memory of an Anti-war Movement”, in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton, eds., 
Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995): 114-31; Curthoys, 
“Mobilising Dissent: The Later Stages of Protest” in Gregory Pemberton, ed., Vietnam Remembered, 2nd ed. 
(Sydney: New Holland, 2002): 138-63; Curthoys, Freedom Ride: A Freedom Rider Remembers (Sydney, Allen & 
Unwin, 2002); Verity Burgmann, Power and Protest: Movements for Change in Australian Society (St Leonards, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Ralph Summy, “The Australian Peace Movement, 1960-67: A Study of Dissent” 
(Masters Thesis, University of Sydney, 1971); Summy, “The Australian Peace Council and the Anticommunist 
Milieu, 1949-1965,” in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, eds., Peace Movements and Political Cultures, 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 233-64; Malcolm Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement 
in Australia: 1969-73” (PhD Thesis, Flinders University, 1977); Saunders, “‘Law and Order’ and the Anti-Vietnam 
War Movement: 1965-72,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 28:3 (1983): 367-79; Saunders and Summy, 
“Salient Themes of the Australian Peace Movement: A Historical Perspective,” Social Alternatives 111:1 (1982): 23-
32; Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement: A Short History (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, 
Australian National University, 1986); Saunders and Summy, “The 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress: Culmination of 
Anti-Communism in Australia in the 1950s,” in Ann Curthoys and John Merrit, eds., Better Dead than Red: 
Australia’s First Cold War 1945-1959, vol. 2 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Barry York, Student Revolt: 
Latrobe University 1967 to 1973 (Campbell, ACT: Nicholas Press, 1989); York, “The Australian Anti-Vietnam 
Movement: 1965-1973,” Melbourne Journal of Politics 15 (1983-84): 24-40; and York, “Police, Students, and 
Dissent: Melbourne 1966-1972,” Journal of Australian Studies 8:14 (1984): 58-77. 
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significant body of oral testimony and memoir.7 This work tends to concentrate on what 
Curthoys calls the “later stages of protest,” that is, protest against the War and conscription after 
1967.8 Curthoys, Summy and Saunders have produced work on protest before 1967, but with the 
notable exception of Summy’s 1971 Masters thesis, this has formed part of longer works that still 
privilege the period after 1967.9 Summy’s work is focused on the end of the 1950s, the 
emergence of a new peace movement and the red-baiting that attended the Australian Peace 
Council and its state bodies.10 One consequence of this historiographical focus is the near 
disappearance from the literature of Australian anti-nuclear activism in 1961 and 1962. Because 
of this absence, and because of its critical importance in the evolution of Australian protest in 
this period, it is a key element in the argument of this thesis. Australian anti-nuclear groups in 
the 1960s are mentioned in passing in few texts but there is as yet no specific history of 1960s 
Australian anti-nuclear protest, despite a considerable literature on the British organisation. 
Nonetheless, Australians put on protests in solidarity with and even named their organisations 
after British precedents, notably the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and some of 
the key players in these Australian anti-nuclear protest movements became prominent in the anti-
war movements.11  
                                                 
7 John Percy, A History of the Democratic Socialist Party and Resistance, vol. 1 (Sydney: Resistance Books, 2005); 
Bob Scates, Draftmen Go Free (Richmond, Vic.: B. Scates, 1988); Mick Armstrong, 1,2,3, What are we Fighting For? 
(Melbourne: Socialist Alternative, 2001); Beverley Symons and Rowan Cahill, eds., A Turbulent Decade, (Sydney: 
Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 2005); Gloria Frydman, ed., The Protesters (Blackburn: 
Collins/Dove, 1987); Greg Langley, Decade of Dissent: Vietnam and the Conflict on the Australian Home Front 
(North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Bernie Taft, Crossing the Party Line (Newham: Scribe Publications, 1994), 
chap. 20; Tom Uren, Straight Left (Sydney, Random House, 1995), chap 11; and Denis Freney, A Map of Days: Life 
on the Left (Port Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1991). 
8 Curthoys, “Mobilising Dissent”. 
9 Summy, “The Australian Peace Movement,”; Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement; and 
Curthoys, “The Anti-war Movements”.  
10 Summy, “The Australian Peace Council and the Anticommunist Milieu”; and Summy and Saunders, “The 1959 
Melbourne Peace Congress”. 
11 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, chap. 7, chap. 8; and Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, 35-6. 
Select examples from the literature on the British CND include: Richard Taylor, Against the Bomb: The British Peace 
Movement 1958-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); James Hinton, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 
Twentieth-Century Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1989); Holger Nehring, “The British and West German Protests 
against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War, 1957-64,” Contemporary British History 19:2 (2005): 
223-341; Jodi Burkett, “Direct Action and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1958-62,” in Nick Crowson, 
Matthew Hilton and James McKay, eds., NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-State Actors in Society and Politics 
since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 21-37; Burkett, “Re-defining British morality: ‘Britishness’ and 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 1958-68,” Twentieth Century British History 21:2 (2010): 184-205; 
Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945-68 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Burkett, “The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and changing attitudes towards the Earth in 
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Because of the focus on protest after 1967, the literature credits students as the source and 
prime mover of the radicalisation that characterised this period. Radical students dominate this 
literature. York claims that “[t]he social base of the movement was generally to be found in 
student and academic circles, and was certainly middle-class,” and implies that ‘youth’ and 
‘student’ were interchangeable terms. He argues that this was visible to contemporaries: “The 
youth cultural aspect is really central to any understanding of the anti-Vietnam war movement, 
and the more perceptive campaigners at the time realised it.”12 The scholarly attention paid to 
radical students is disproportionate to their numbers, especially to that tiny minority who claimed 
that violence had a legitimate political purpose - among them campus ‘celebrities’ like Albert 
Langer or Michael Hyde at Monash, or Brian Laver at the University of Queensland.  
The role of the 1966 election as a generational watershed is also central to this literature 
because of the role of student activists in its production. In this interpretation, the defeat of the 
ALP at the polls in November 1966 shocked anti-war activists and drove many to iconoclastic, 
confrontational and eventually violent forms of protest. York argues that Labor’s defeat in 1966 
“fueled the development of a militant, extra-parliamentary trend within the student movement in 
Melbourne”.13 Marks places the ALP’s election defeat alongside Vietnam and conscription in a 
“triumvirate” of radicalising factors that spurred the development of a local Australian radical 
student ‘New Left’.14 These scholars, often participants themselves, echo contemporary 
concerns. The Monash University newspaper Lot’s Wife argued that “No matter whose 
interpretation one accepts of the election result, it was a shocking defeat for those who oppose 
the Australian and American commitments in Vietnam,” noting that the election had been the 
“last hope” for anti-war campaigners and the loss produced a feeling of “utter helplessness”.15 In 
1968, Humphrey McQueen felt that “[i]n 1966 the young left looked forward to a Labor victory. 
It worked incredibly hard... The defeat that followed either shocked them into apathy or slowly 
gave rise to undirected militancy”.16 Michael Hyde, a member of the Monash Labor Club and 
                                                 
the nuclear age,” British Journal for the History of Science 45:4 (2012): 625-639; and Burkett, Constructing Post-
Imperial Britain: Britishness, ‘Race’ and the Radical Left in the 1960s (Basingstoke: Palgrave  Macmillan, 2013). 
12 Barry York, “The Australian Anti-Vietnam Movement,” 33. 
13 York, “Police, Students & Dissent,” 59. 
14 Russell Marks, “Towards an Intellectual History of the Australian New Left: Some Definitional Problems,” 
Melbourne Journal of Politics 34 (2009-10): 93-97. 
15 Curthoys, “Mobilising Dissent,” 147. 
16 York, “Police, Students and Dissent,” 59. 
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draft resister, recalled in 1992 that “[a]fter Labor’s disillusioning defeat a strong feeling emerged 
that, given the failure of the electoral system to remove conscription, we should resort to civil 
disobedience to defeat it”.17 Another Melbourne participant, Mick Armstrong, argues that 
“Labor’s shattering defeat in 1966 ... shocked activists and proved a turning point for the anti-
war campaign”.18 This helplessness became the justification for more radical forms of protest 
amongst students. Students who were active in confrontational anti-war protests after 1966 
described the election as a moment of rupture that impelled them to more radical and disobedient 
acts. Many of the subsequent historical accounts have seen this confrontational phase as the 
height of the protest movement, ignoring or, in some instances, dismissing earlier, more peaceful 
campaigns aimed at mobilising a somnambulant or passive electorate. In fact, there was a longer 
tradition of more liberal, peaceful opposition to war both before and after 1966 that is generally 
overlooked in the historiography of protest in this period. 
The near absence of detail about protest in the early 1960s is exacerbated by the concentration 
on the anti-communist consensus of the 1940s and 1950s as the frame for peace activism. At the 
height of the Cold War peace activists were characterised as duplicitous communist agents or 
naïve dupes, helping an international communist conspiracy to secure victory in the larger global 
struggle by fomenting unrest at home. For this reason, the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress, at 
which new continuing committees replaced the old state Peace Councils, is the subject of some 
debate about the continued influence of the CPA and the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council 
on Australian peace activists.19 Thus the long 1960s in Australia is often presented as a decisive 
shift from Old Left to New Left, with 1966 acting as a moment of rupture. This characterisation 
obscures the period between 1959-1966 almost completely, though some efforts have been made 
recently to address this.20 Murphy argues that while the public continued to associate the peace 
movement with the apparently monolithic threat of Soviet Communism, the early 1960s saw a 
“subterranean realignment of political forces” that “diluted the ponderous influence of the CPA” 
                                                 
17 Michael Hyde (member of Monash Labour Club), interview with Greg Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent: 
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and “began to fracture the peace movement’s alignment with Cold War divisions”.21 Although 
Murphy and Curthoys among others have offered a more complicated explanation of protest in 
the early part of the decade, the dominant narrative about the protest movements of the 1960s is 
one of a quiescent peace movement and a rising New Left. 
Because both the Cold War consensus and the youth rebellions of the late 1960s were 
transnational phenomena, there has also been some debate about the national authenticity of 
Australian protest in this period. Two members of the Australian New Left in 1970 decried “the 
failure to develop any coherent and specifically Australian understanding of society and social 
change”. 22 In this interpretation, the Australian New Left was defined by its incapacity to break 
away from the American model: in their “lack of any intellectual tradition that has not been 
imported from Europe or the USA … the radicals of the sixties are yet another reproduction of 
the historical nature of the Australian intelligentsia, rather than a real point of departure”.23 
While sketching out ground for a comparative history of the Australian and American 
movements in 1992, Curthoys noted Gerard Henderson’s 1969 criticism that the Australian anti-
war movement was “purely derivative, nothing but an imitation of the American movement, 
somehow not an indigenous Australian political movement, but something imported from 
outside.”24 York notes contemporary concern with “the derivative nature of much of the protest 
activity in Australia”, and characterises this attitude as an activist “cultural cringe”.25 
The question of the extent to which protest arose from Australian contexts or was merely 
imitative has persisted in the historiography. Russell Marks, for example, argues that “most 
groups [of the New Left] were more or less derivative, mainly of American initiatives,” although 
he concedes that it was always “local and immediate” factors that catalysed radicalisation.26 His 
more recent work is less preoccupied with this question, though it retains its focus on the 
relationship between expressions of radicalism and expressions of nationalism.27 Gerster and 
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Bassett deny any “indigenous revolutionary tradition” at all, and argue that Australian activists 
“failed to develop styles of protest appropriate to local social conditions” in a faddish age where 
“America became the greatest fashion of all.”28 Other historians engaging with this question have 
turned to transnational history. Curthoys gestured towards the need for a transnational analysis of 
Australian protest as early as 1992, and more recent work by Sean Scalmer has analysed the 
spread of the “political gimmick” through transnational networks of activists, their critical 
translation and adoption by Australians, and their incorporation into a local Australian protest 
“repertoire”.29 Tanya Luckins has argued that in the 1960s, Australians demonstrated a 
cosmopolitan awareness of international events, and used cosmopolitanism as “a conceptual tool 
to enhance people’s awareness of their everyday lives and how they might let the world into 
Australia.”30 More recently, Jon Piccini has traced the movements of people across national 
borders – Australians abroad and foreign activists in Australia – and analysed the ideas that they 
brought with them, as well as the ways those ideas were shaped by the Australian political 
context at the time.31 In this interpretation, Australian protesters were responding to both an 
ephemeral sense of global rebellion as well as local factors, with the two sets of stimuli so 
closely entangled as to be inseparable. 
This thesis attempts to engage with and contest these three major traditions in the Australian 
historiography on protest in the 1960s; recovering the history of protest before 1966, exploring 
the multiple strands of protest after 1966 to place radical activism in a wider context, and finally 
providing a more complex account of the transnational and local factors that shaped Australian 
protest. In doing so I have taken seriously Summy and Saunders’ contention that pacifist or anti-
war activism has been a continuous presence in Australian political life since at least the turn of 
the 20th century. This thesis aims to complicate the ‘watershed’ narrative, and detail a small part 
of the process of “subterranean realignment” that Murphy has charted.32 In doing so this thesis 
                                                 
28 Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett, Seizures of Youth: The Sixties and Australia (South Yarra, Vic.: Hyland House, 
1991): 32, 66. 
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attempts to re-frame the activism of the early 1960s not as failed campaigns but as part of a 
continuum of Australian activism that bequeathed to later activists ideas and practices that 
informed the Draft Resistance and Moratorium campaigns after 1969. A focus on practice also 
side-steps the question of protest as either derivative or genuine. Following Scalmer, this thesis 
looks at the transmission of activist practice across national boundaries as a process of 
“translation,” whereby activists critically experiment with practices observed in use elsewhere in 
the world, and adapt them to their local political context. Successful translations are then widely 
adopted, while ideas, vocabulary or practices that cannot be translated are discarded.33 This 
thesis, then, places activist practice in Australia in the long 1960s in a transnational framework to 
better understand the distinctiveness and character of Australian protest movements in this 
period. In doing so this thesis seeks to understand the political activism of the 1960s not as a 
singular teleology towards New Left radicalism but as a broad and complex assemblage of ideas 
and practices that covered a wide spectrum of beliefs.  
 
Protest Practice as Methodology 
The methodological focus of this thesis is on protest as a set of practices, a repertoire of actions 
mobilised against policies and discourses dominant in national political culture. As a point of 
intervention, this conceptual model of protest is a response to of one of the key methodological 
problems in writing a history of activism - the notion of a ‘movement’. Summy and Saunders 
note the “vexed definitional question” of who should be included in the category of “peace 
movement”.34 Marks notes similar problems in determining membership of the Australian New 
Left.35 Political Scientists and Sociologists confront the same questions. Nick Crossley explains 
the problems with Social Movement Theory in detail: 
Many definitions have been offered in the literature but all are problematic. Some are too 
broad, such that they include phenomena which we would not wish to call social movements, 
and yet any attempt to narrow the definition down seems destined to exclude certain 
movements or at least the range of their forms and activities. In addition, every definition 
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includes terms which themselves require definition. We would all agree that social movements 
are ‘collective’ ventures, for example, but what makes a venture count as collective? Is it a 
matter of numbers? If so, how many? Is it a matter of a type of interconnection between 
people, an organisation or network? If so, how is that interconnection itself defined? Does 
‘wearing the badge’ and ‘buying the T-shirt’ make one part of the movement or must one 
attend monthly meetings and engage in protest? And if the latter, what counts as protest? 
Would wearing the aforementioned badge count as a protest or must one stand in a group of 
three or more people waving a placard? There can be no decisive answers to these questions.36 
Dilip Gaonkar summarises the conceptual problem of defining ‘movements’ as “the entrapments 
of pure particularism” on one hand, and “the lures of transcending universalism” on the other.37  
Historians by training prefer particularism to universalism, and have moved away from using 
essentialist structural categories like groups or networks to investigate social movements. Thus 
Charles Tilly, writing on pre-Revolutionary France, has coined the term “repertoires” to describe 
“clump[s] … of claim-making routines”.38 For Tilly, protest is the “product of learned and 
historically grounded performances” that can only be used “in a given time and place”.39 Sidney 
Tarrow also argues in favour of contingency, noting that the symbols used by activists must be 
“culturally resonant”.40 Tarrow also argues that contentious politics is performative: its aim is 
“creating solidarity among potential movement participants”.41 These culturally contingent 
performances establish 
the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s structure of conflict and alliance. By drawing on 
inherited collective identities and shaping new ones, challengers delimit the boundaries of 
their prospective constituencies and define their enemies by their real or imagined attributes 
and evils.42 
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Ernesto Laclau conceptualises contentious politics in a similar fashion, as a ground on which 
political meaning is brought into being through antagonism. In his model, political actors 
rhetorically establish an “internal frontier” that produces solidarity with their political arguments 
on one side, and “radically excludes” alternative political meanings on the other. In this way, 
contentious politics constitutes categories like “the public” or “the people” by exclusion.43 
Francesca Polletta characterises contentious politics as acts of storytelling that unsettle rather 
than reproduce the authority of accepted institutions and meanings, and change over time.44 Tilly 
notes, following Polletta, that investigation of social movements will thus “have to feature 
change and variation in existing idioms, categories, and practices, including the idioms, 
categories, and practices of reporting media”.45 In these models political protest is a meaning-
making exercise, and the meanings it creates are historically and culturally grounded. 
This thesis traces changes in activist practice in Australia between 1959 and 1972. By 
examining the meanings that activists and others made through political protest during this 
period, it offers a history of Australian activism not as an organisational network or monolithic, 
homogenous ‘movement’ but as the development and evolution of practice over time. Practice 
allows for the tracing of continuities across the supposed watershed of 1966. It also explains the 
apparent rupture of the arrival of the New Left as the product of a transnational circulation of 
ideas and practices that began as early as 1961. The existing literature’s disproportionate focus 
on students preserves contemporary understandings of students as the prime movers of radical 
protest or the harbingers of violence and disorder. Practice as a methodological approach allows 
that focus to be the subject rather than the outcome of analysis.  
 
Australian Activism as a Clash Between the Collective and the Individual  
This methodological approach reveals that Australian protesters in the Vietnam epoch shifted 
between two major ideological explanations for their protest. One framed protest as a 
representative activity on behalf of an imagined Australian public, on behalf of whom protesters 
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critiqued government policy and held the government to account. This interpretation of protest 
understood ‘the public’ and ‘public opinion’ as primordial democratic forces whose power 
overruled the state, as it was the ultimate source of that delegated power. This notion of protest 
relied on a Kantian notion of rational-critical debate in which public opinion was formed through 
public debates between groups of citizens and inevitably arrived at both rational and moral 
conclusions. It is indicative of the power of this idea in the 1960s that the German philosopher 
Jurgen Habermas developed this Kantian concept into his influential model of the Public Sphere, 
published in 1962.46 In this understanding of protest, if activists simply listed or exposed the 
flaws in a given government policy, rational-critical public opinion would turn on the policy and 
its repeal would naturally follow.  
The second ideological model that influenced Australian protesters was Liberal individualism. 
According to Adrian Oldfield, Liberal philosophy understands individuals are “sovereign and 
morally autonomous beings,” whose sovereignty guaranteed their freedom from interference 
from the state.47 The idea of non-interference as a foundational model of citizenship made liberal 
individualism attractive to anti-conscription protesters. Though these two governing assumptions 
accorded moral sovereignty to two very different democratic actors – the individual and the 
public – this apparent conflict did not bother Australian protesters in their attempts to make 
political meaning out of them. Rather as conditions and contexts changed, protesters shifted 
ground, drawing on different strands of thought to justify a particular practice or a new strategy 
of opposition. While protesters drew on continuous traditions of thought they were also 
opportunistic, pragmatic and above all critical in their efforts to mobilise public opposition to the 
Vietnam War. This thesis will chart the development and evolution of these two explanations of 
protest, their interactions and fusions. 
Chapter One examines the anti-nuclear campaigns of 1961-1966. It outlines the public 
representation model of Australian protest, in which anti-war organisations attempted to both 
shape and report anti-nuclear public opinion to the federal government through the use of public 
meetings, petitions, and lobbying trips. It also offers the first attempt at a history of these anti-
nuclear campaigns. Australian anti-nuclear protest shared much in common with early anti-war 
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organisations, including some members, and an organisational reliance on the state peace 
committees. The dialogue between British and Australian organisations also bequeathed 
Australian anti-war activism access to a global network beyond the compromised World Peace 
Council, and examples of civil disobedience that would later be translated and developed locally 
as effective anti-war protest. The impact of Gandhian nonviolence is particularly apparent in the 
British CND; Scalmer has examined the spread of Gandhian ideas and practice across the West 
in the 20th century, and similar ideas inflected and informed Australian anti-war protest in the 
early 1970s.48 Histories of Australian anti-war protest begin and end with Australian 
involvement in the Vietnam War. Including Australian anti-nuclear protest from the early 1960s 
demonstrates that the contentious politics of the 1960s is not only a response to international or 
electoral politics, but also a sustained effort to reimagine contemporary Australian democratic 
engagement in relation to international events. 
The institution of National Service pre-dated commitment to the Vietnam War by seven 
months. The Menzies government introduced a peacetime call-up of 20-year-old male citizens in 
November 1964 as part of an expanded defence policy designed to meet a wide range of assumed 
Cold War threats in the region. Following the announcement of the Scheme, the legitimacy of 
the state’s coercion of its citizens to serve in time of war underwent intense scrutiny. The phrase 
‘anti-war movement’ is often inclusive of anti-conscription activism, given the National Service 
Scheme’s entanglement with commitment to Vietnam, however opposition to conscription 
produced a discrete set of organisations and protest practice. Chapter Two examines activism 
against the National Service Scheme, focusing on the activism of the two largest and most 
developed anti-conscription organisations – the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), 
formed out of the Young Labor Organisation in 1964, and the women’s group Save Our Sons 
(SOS). It focuses on four aspects of activism against conscription: the mobilisation of the 
memory of the Great War conscription referenda; the difference between YCAC’s liberal 
assumptions about citizenship and SOS’s assumptions, drawn from a history of Australian 
women’s activism; the translation of the American practice of draft card burning as a symbolic 
rejection of the state’s right to conscript its citizens; and the framing of conscientious objection 
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as a liberal assertion of the sovereignty of the individual. This chapter introduces the model of 
liberal individualism that influenced the development of Australian protest during the Vietnam 
War. 
Chapter Three fleshes out the early years of anti-war protest, with special attention to a 
number of ad hoc coalitions that formed in Sydney and Melbourne with the express intention of 
protesting against Australian involvement in the War. It focuses on the visits to Australia by 
President Johnson of the United States, and Premier Kỳ of South Vietnam. At first the existing 
peace committees simply modified the practices through which they had opposed nuclear 
proliferation – the public meeting and lobbying MPs chief among them. These practices were 
found to be increasingly inadequate by many activists. Many were increasingly influenced by 
protest at the University of California, Berkeley. The new ad hoc anti-war coalitions translated 
the ‘teach-in’ in much the same way as early anti-conscription protesters had adopted the draft 
card burning. Finally, this chapter examines the development of the ‘Noisy Minority’ label that 
Coalition MPs and unsympathetic journalists developed to discredit protesters after the anti-
Johnson and anti-Kỳ protests. Even if 1966 was not a clear generational watershed, it did 
represent the low ebb of the legitimacy of protest during the Vietnam War. 
Where previous chapters deal with the developments in protest practice chronologically, 
Chapters Four and Five cover the later years of protest in parallel, taking different thematic 
aspects of protest after 1967 as their subject. Taking Tilly’s notion that the language that media 
outlets report protest in is as important as that which protesters use to explain their own actions, 
Chapter Four examines the construction of student protesters in the pages of daily newspapers 
between 1967 and 1971. In this period students became the harbingers of violence at public 
protests. Just as anti-nuclear and anti-war protesters had adopted British and American protest 
practices, translating them to suit the Australian political context, newspapers and MPs began to 
interpret students’ actions in relation to overseas examples. 
This chapter also examines the anti-Springbok campaign of 1971 as it involved many of the 
same activists and the same confrontational practices as anti-war protest. As student violence 
became a widely-reported phenomenon, the characterisation of protesters as a ‘noisy minority’ 
developed into the idea of the ‘hard core’ of student or radical provocateurs, leading well-
meaning and peaceful protesters astray. The chapter concludes with an examination of the ‘Law 
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and Order’ debates during the lead up to the second Moratorium in July and August 1970, during 
which opponents of protesters began to explain their opposition in terms of the citizen’s right to 
non-interference. 
The final chapter returns to a discussion of protesters’ own explanations of their actions, with 
an analysis of the development of an Australian repertoire of lawbreaking as protest practice. 
Between the inception of the campaign against bylaw 418 in Melbourne in early 1969 and the 
end of the National Service Scheme with the election of Whitlam, Australian protesters began to 
fuse the liberal individualism of anti-conscription protest before 1967 with collective non-violent 
lawbreaking. The anti-nuclear protesters of the early 1960s had drawn on the Gandhin-
influenced models of protest in use in the UK, but now lawbreaking was reconfigured as a model 
of participatory democracy, and used to justify large-scale public dissent in the form of the 
Moratorium Campaigns. During the same period, anti-conscription activists, influenced by the 
global tide of New Left radicalism and similar developments in the United States, abandoned 
conscientious objection and began Draft Resistance. Based in the same notion of public 
lawbreaking as an act of protest, Australian Draft Resistance nevertheless developed quite 
differently to its American antecedent, with spectacular evasion of punishment rather than 
collective, public acts of submission to it – as was the American norm - becoming its central 
tactic. The chapter offers a history of the development of a coherent and widespread philosophy 
of moral lawbreaking in the Australian context, in stark opposition to the media representation of 
protest as violent in the preceding chapter. 
Rather than examine protest during the Vietnam War as a monolithic movement, this thesis 
frames it as the interplay between two developing, often contradictory protest repertoires. It 
charts a shared but evolving repertoire of protest practice across what are usually understood as 
four discrete movements, but overlapped in time and membership: protest against nuclear 
weapons, against the National Service Scheme, against Australian involvement in the War in 
Vietnam, and against Apartheid in South Africa. It situates these four discrete sets of campaigns 
in their transnational context, examining the ways that ideas circulating through transnational 
activist networks were adopted and adapted by Australian activists. Finally, it examines the 
different ways that Australians over the period used the concepts of the public and the public 
sphere and the philosophy of liberal individualism to make arguments about the morality and 
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legitimacy of protest in a democracy. What emerges is a picture of protest’s capacity to remake 
the political meanings of the Vietnam War and conscription in Australia.
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Chapter 1: The Anti-Nuclear Campaigns of the early 1960s 
Between June 1961 and September 1966 Australian activists mounted a sustained protest 
campaign against nuclear weapons. In support of nuclear disarmament, Australian anti-nuclear 
activists constructed their ‘movement’ as a democratic assemblage that acted to both mobilise 
and represent the public. They circulated petitions and passed resolutions at public meetings, 
claiming to represent large portions of the Australian electorate. They then carried these 
documents to the federal legislature and embassies of foreign nuclear powers. They promoted the 
idea that public opinion was a democratic force with more legitimacy than the electoral process, 
and aimed to create documentary evidence of public opinion as political leverage. Australian 
activists also maintained a transnational dialogue with the British Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) and its radical offshoot the Committee of 100 in this period, which 
nourished and shaped Australian protest. Through this dialogue, Australian protesters argued that 
their protest actions were part of a world-wide network that represented a global public. They 
drew on this international network and critically engaged with specific protest practices from 
Britain: the long march, the radial march, and the vocabulary of universalism. These three 
practices – the construction of public opinion as a democratic force, the nurturing of international 
solidarity, and the adoption and adaptation of protest practice from overseas - shaped anti-
nuclear protest from 1961 to 1966. Critically for this thesis, the activists and organisations that 
worked on anti-nuclear campaigns later brought their experience to bear on anti-conscription and 
anti-war campaigns. This continuity of practice and personnel makes an examination of anti-
nuclear activism in the early 1960s essential to any understanding of later anti-war protest. 
The literature on peace activism in Australia marks out the period 1949-1959 as a “rebirth” of 
organised Australian pacifism. The Australian Peace Council and its state bodies were formed in 
1949, and the Melbourne Peace Congress in 1959 established the first permanent Committee for 
International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD). After the 1964 Sydney Peace Congress, the 
Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD) was established in NSW. 
Similar committees were inaugurated in all other states except WA.1 The 1959 Congress in 
particular has emerged as a watershed in the historiography of Australian activism, marking the 
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high point of peace organisations’ public notoriety due to their organisational ties to the 
Communist Party of Australia.2 There was considerable continuity of personnel in these peace 
organisations. Reverend Alf Dickie, present at the initial meeting of the Australian Peace 
Council in 1949, became chairman of the CICD and remained in the position until 1972.3 Jim 
Cairns, who later became a federal Labor MP, was also present at that founding meeting in 1949. 
He would also eventually become chairman of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and replace 
Dickie as chairman of the CICD.4 Other long-term activists, like Bob Gould or Roger Barnes, 
joined anti-nuclear organisations in this period and remained active until the end of Australian 
involvement in Vietnam. There was also organisational overlap, with the state Committees 
organising both anti-nuclear and anti-war protests. As this chapter will demonstrate, the 
similarities and continuities between anti-nuclear protest and anti-war protest are as significant as 
their differences. 
Australian anti-nuclear protest in the 1960s is mentioned in few texts as an interregnum 
between the founding of the postwar Peace Councils in 1949 and the flowering of Australian 
protest during the Vietnam War.5 There is, as yet, no substantial history of 1960s Australian anti-
nuclear protest. References to the early Australian anti-nuclear campaigns are most often found 
in material that deals with British anti-nuclear tests at Emu Field, Ernabella, or Christmas Island, 
and thus concentrates on ex-servicemen or Indigenous people, not urban activists.6 Despite this 
relative absence, the campaign against nuclear weapons occupied much of the organisational 
capacity of the Australian Peace Committees from the end of the Second World War until the 
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reintroduction of conscription for Vietnam. As this chapter demonstrates, these protest 
movements were a crucial ground for the development of techniques, tactics and strategies that 
influenced later protest movements.  
The chapter begins with a history of the bi-annual protest rallies that were held in east coast 
metropolitan centres at Easter and in August between 1961 and 1966. The Easter marches were 
publicised as marches in support of the British Aldermaston marches, while the August events 
were billed as Hiroshima Commemoration or Hiroshima Day marches. I then turn to an 
examination of the practices through which protesters claimed to represent public opinion. As 
established democratic processes, petitions and public meetings produced public opinion and 
communicated it to the government. Anti-nuclear protesters used these practices to make their 
actions comprehensible as a normal part of the relationship between citizen and state. In doing 
so, they hoped to draw attention to the sovereign democratic power of the public and attach its 
legitimacy to their protests. The final two sections of the chapter examine the ways that 
Australians engaged in correspondence with British anti-nuclear organisations. The international 
dialogue between the Australian and British anti-nuclear organisations shaped Australian protest 
practice, and gave protesters a sense that they belonged to a world-wide movement. The 
transnational adoption of new protest practices also shows the limits of translation, with 
Australian activists rejecting civil disobedience as a practice. 
 
Anti-nuclear protest in Australia from 1961 to 1966: A short history  
Australian anti-nuclear activism was part of what Carter characterises as the “first nuclear 
disarmament movement,” operating from 1957 to 1964.7 Since the late 1950s the British CND 
and associated anti-nuclear groups had been staging four-day marches between Aldermaston in 
Berkshire and London. By 1961 the American Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) 
was mounting solidarity marches at Easter, and the more radical British Committee of 100 began 
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to mount high-profile protests against police bans.8 The arms race was accelerating in the early 
1960s, and Australian newspapers gave front page space to moments of Cold War tension: the 
second manned orbit by the USSR and the growing tensions between Western powers and the 
Soviet Union in Berlin hogged the headlines while thousands marched in Britain and the USA.9 
In late 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis marked a high point in nuclear tensions. In 1963, British 
anti-nuclear protest made global headlines again with the leak of the UK’s war plans in the 
‘Spies for Peace’ scandal.10 In August 1963, the US, USSR and UK came to an agreement on an 
international Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting atmospheric nuclear tests.11 The treaty made anti-
nuclear protest more difficult to mobilise, and British and American protest subsided after 
1963.12  
Australian protests unfolded in the context of this global escalation. Just before Easter 1961, 
the precursor to the AICD, the NSW Peace Committee for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament (NSWPCICD), inaugurated a new item on the Sydney protest calendar. It 
announced that it would be commemorating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima with a “mass city 
march and Domain Rally for Peace and Life.”13 After the march there would be a ceremony at 
the Trocadero, the famed Sydney dance hall and entertainment venue, at which the Secretary of 
the NSWPCICD would be presented with the Lenin Peace Prize.14 The August protest drew an 
estimated crowd of 5000, while a similar march in Melbourne drew 3000 to Flinders Park to hear 
speakers that included two clergymen and a Labor MP.15 In addition to the Hiroshima Day march 
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and in response to a request from the British Committee of 100, the NSW Peace Committee 
organised a relay march to Canberra in late September to coincide with the British protests.16 
This comprised 14 teams of walkers, each of which walked 14 miles of the 200 miles between 
Sydney and Canberra. Given the relatively large distances between other state capitals and the 
federal capital, the delegations from Melbourne and Brisbane came in motorcades rather than 
relay marches. The three delegations met on the outskirts of Canberra and visited Parliament 
House to deliver a letter to the Prime Minister in favour of the adoption of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Statement for Total World Disarmament.17 The Canberra Times coverage 
noted that the marchers also visited the American, British, French and Russian embassies.18 
Other metropolitan dailies ignored the Canberra delegation, preferring the spectacular civil 
disobedience and arrest tally at the British marches and the announcement of another series of 
American nuclear tests.19  
The 1962 program was more ambitious, incorporating a national petition and two separate 
delegations to Canberra. In March, a Sydney CND group formed, complementing the Victorian 
group that had been operating since 1960.20 These groups were much smaller than the state peace 
committees; the Victorian CND reported 71 members in 1962 after two years of operation, while 
the Sydney group’s inaugural meeting was of 50 people.21 Fear of nuclear fallout began to 
occupy Australian imaginations during the planning of the 1962 marches. In April 1962 the 
British Government began to test the Polaris weapons system in the Pacific, which had been the 
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target of a series of protests in Scotland.22 The front page of the Sydney Morning Herald warned 
that fallout could potentially arrive in Australia in a matter of days.23 The Aldermaston protests 
inaugurated the use of a “radial march”: in Melbourne and Sydney, several small groups of 
marchers converged on the city centre “from the outer suburban perimeter of an area that would 
be devastated by an H bomb exploding over Sydney”.24 In the days before the Aldermaston 
support marches the papers reported on new Russian and American nuclear tests.25 The Sydney 
Morning Herald reported that after three American atmospheric blasts in the Pacific, QANTAS 
technicians were testing their aircraft with Geiger counters after flights.26 Around 2000 turned 
out in Sydney and Melbourne, whilst in Brisbane, the Queensland Peace Council (QPC) 
combined their anti-nuclear march with the annual Labour Day parade.27 The NSW Peace 
Committee and the Victorian CICD chartered aircraft to convey their delegations to Canberra.28 
In the Commonwealth Parliament, Arthur Calwell, leader of the Opposition, argued that the 
existing Antarctic treaty ought to be extended to create a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, an 
action acclaimed by anti-nuclear organisations.29  
The Hiroshima Day protests for 1962 were characterised as a “nation-wide campaign to 
Canberra” to present a national petition to Parliament.30 The disarmament petition was launched 
in June, and asked the federal government to adopt the Leader of the Opposition’s proposal for a 
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nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere.31 A month before the rallies there were 40,000 petitions 
circulating. Organisers were aiming for 500,000 signatures nationally.32 The state Peace 
Committees also planned individual rallies and marches in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, and 
a repeat of the previous year’s relay march and motorcade to Canberra. On the morning of the 
rally the Sydney Morning Herald reported on the front page that the Russians would once again 
begin testing in the Arctic.33 The Melbourne march, held on Sunday, August 5th, attracted 3000 
people, while the Sydney march equaled the 5000 of the previous year.34 The first group of 
walkers for the Canberra relay march left from the Sydney Stadium at the conclusion of the rally, 
meeting the motorcades from Queensland and Victoria on the outskirts of Canberra. A chartered 
train from Sydney brought more delegates the following day.35 The Queensland motorcade had 
travelled in two groups; one down the New England Highway and the other down the Pacific 
Highway, both stopping at various points to attend peace events, pick up delegates and collect 
completed petitions. Once collated in Canberra, the petition contained around 200,000 
signatures.36 It was presented to Gough Whitlam, then Deputy Leader of the Opposition, who 
tabled it in the House of Representatives.37 The delegation also visited the American, Russian 
and French embassies, and the British, Indian and Malaysian High Commissions, where they 
presented a set of demands and a transcription of the memorandum tabled by eight neutral 
nations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in April that year.38 The demands included 
international support for Calwell’s nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere proposal, the 
condemnation of continued nuclear testing, and the adoption of the neutral nations’ 
memorandum as a basis for an international test detection regime.39 The Cuban Missile Crisis in 
October represented a high point in superpower nuclear tensions. A month later a CND group 
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formed in Brisbane.40 By the end of January 1963 the Brisbane group had 25 regular members, 
and the four groups were corresponding about forming a national CND.41 
Though international tensions lessened and nuclear testing programs slowed, the Australian 
anti-nuclear 1963 program was a repeat of the previous year’s. There were radial marches in 
Sydney and Melbourne, rallies in Brisbane, and another delegation to Canberra in August, this 
time including delegates from South Australia and Western Australia.42 The Easter marches were 
overshadowed by front page coverage of violent protests in London and the leak of the UK’s 
nuclear war plan. The latter was accomplished by the protest group ‘Spies for Peace,’ who 
handed out the plans as a pamphlet at the Aldermaston demonstration in London.43 The Sydney 
CND group republished the ‘Spies for Peace’ pamphlet in its entirety.44 Between the Easter and 
August marches, the NSWPCICD and a number of other interested organisations supported the 
formation of a Hiroshima Commemoration Committee which would take explicit responsibility 
for the Easter and August protests in coming years.45 The demands of anti-nuclear campaigners 
in Australia crystallised in 1963 around support for an international Test Ban treaty, removal of 
foreign bases from Australian territory, and demands for government censure of French nuclear 
tests in the Pacific.46 On the day after the Australian Hiroshima Day protests, the papers reported 
                                                 
40 Janet Lewis to Bertrand Russell, January 3, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, Salvatore D’Urso Collection, UQFL 72, Fryer 
Library, University of Queensland, Brisbane (hereafter D’Urso Collection). 
41 Lewis to Bob Gould, January 23, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection. 
42 Morrow and Anderson, Press Release, April 16, 1963; and CICD, “Keep Australia Nuclear Free – March on 
Melbourne Sunday April 21st” (1963 Melbourne Aldermaston support march leaflet), [March-April 1963], all in 
Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 20-21 April 1963,” Box 2 (74), PND Records; “Ban-the-bomb 
demonstration here was ‘symbolic,’” Courier-Mail, April 15, 1963, 5; “Anti-bomb Marchers in Rally,” SMH, April 22 
1963, 8; “2000 Ban-bomb Marchers in City, Age, April 22, 1963, 6; Morrow and Anderson, Circular to Supporting 
Organisations, July 16, 1963, Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records; “Marchers’ Nuclear 
Protest,” SMH, August 5, 1963, 4; “1500 at Ban-Bomb Yarra Bank Rally,” Age, August 5, 1963, 3; “1000 Walk For 
Peace,” Canberra Times, August 16, 1963, 3. 
43 “‘Peace Spies’ Stir Security Crisis,” Age, April 15, 1963, 4. 
44 SCND Sanity 1:6, August 1963, 5 (unless otherwise noted, all issues of SCND and VCND Sanity have been 
obtained courtesy of the personal collection of Dr Kyle Harvey); Lewis, “CND Report on Spies for Peace (Australia 
Inc.),” July 11, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; “Spies for Peace (Australia Inc.),” [July 1963], Folder 4, Box 
1, D’Urso Collection. 
45 Rev. A.D. Brand, Dr. A.G.H. Lawes, Mrs. M.J. Holmes, Mrs. J. Richards, Dr. W.A. Suchting, and Mr. J. Heffernan 
(conveners, Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, hereafter HCC) to interested organisations, June 7, 1963, 
Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records. 
46 HCC, “Hiroshima 1945 – Us? 196-?” (1963 Sydney Hiroshima Day leaflet), [July-August 1963], Folder “Hiroshima 
Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records. 
25 
 
on the signing of the international Test Ban treaty.47 After this news broke, the key demands of 
the campaign concentrated on French Pacific testing and the removal of foreign bases from 
Australia.48 At the end of December, the four CND groups met in Sydney and drew up a 
constitution and aims for the Australian CND.49 However, there is no evidence that the national 
CND existed for longer than this one meeting. By March 1964, several of the tiny CND groups 
were reporting terminal operating deficits and loss of personnel.50 
Throughout the year, the momentum of anti-nuclear activism flagged as the war in Vietnam 
began to eclipse nuclear testing as a pressing political debate. Anti-nuclear protest in 1965 
showed none of the careful interstate coordination of previous years, with a mix of ‘Easter’ and 
‘Aldermaston’ marches in three states spread the week before Easter, until the end of May.51 
Though numbers were down, rallies in all three states continued to draw thousands of 
participants.52 Easter actions continued in 1964 in Melbourne and Brisbane, but the Sydney 
Hiroshima Commemoration Committee replaced the Aldermaston support march with a rally for 
“peace in Vietnam” in late May.53 The August march in Sydney was framed around the central 
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theme of “no war over Vietnam”.54 Only a week before the rally, North Vietnamese patrol boats 
fired on the USS Maddox in what became known as the ‘Tonkin Gulf incident’. The speech that 
Jim Cairns gave at the Sydney rally – titled “Australia’s Relations with Asia” – dominated the 
Herald’s reportage.55 The announcement of conscription in November 1964 and commitment of 
an Australian battalion to the conflict in April 1965 cemented the importance of Vietnam to 
many protest organisers. The CND groups in Sydney, Brisbane and Perth ceased operation in 
early 1965, though the Victorian CND continued to produce its newsletter Sanity until mid-1966 
at least.56 Hiroshima Day activities for 1965 were all framed in relation to Vietnam.57 By 1966, 
the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee in Sydney had been reconstituted into the Project 
Vietnam Committee, which took over the organisation of the Hiroshima Day marches.58 From 
1964 to 1966, ‘Vietnam’ slowly eclipsed ‘nuclear weapons’ as the issue at the heart of Australian 
protests. In 1963 the Easter march and the Hiroshima Day march had different purposes: the 
former to express solidarity with Aldermaston, and the latter to commemorate the dropping of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Between 1964 and 1966 the distinction disappeared and the two 
protests became just two anti-war protests among many. 
 
Protest Marches as Public Opinion 
The organisers of anti-nuclear protest in Australia understood their actions as an integral part of 
representative democracy. Australian anti-nuclear protest in the early 1960s was designed around 
the assumption that in a democratic state the public was primordial – that is, it was the sovereign 
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democratic entity from which all other democratic entities and processes drew their legitimacy. If 
the opinion of that public could be demonstrated to be at odds with government policy, the 
government could either change its policy or its authority would be exposed as illegitimate. For 
the peace organisations and CND groups, any protest action thus had to do two things: create 
evidence of anti-nuclear public opinion, and bring that evidence to the government. Once it was 
revealed through significant numbers of signatures or the diversity of the crowd at a public 
meeting, protest organisers argued that this public opinion legitimised their actions as a 
democratic process. To become the bearers of that evidence was to become representatives of the 
public, fostering a connection to the Australian people that overruled the processes of elections 
and adversarial parliamentary debate. Thus in 1963, the BCND’s Direct Action Sub-committee 
explained their attempt to change government policy through mass mobilisation as “putting into 
practice the theoretical principles of democracy”.59 
The delegations to Canberra were designed to bring public opinion on the nuclear question 
into being. Anti-nuclear campaigners used established democratic processes – meeting procedure 
and the petition – to produce this public opinion. They then performatively delivered that public 
opinion – by physically carrying letters, resolutions and petitions over hundreds of miles in 
motorcades and relay walks – to democratic representatives and officials in Parliament and 
various Embassies. At first, protest organisers framed their demands as resolutions adopted by a 
meeting, using the same vocabulary of meeting procedure that drove democratic assemblies like 
trade unions, incorporated societies, and parliament. The petition launched in June 1962 and 
presented to Whitlam in Canberra in August allowed organisers to claim that they represented 
the 200,000 signatories. By 1963, the organisers were claiming to represent large segments of the 
population without the supporting evidence of rallies or petitions. A letter to Prime Minister 
Menzies claimed that the August delegation to Canberra in 1963 represented “over 200,000 
citizens from five states of the Commonwealth,” while a resolution adopted at a rally of 
delegates in Canberra a few days later increased the number to 500 000.60 The Disarmament 
RAG framed the public as a democratic force in its own right, arguing that MPs would be swayed 
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by large enough protests: “They’ll listen to you. You elected them.”61 Activists understood the 
meeting and the petition as ways to reveal a majority, primordial public opinion or the will of 
“the people of Australia”. These practices made protesters’ actions comprehensible as a normal 
part of the relationship between citizen and state. 
The organisers’ assertion of legitimacy was crucial given the increasing number of stories in 
mainstream media of communist infiltration of the peace campaigns. Thus the resolution adopted 
at the 1962 Sydney Aldermaston rally began with the claim to have been “unanimously adopted” 
by a “meeting of Australian citizens forming a wide cross section of political and religious 
opinion”.62 When the Reverend Brand, Chairman of the NSWPCICD, wrote to the embassies and 
high commissions that the delegation intended to visit, his letters began by claiming  
I have been directed by a meeting of over 2,000 citizens held in Sydney and a similar 
gathering in Melbourne on Sunday last, to request the earliest opportunity for a delegation to 
submit and discuss with you the unanimously endorsed resolution of these gatherings.63 
A press release written on the same day repeated the claims of both diversity and democratic 
representation.64 Later in May, a group of peace activists circulated a statement “for signature by 
a representative group of citizens from the educational, professional, religious and cultural 
spheres,” probably for publication as an advertisement in a major newspaper.65 The statement 
began with the text: 
We, a representative group of citizens of varying occupational, religious, political and social 
views, desire to commend Mr. Calwell, the leader of the Opposition, for his proposal to 
establish a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere.66 
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Aware of the criticism that they represented only a small section of the Australian public – 
namely, communists, dupes and fellow travellers – organisers of anti-nuclear protest framed their 
meetings as representative assemblies by highlighting the diversity of the crowd as well as its 
size. 
This claim shows that Australian activists believed that the public was the sovereign political 
force in a democracy. They assumed that the gap between elections was too large to capture this 
public’s views on important political issues. The aim of the 1962 petition was framed by 
organisers as providing “the people of Australia with an immediate opportunity to demand that 
the Calwell proposal is adopted and acted upon by the Federal Government”.67 In August 1962, 
the NSWPCICD solicited written reports from members of the delegation to Canberra. One 
respondent spoke in terms of a national public, characterised by its inherent democratic force, 
discrete from the capacity of its constituents to vote: 
It is one thing to talk about democracy, it is one thing to say we vote at election time, it is one 
thing to write letters to the papers, but it is democracy in action when 1000 people from the 
Commonwealth of Australia assemble opposite the house of Parliament in an organised, 
orderly fashion, to say to the government of the day: We, the people, we the delegates from 
hundreds of work places, we want Peace.68 
The relationship between the public and the protesters was fluid. Sometimes they represented the 
public, sometimes they constituted it. Either way, protest organisers hoped to gain political 
leverage from their relationship to it. 
The NSWPCICD sent out a questionnaire in May 1962 to marchers in the radial walks. The 
responses it collected reveal the faith Australian anti-nuclear activists had in the capacity of 
rational argument to convince the public of their moral rightness. One respondent was convinced 
that the leaflet handed out by the marchers “was bound to shock people to their senses, and make 
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them realise how hopeless and horrifying” the possibility of nuclear war was.69 Another 
explained that the radial march’s “entire aim is to impress upon citizens that the participants of 
the ‘Peace Action’ are a thinking majority”. Another argued that the leaflet would “only appeal 
to fellows like myself who are already convinced of the necessity for nuclear disarmament. Now 
we have to appeal to the average citizen who is not convinced of this.”70 The questionnaire asked 
respondents “How do you think we should deal with the problems of provocation (shouted 
remarks, etc.)?”71 One respondent answered “Right education”.72 Australian anti-nuclear 
protesters, influenced by the idea of the public as a rational-critical space in which ideas were 
tested by interlocutors for their moral validity, understood their democratic role of protest as to 
educate the public as well as to represent its views to the government.  
The geographical boundaries of this public were also fluid, despite the clear representative 
strategy of targeting government officials. Demonstrators in the NSWPCICD were nourished by 
the idea that they were part of a global movement. One participant, writing to the NSWPCICD 
about the Canberra delegation, spoke about the strength that cross-border unity lent to their local 
political “struggle”: 
We gained strength from the knowledge there were so many other organisations and 
individuals prepared to join actively in the struggle for peace not only in our own Country, but 
as we learned from our visits to some of the Embassies, in many other Countries in the World 
too. We felt heartened by our unity and by the evidence we had gained of the great and 
growing strength of the world movement for Peace.”73 
A leaflet advertising the 1962 Aldermaston support march characterised transnational anti-
nuclear protest as a “great new force of good sense and peaceful desires that is today awakening 
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right throughout the world.”74 In 1963 the Manly-Warringah Peace Committee argued that the 
publicity of the Aldermaston marches in Britain had “struck a sympathetic chord in many 
countries; recognition of mutual interest has led to similar movements all over the world,” and 
that by taking part in the solidarity action, Australians had an “opportunity to add to the weight 
of public opinion against the nuclear madness.”75 Australian protesters who marched with the 
NSWPCICD imagined themselves as part of a world-wide movement, representing global public 
opinion to individual national governments. 
The Australian CND groups also spoke in terms of global anti-nuclear public opinion. The 
Sydney CND accorded the same rationality to an assumed global public that the NSWPCICD did 
to Australians. The Disarmament RAG claimed that “Citizens all over the world are beginning to 
realise that we are all linked in our desire for peace. Being no longer isolated in action, we can be 
effective in restoring sanity.”76 The organisation’s newsletter asserted that “the lessening of 
nuclear tensions” was an outcome that “all rational people desire.”77 By 1963, SCND were 
representing their activism as a response to a world-wide groundswell of unaddressed public 
opinion: “All over the world, people are asking: ‘How can our cities be saved?’ ‘How can a 
Nuclear War be prevented?’ ‘What should we do?’”78 Rather than petitioning governments, 
Australian CND groups advocated for utopian internationalism as the solution to the nuclear 
problem. Disarmament RAG argued that the solution to the nuclear problem was not just to form 
a world-wide movement, but to “make One World, a brotherhood of nations” through the UN.79 
The Research Action Group newsletter for Hiroshima Day 1962 advocated that their readers “be 
loyal to the human race”.80 The November edition of Sanity reported a talk on “world 
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government and world disarmament” at its previous meeting.81 Throughout 1964 and 1965 the 
newsletter continued to speak in terms of internationalism rather than a unified global public.82 
The magazine reprinted an article from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by a West German 
scientist that argued “world peace and world organisation” were “the only thing that can save 
us”.83  
After the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Australian anti-nuclear organisations’ goals 
changed. The idea of a world-wide movement was less frequently invoked. The 1963 Hiroshima 
Day protest based its campaign aims around local and regional preoccupations: French tests and 
US bases in Australia. The Manly-Warringah Peace Committee’s news bulletin for February 
1963 argued that “in our view the people are not fully informed” about US bases on Australian 
soil.84 While the sense of belonging to a world-wide anti-nuclear movement was transitory, 
activists’ belief that their role was to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons 
and then inform the government of public opinion persisted. In this way they were attempting to 
simultaneously create and report public opinion. In support of this goal, and in an attempt to 
foster and leverage global public opinion, in the period between Easter 1961 and August 1963, 
Australian activists worked to construct a world-wide movement of anti-nuclear protesters. 
 
Constructing a World-Wide Movement 
The announcement of the inaugural Hiroshima Day protest made it clear that the organisers 
hoped to capitalise on what they saw as already-existing public opinion, as a response to 
“widespread demands for more demonstrative forms of activity, affording wider opportunity for 
public witness and support for peace and disarmament”.85 Coverage of British and American 
anti-nuclear protests formed part of the context of this decision.86 A month after the 
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announcement of the march, the NSWPCICD received a letter from the Committee of 100, a 
radical British activist organisation that advocated civil disobedience. The letter advised the 
Peace Committee of a new British campaign against the Polaris missile and acknowledged that 
the global reach of nuclear weapons called for an expansion of the horizons of anti-nuclear 
activism: 
[W]e realise that if the Americans simply took the base from Scotland and put it somewhere 
else the total danger to world peace would not be affected. … We need, in fact, a world-wide 
movement of resistance which will make it impossible for any government, East or West, to 
have nuclear bombs or bases. 87 
The Committee of 100 framed nuclear weapons as a global problem that required the 
construction of a world-wide network of organisations to solve. As such, the letter concluded 
with a request for a solidarity action by Australian peace and anti-nuclear organisations. 
The NSWPCICD adopted the rhetoric of a world-wide movement. The press release for the 
first relay march to Canberra claimed that it would “link Australia with the international march 
movement for world disarmament.”88 The 1962 Aldermaston march was framed as the result of a 
“powerful upsurge of feeling and action expressing a universal revulsion against the threat of 
nuclear annihilation,” which was “in evidence the world over.”89 The NSWPCICD explained the 
march as part of a “world wide crusade for human survival,” and leaflets distributed for that 
march exhorted their readers to “take your place with us in this world-wide movement”.90 By 
1963 the Committee spoke of the “growing unity” evident across diverse national movements.91 
                                                 
SMH, April 5, 1961, 3; “‘Ban H-Bomb’ Rally Ends in Clash,” Age, April 5, 4; “M’sP. in Protest March,” Canberra 
Times, April 5, 1961, 15; “Australians in March,” Canberra Times, April 6, 1961, 14. 
87 Michael Randle (Secretary, Committee of 100), to Morrow, July 13, 1961, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), 
PND Records. 
88 NSWPCICD, Press Release, March 20, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” 
Box 2 (74), PND Records. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid.; NSWPCICD, “Join With Us in Solidarity With Aldermaston” (1962 Sydney Aldermaston support march 
leaflet), [March-April 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND 
Records. 
91 NSWPCICD, Press Release, February 5, 1963, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 20-21 April 1963,” 
Box 2 (74), PND Records. 
34 
 
Australian protesters argued that their actions arose out of the spontaneous global expression of 
anti-nuclear public opinion. 
Coverage of international protests and correspondence from overseas anti-nuclear 
organisations fostered the desire of Australian activists to be part of this world-wide movement. 
The Committee of 100 and the NSWPCICD carried on a correspondence throughout mid-July 
1961, and Australian protests were reported in Committee of 100 international bulletins.92 The 
NSWPCICD also wrote to Canon Collins, secretary of the British CND, before the 1962 
Aldermaston support march. They included a leaflet publicising the radial walk in Sydney “in the 
hope that it may have some publicity value for your campaign from the viewpoint of … 
demonstrating … the increasing world impact of your movement.” They also asked Collins to 
record the speeches at Trafalgar Square and send them by air mail to be played at the Sydney 
march.93 The NSWPCICD hoped that Collins’ reply would “mark the beginning of a developing 
pattern of common actions towards our common goal,” instituting a more permanent 
organisational connection between the Sydney Committee and the British CND.94 As she was 
trying to form and then grow the Brisbane CND group, Janet Lewis kept up correspondence with 
several well-known British anti-nuclear activists, including Bertrand Russell, Peggy Duff, and 
Wendy Butlin.95 It was through this correspondence that Lewis was able to locate the CND 
groups in the other states, and it was in a letter from Peggy Duff that the idea of a national CND 
was first mooted.96 Australian anti-nuclear organisations were nourished by the sense of 
belonging and community this correspondence produced, and drew on it to shape their 
organisational structures and protest practice. 
This presented Australian anti-nuclear activists with a different practical problem – how to 
make the international connections they claimed to have with overseas organisations and publics 
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feel real. These connections were instated at specific moments by international correspondence 
and invoked by speakers at rallies. During the planning of the 1962 Hiroshima Day and 1963 
Aldermaston support and Hiroshima Day marches, the chairmen of the NSWPCICD, Reverend 
Allan D. Brand, and the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, Dr. A. G. H. Lawes, wrote to 
public figures in various countries asking for messages of support.97 They received responses 
from Bertrand Russell, Linus and Ava Pauling, Albert Schweitzer, J. D. Bernal, head of the 
World Council for Peace, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and the Washington Steering Committee for 
Women Strike for Peace, among others.98  
Several of the letter-writers reflected the assumptions of Sydney activists regarding the 
movement’s global character. Dr. Benjamin Spock and Bertrand Russell both spoke in terms of a 
global people exerting pressure on national governments, while the President of the World 
Council for Peace, J. D. Bernal, wrote to the Aldermaston support marchers in 1962 that their 
rally “forms part of a great, world-wide campaign” taking place in “in some twenty countries,” 
and that their undertaking was “a most significant and well-planned contribution to this 
campaign”.99 These messages were printed and read out to the crowd at the rallies.100 Lawes 
wrote to each speaker in 1963, explaining the “special significance which international messages 
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have for us ‘down under’”.101 By playing taped messages or reading statements from British 
CND personalities, Australian demonstrators hoped to leave their audiences feeling they were 
part of a world-wide movement that persisted beyond the close of the rally. In the same way that 
the actions of activists produced documents that those activists argued were evidence of public 
opinion, these international messages produced an imagined global movement, rather than being 
produced by it. After reading or referring to international correspondence, speakers at rallies 
claimed that these messages were evidence of an already-existing world-wide movement and 
global public.  
The importance of Aldermaston to global anti-nuclear protest in the early 1960s meant that 
Australians could also invoke the British imperial connection and a cultural closeness with their 
British counterparts. Australian protesters mobilised their common British heritage to add 
legitimacy to the world-wide movement they constructed, and thus to their protests. Carter 
argues that it was “not surprising” that Australian anti-nuclear activism echoed that of the CND, 
given the close cultural connection.102 In addition to the Australians who travelled to march in 
the UK, some British activists travelled to Australia and joined peace and anti-nuclear 
organisations.103 The NSWPCICD claimed in a press release that the Easter 1962 march was 
meant “to demonstrate our admiration and support for the British movement”.104 As well as 
speaking about being part of a world-wide movement, Australian activists also spoke about being 
in solidarity with “British people,” “the British people,” or “our British colleagues”.105 The 
Building Workers’ Industrial Union preferred to emphasise the Imperial connection rather than 
membership in a universal, world-wide movement, distributing leaflets titled “British-Australian 
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Solidarity”.106 Trenchant ideas about Australians’ belonging to a British world found expression 
in Australian activists’ Aldermaston support march publicity material, and resulted in the 
privileging of the British in this imagined global movement. 
The British connection was invoked by Australians in response to the news that six 
Committee of 100 protesters had been arrested while trying to gain entry to the US Air Force 
base in Wethersfield, Britain. The NSWPCICD sent out a circular advising its supporting 
organisations of the arrests and “repressive” 18-month sentences, and asking for their members 
to write in protest to the British Home Secretary via the British High Commission. The circular 
placed the British activists at the head of the world-wide movement, arguing that “the 
outstanding contributions of our British colleagues to this great crusade for human survival 
merits nothing short of a massive Australia-wide campaign supporting their action and 
demanding their release from prison”.107 Members of the NSWPCICD and its supporting 
organisations responded, and several mobilised the Australian-British connection in their 
arguments. Letter-writers argued that the punishment of the marchers contrasted with the 
traditions of British justice, and would negatively impact Britain’s global reputation. One letter 
concluded that “lovers of Britain are bitterly disappointed at an official action which is so 
grievous a departure from the calm good sense we have come to associate with Britain”.108 A 
Union official noted that “it is degrading to British subjects to see the Mother country treat 
citizens in this manner.” 109 A British schoolteacher who had lived in Australia for a decade 
lamented that the prison sentences brought “only discredit to British traditions of justice and 
tolerance in the eyes of all decent people in the world.”110 In these letters, Britishness and 
Australianness were conflated, both in terms of an assumed cultural commonality, and a legal 
sense of belonging as British subjects. Anglophone cultural closeness was explicitly referenced 
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by the union official above, stating that “I am further to point out that my Union is most 
concerned at trends taking place in Great Britain, trends which we believe must inevitably lead to 
a complete breaking of Commonwealth ties.”111  
 
Translating the ‘Long March,’ Adopting Unilateralism, Rejecting Civil 
Disobedience 
This identification with British activists also provided the context for the selection and adoption 
of specific British anti-nuclear practices by Australian protesters. Scalmer has analysed the 
spread of protest practices through transnational networks of activists, their critical adoption by 
Australians, and their incorporation into a local Australian protest repertoire. Key to his model of 
transnational diffusion is the idea of ‘translation’. Acknowledging the historical and cultural 
contingency of protest, Scalmer notes that any practice observed by Australians in use elsewhere 
in the world must first be experimented with in order to see if it can be made comprehensible to 
Australian audiences. Scalmer argues that where they could re-interpret such a practice in terms 
of the local political context, the practice would diffuse through activist networks, becoming 
widespread.112  
Australian anti-nuclear protesters were aware of a number of practices in use in Britain and 
the United States. Three in particular struck a chord – the ‘long march,’ the British CND’s 
rhetoric of unilateralism, and the Committee of 100’s ideas about non-violent direct action. 
Nonetheless, Australian activists adopted some international practices and adapted some others, 
while ignoring ones they thought unsuitable in Australian circumstances. They were not mere 
recipients of international practices, but active in shaping tactics to local contexts. They 
developed the long march into relay marches and radial marches, responding to particular aspects 
of Australian geography and the sensitive timing of solidarity actions in a world-wide movement. 
Scalmer argues that Gandhi’s concepts of satyagraha and the 24-day salt march of 1930 
influenced the development of long marches in British anti-nuclear activism, as well as in the US 
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in both anti-nuclear and Civil Rights protests. The conceptual link to Gandhi was embodied by 
suffering and self-sacrifice – “lacerated feet” and “pronounced limps” on the Aldermaston 
marches – in service of a political aim.113 The Australian CND groups invoked the unilateralism 
of the British CND as an antidote to local Cold War domestic tensions. Civil disobedience in the 
model of the Committee of 100’s non-violent direct action was not used during Australian anti-
nuclear protests, despite the Committee’s letter asking Australian organisers to consider it, and 
some discussion of what local civil disobedience might look like among Australian CND 
members. Australian anti-nuclear protesters only employed those international tactics they 
deemed useful in Australia. 
The long march was the most successful of the three efforts at translation. The British Direct 
Action Committee had been instrumental in inaugurating the 52-mile, four-day London to 
Aldermaston march of 1958, and the long march was also used by American peace marchers.114 
The British example was rendered visible to Australians through local press coverage. At Easter 
1961, four months prior to the inaugural Australian Hiroshima Day commemoration march, 
several Australian metropolitan dailies reported on anti-nuclear demonstrations in the US and 
UK.115 In the US, six hundred marchers travelled from an Air Force Base in New Jersey to New 
York, 200 Quakers staged a “witness for peace” vigil in Times Square, and in Los Angeles there 
was a march of 2000, addressed by Linus Pauling.116 The American protests, organised by 
SANE, were quickly overshadowed in the press by reportage of the British CND’s march from 
Aldermaston to London.117 The Herald reported the events in London as “yelling demonstrators” 
who “defied police orders to move on and squatted in the street and on pavements”.118 The Age 
characterised it as a “melee” in Trafalgar Square in which the police “charged” the protesters and 
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“dragged them feet first” away from the US Embassy to which they were trying to gain entry.119 
The breakaway march, led by a Highland Piper to the US embassy, was specifically targeted at 
the removal of the Holy Loch submarine base from Scotland, from where the US could deploy 
the Polaris submarine-launched nuclear missile system.120 The Aldermaston rally in London in 
1961 made civil disobedience a hallmark of British protest in the Australian press’ eyes.121  
However, geographical factors influenced this adoption. The British and American marches 
went from nuclear bases or facilities to large metropolitan areas – London or New York, and 
symbolically linked the subject of the marchers’ demands – nuclear weapons – to their object – 
urban public opinion. Without nuclear bases or factories in Australia, there were no obvious sites 
at which to begin the marches. The interstate relays and motorcades began in metropolitan 
centres, and the federal legislature became their object. This was a simple substitution; not only 
was Canberra the Australian governmental equivalent to London, but the Committee of 100 had 
included the text of a declaration to be signed by as many demonstrators as possible and then 
presented to the Embassies of the nuclear powers.122 The 52 miles between Aldermaston and 
London, or even the 109 miles between McGuire Air Force Base and New York, were smaller 
distances than the 200 miles between Sydney and Canberra, 300 between Melbourne and 
Canberra, or the 500 between Brisbane and the capital. To accommodate these difference, the 
Victorian and Queensland delegations travelled in cars, foreclosing the personal hardships of 
marching – fatigue, hunger and tired feet - apparent in the British and American examples and 
stripping them of their obvious Gandhian connotation.123  
Time also played a part in the evolution of the long march in Australia. The Aldermaston 
marches always took place over the four days of Easter. It took two to three days for coverage of 
the British marches to appear in Australian metropolitan dailies. For this reason, the marches in 
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Sydney and Melbourne were delayed by a week.124 The first one was timed to take place in 
support of the Committee of 100’s 1961 Holy Loch Polaris protests, but was delayed by two 
days as the object of the march - Federal Parliament - was closed on weekends.125 Though the 
inaugural relay walk was initiated in response to the Easter marches in the US and UK, the relay 
marches to Canberra only occurred in September as part of the Hiroshima Day activities. 
Australian anti-nuclear protests were thus organised according to an international schedule 
originating from the UK and were expressed through a practice – the long march – that had been 
used visibly elsewhere by anti-nuclear activists. However, they were translated to fit local 
considerations of distance and time. 
The Committee of 100’s suggestion of government and embassy visits became central to 
Australian anti-nuclear protests. The Hiroshima Day marches were followed by some form of 
interstate delegation to Canberra. In 1962 there were two delegations, one at Easter and one in 
August. These delegations visited the embassies of the United States, USSR, and France, and the 
Malayan, Indian and British High Commissions.126 Where the Committee of 100’s declaration 
had been in the form of a petition, the form of the Australian declarations changed over time. In 
1961 the relay march carried a letter to the Prime Minister.127 Later they brought declarations 
that had been read out at the Sydney and Melbourne rallies and claimed to have been 
“unanimously adopted”.128 The Hiroshima Day interstate delegation in 1962 was organised 
around the national petition that had been circulating since June in support of Calwell’s nuclear-
                                                 
124 Robert Gould, “Memo to all peace organisations, and Interested Individuals in Australia and New Zealand,” 
[October 1965], Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, MS 
10002, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne (hereafter YCAC Collection). 
125 Committee of 100, “Report upon international demonstrations Sept 16 and 17,” enclosed with Randle to 
Morrow, September 6, 1961, Folder “Aldermaston March, 1961,” Box 2 (74), PND Records. 
126 “100 Feted at Red Embassy,” Canberra Times, September 21, 1961, 3; Morrow and Anderson, Press Release, 
May 2, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records; “600 
Expected for City Bomb March,” Canberra Times, August 15, 1963, 3; “800 March at Canberra in Ban—Bomb 
Display,” Age, August 16, 1963, 3; “1000 Walk For Peace,” Canberra Times, August 16, 1963, 3.  
127 Morrow and Anderson, Press Release, September 11, 1961, Folder “Aldermaston March, 1961,” Box 2 (74), PND 
Records. 
128 Morrow and Anderson, Press Release, May 2, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 
1962,” Box 2(74), PND Records; Brand to the Ambassador, Embassy of Brazil, May 4, 1962; Brand to Sir Garfield 
Barwick, May 2, 1962; Brand to W. Belton (Charge D’Affairs, American Embassy), May 3, 1962; Brand to British 
High Commissioner, May 3, 1962; all in Folder Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2), Box 67 (74), PND 
Records; Anderson, Circular to supporting organisations, July 25, 1963; and “A & NZ Congress for International Co-
Operation and Disarmament – Melbourne Assembly Hall Rally, Aug 7th, 1963” (declaration adopted by 1963 
Melbourne Hiroshima Day Rally), both in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records. 
42 
 
free Southern Hemisphere proposal. 129 The document delivered to the Embassies in the same 
year was a short list of demands, and had a copy of a memorandum in support of a test ban treaty 
attached to it.130  
The delegations to Canberra revolved around the claim that the documents presented to 
Parliament and the embassies had some form of representative potency. Though the declaration 
had acquired the representative force of “unanimous” adoption at coordinated rallies, by August 
1962 the declaration was expressed through a nation-wide petition, bolstering its claim to 
represent Australian public opinion. Australian peace organisations had previously used the 
petition in the form of the 1949 ‘Peace Ballot,’ which was quickly subsumed by activities in 
support of the World Peace Council’s 1950 Stockholm Appeal for a total ban of Nuclear 
Weapons.131 The national petition of 1962 demonstrates that when presented with a new idea 
from an international correspondent, Australian activists first drew on existing practice and 
experience. The 1962 ‘Campaign to Canberra,’ as the apogee of Australian anti-nuclear protest 
in the 1960s, was an amalgam of practices sourced from local experience and global example, 
augmented by experimentation and by the repurposing of established forms of protest. 
Amidst experimentation, translation and repurposing, the radial walk stands as an example of 
a new protest practice. It was envisioned as “radial columns of marchers converging on the City 
from the outer suburban perimeter of an area which would be devastated by an H. Bomb 
exploding over Sydney”.132 The concept was used in all three cities between Easter 1962 and 
1966. The radial march responded to the lack of nuclear infrastructure in Australia. With no 
equivalent facility to Aldermaston or Holy Loch, Australian protesters focused on the possibility 
of Australian cities being the target of nuclear strikes – a possibility implied by Australia’s 
international position as the supporting ally of nuclear powers, rather than a nuclear power in its 
own right. A SCND leaflet argued that “H-Bombs in Australia mean H-Bombs ON Australia,” 
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claiming that bases designed to aid the launch of first-strike nuclear weapons could become 
priority targets in the event of nuclear war.133 The radial march concept side-stepped the lack of 
nuclear infrastructure, calling the absence of nuclear bases in Australia into focus in order to 
oppose their construction. The Australian Easter marches were often publicised as opportunities 
for Australians to “demonstrate our support for the British movement for nuclear and total 
disarmament,” especially in 1962.134 The radial march was developed in relation to Australian 
activists’ understanding of their own local political context as citizens of a non-nuclear partner to 
great and powerful friends. 
In a similar fashion, Australian CND groups adopted the British Campaign’s position on 
unilateral disarmament, but did so in an attempt to distance themselves from the Cold War 
consensus that conflated Australian peace activism with communism. The British CND’s central 
demand was for the unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons by Britain, regardless of the 
status of other powers’ nuclear arsenals.135 According to Jodi Burkett, CND’s leaders were 
engaged in a nationalist project, and anti-nuclear activism was in part an effort to articulate a 
progressive form of Britishness. CND activists argued that by standing as an example of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, Britain could precipitate the end of the Cold War in a similar 
way to the British banning of the slave trade.136 The Australian CND groups adopted the same 
unilateralist approach. In February 1963, the Sydney CND Newsletter summed up the British 
position as “Make your own Government renounce nuclear arms and bases, unconditionally,” 
and acknowledged that it was the aim of the group to “work on the same lines as CND in 
Britain”. 137 The Western Australian CND group outlined a similar position in their newsletter, as 
did the VCND members who drafted the common policy document for the proposed National 
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CND.138 The idea of unilateralism as moral leadership was reframed by Australian anti-nuclear 
activists: leaflets produced by the NSWPCICD and CICD for Hiroshima Day 1962 exhorted the 
public to “Let Australia lead against policies that threaten the future of mankind.”139 In the 
context of Calwell’s proposal for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, this framing accorded 
Australia a regional leadership role similar to Britain’s world role. The British CND’s language 
of unilateralism and moral leadership was adopted by local CND groups, and some of this 
rhetoric circulated through other peace groups. 
Unilateralism was attractive to Australian peace activists because it offered an answer to the 
trenchant criticism that peace organisations were Communist fronts. During the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, prominent Coalition MPs spoke in parliament about the state and federal peace 
councils as communist front organisations, and the criticism stuck.140 Even once those same 
peace groups began to agitate against nuclear weapons, they were unable to contest this public 
criticism. The award of the Lenin Peace Prize to William Morrow, a former Tasmanian Labor 
Senator and Secretary of the NSWPCICD, attracted attention at the inaugural Sydney Hiroshima 
Day march. The word ‘peace’ was included in inverted commas in the Sydney Morning Herald’s 
headline, indicating that the paper thought the NSWPCICD was a communist front 
organisation.141 The Canberra Times also made prominent mention of Morrow’s Soviet award, 
under the pejorative headline “100 feted at red embassy”.142 The QPC caused some controversy 
in the pages of the Courier-Mail in 1962 when the executives of the Federated Clerks Union and 
the Federated Ironworkers’ Association threatened to withdraw from the annual Labour Day 
march because they would not have their unions associated with a communist front 
organisation.143 In August that year, a group of 50 counter-demonstrators marching under 
banners reading “Better Dead Than Red” interrupted the larger anti-nuclear march organised by 
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the QPC, Fellowship of Reconciliation and Society of Friends. Fights began when QPC marchers 
tore down the counter-demonstrators’ banners.144  
By critiquing both western and Soviet nuclear policy, the CND groups hoped to resist the 
categorisation as communist front organisations that had plagued the peace councils. In early 
1964 the Victorian CND (VCND) newsletter Sanity reported on the formation of the 
International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, noting that the Soviet Peace Committee 
had blasted the international confederation of anti-nuclear organisations as a tool of “agents of 
the imperialists, who are working to split the ranks of the peace forces”.145 By demonstrating that 
they were aligned with a group that attracted criticism from the Soviet Peace Committee, the 
VCND hoped to demonstrate that unilateralism was incompatible with Stalinism. When they 
were drawn into a protracted debate with Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher at Melbourne University 
through pamphlets, public confrontation and stories in the student newspaper Farrago, the 
VCND invoked unilateralism as an argument against Knopfelmacher’s characterisation of the 
organisation as a communist front.146 The world-wide movement was the medium through which 
such unilateralism could spread. The Sydney CND’s Research Action Group advocated that to 
side-step the “irresponsible” leaders who preferred “for reasons of their own, to remain on the 
brink of war … We must begin negotiating directly with citizens in every country. …we need 
information based on direct contact with the very people who are supposed to be our 
enemies”.147 The VCND published an account of two Committee of 100 members who had 
travelled to East Berlin to “see what potential existed for a non-aligned ‘unilateralist’ protest 
movement in East Germany”. The article explained that: 
‘Go back to Russia’ and ‘Why don’t you demonstrate in Red Square?’ are suggestions well 
known to CND supporters. They indicate a widespread belief that Peace Groups in the West 
undermine the morale and preparedness of the ‘Free World’ and are thus wittingly or 
unwittingly tools in the Cold War. 
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One organisation which actually has demonstrated behind the Iron Curtain is the Committee of 
100.148 
The publication of the article, coming after two months of the newsletter defending the VCND 
against red-baiting ‘attacks’, was an attempt to mobilise universalism as a foil to the domestic 
Cold War politics of red-baiting. 
If the long march found fertile soil and unilateralism could be used to similar ends in both the 
UK and Australia, civil disobedience demonstrated the limits of translation. Despite examples 
from Britain being reported in the press and in correspondence, Australian anti-nuclear protesters 
proved resistant to the adoption of confrontational lawbreaking in the Committee of 100 model. 
Newspaper coverage of the Aldermaston marches furnished Australians with examples of protest 
marches held in contravention of police directions.149 The Committee of 100’s initial letter 
asking for support had included a flyer that spoke of a “new method of non-violent protest” that 
included the rejection of the government ban on their protest.150 Among Australian organisations 
that protested nuclear weapons, only the Sydney and Brisbane CND groups expressed sentiments 
in line with lawbreaking as protest. The Disarmament Rag newsletter advocated that readers 
“refuse to pay taxes for a military budget” but this underdeveloped suggestion of civil 
disobedience was never carried out. 151 After the leak of war plans in the UK by the ‘spies for 
peace,’ the Sydney group reprinted the pamphlet, courting legal action.152 The BCND was 
investigated for its potential role in the reprinting, with the “security police” visiting BCND 
offices, interviewing members and taking samples from typewriters.153 After this investigation 
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and in an atmosphere of increasing perceived hostility towards demonstrators in Queensland, 
BCND secretary Janet Lewis wrote to other CND organisations, attempting to get a more 
comprehensive picture of laws and regulations governing public assemblies and 
demonstrations.154 While BCND eventually convened a “Direct Action Subcommittee” and 
Lewis explained that the point was to “put these laws to the test in the near future,” the BCND’s 
advice to a hopeful activist in Rockhampton was to negotiate with local authorities before 
planning protests.155 It outlined the regulations that govern the use of common protest practices: 
vigils, leaflets, posters, stickers, painted slogans, pickets, jerkin parades, marches, and radial 
walks.156 Rather than outlining tactics for politicised law-breaking, the pamphlet was instead a 
manual for how to produce legal protest. Even the most radical of Australian protesters in the 
early 1960s shied away from advocating law-breaking. 
The BCND’s Direct Action Sub-Committee took its name from the Committee of 100’s 
Gandhian predecessor, and understood how that organisation used moral lawbreaking as protest. 
In correspondence, Lewis referred to Queensland as “well-nigh a police state,’ interpreting the 
effect of these laws as the prevention of peaceful assembly for political demonstrations.157 
Despite precedents in Britain and elsewhere, the report did not advocate the breaking of these 
laws as a moral response to such repressive legislation: 
It is true that there is a technique called “civil disobedience” which is used by some nuclear 
disarmament groups, but it must be remembered that this involves not disorder and violence, 
but rather a very great degree of discipline and peaceful intention. The whole question of civil 
disobedience and its justification is an exceedingly complex one which is not dealt with at the 
present time.158 
The Brisbane CND’s Direct Action Sub-committee noted that “Whatever the difficulties CND 
must take direct action, because this is the very basis of the movement,” recognising that their 
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refusal to adopt civil disobedience put them at odds with the rest of the world-wide movement.159 
To make good this gap, the report reinterpreted Gandhian protest in light of Australian labour 
history, noting that “we are the successors to such organisations as the early trade unions and the 
suffragettes.”160 The BCND dismissed moral law-breaking as a possible alternative, advocating 
only for negotiation and compliance with police and officials. 
Australian anti-nuclear protests were thus civil affairs. With the exception of the unplanned 
“brawl” with the counter-demonstration at the Brisbane Hiroshima Day march of 1962, 
confrontation was absent from anti-nuclear protest in Australian before 1965.161 NSWPCICD 
organisers applied for permits for each march, and they were always granted under the following 
conditions: 
1. any banners carried must not be of an offensive nature and must not be carried on 
short poles or sticks. 
2. that the route laid down is followed. 
3. that participants march six abreast and retain close formation. 
4. that there is immediate compliance with any Police direction. 
5. amplifiers are not to be used. 
6. that the number of vehicles taking part in the procession be limited to twenty, and that 
all join the procession at the assembly point. 
The permit’s description of the protest as a “street procession” and the requirement that 
participants march “six abreast and retain close formation” indicates that from the police 
perspective there was no distinction between public processions and demonstrations. These 
instructions were copied by the NSWPCICD and distributed to marchers in printed form.162 
Compliance with these permits, which were sought and issued until 1966, demonstrate that anti-
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nuclear protest organisers in Australia went to great pains to comply with the law rather than to 
break it as a protest. Despite the example of the Committee of 100 in the UK, Australian 
protesters in 1966 could find no way to adapt civil disobedience to the Australian political 
milieu. 
 
The Spectre of Vietnam 
Between 1964 and 1966 external involvement in the growing Indochinese conflict replaced 
nuclear weapons as the prime focus of peace organisations’ protests. In mid-1966 the Hiroshima 
Commemoration Committee was reincorporated as the Project Vietnam Committee, the name 
change indicating that anti-nuclear protest had been eclipsed by anti-war protest.163 A flyer 
advertising the 1966 Hiroshima Day march in Sydney bore only the words: 
Vietnam – International Days of Protest 
Sunday August 7 
Hiroshima Day 1966164 
The flyer’s layout offers a visual clue to the shift in emphasis that had occurred by 1966. 
‘Vietnam’ as the object of protest was superimposed on the organisational networks and protest 
practices of the anti-nuclear activism of 1961-1965.  
Some practices developed during the anti-nuclear campaigns no longer made sense when 
applied to Vietnam. Long marches and radial marches were difficult to organise. The radial 
march was designed to symbolise the blast radius of nuclear weapons – a practice that lost its 
meaning once nuclear proliferation was no longer the focus of the protests. The effort to report 
public opinion remained a central concern for anti-war protesters, but they also understood their 
role as educative. After the success of Labor MP Jim Cairns’ speech in August 1964 on 
“Australia’s Relations with Asia,” the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee decided to replace 
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the 1965 radial walks and delegations to Canberra with public forums in Sydney.165 The May 
30th forum was entitled “Australia and Asia – the Years Ahead,” and publicity material claimed 
that 
The purpose of this forum will not be to arrive at a common resolution or view, but rather an 
exchange of opinion in the hope of stimulating public opinion toward an examination of this 
primary problem for Australia’s security and future.166 
The press release assumed that any “examination” of the issue by the public would produce 
rational discourse and thus agreement with the protesters’ position. The assumption that any 
right-thinking member of the public could not fail but to see the validity of a dissenting position 
once informed of the facts was a resilient one in Australian activists’ thinking in the first half of 
the 1960s. So too was the assumption that protest organisations represented an imagined public. 
Just as anti-nuclear activists had delivered letters and resolutions to MPs claiming to represent 
Australian citizens, the secretary of AICD wrote to Menzies in December 1965 forwarding a 
resolution on Vietnam “adopted by a public meeting at Sydney Town Hall on December 13th, 
which was attended by 2000 citizens”.167 Similarly, “Project Vietnam” was “designed to … 
allow the expression of concerted public opinion and to stimulate public thought”.168 The 
experience of anti-nuclear protest bequeathed anti-war protesters the assumption that protest 
simultaneously mobilised and represented public opinion. 
These assumptions remained part of Australian protest culture through the long 1960s. Key 
individuals belonged to both anti-nuclear and anti-war organisations. Bob Gould was the 
convener of Sydney CND and the Vietnam Action Committee. Roger Barnes, who was the 
Assistant Secretary of the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, remained active in anti-war 
protest until the early 1970s. The CICD, AICD and QPC were all instrumental in anti-war protest 
throughout Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. This continuity of organisations and 
personnel meant that the critical engagement and solidarity with overseas protest remained 
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features of Australian activism. Many of the organisations and activists who became mainstays 
of anti-war protest over the ensuing decade cut their teeth on the anti-nuclear protests of the early 
60s, learning how to frame protests in terms of public opinion, and how to look to international 
networks for inspiration and solidarity.  
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Chapter 2: Citizenship, Conscience, and Conscription  
The conscription scheme that would supply men to the Australian intervention in Vietnam was 
announced by the Menzies Government in November 1964, with the first intake of National 
Servicemen slated for March the following year. Opposition began even before the first 
conscripts were selected by lottery. The National Service Scheme’s opponents argued that 
Australians preferred volunteerism in the armed forces and that conscription for overseas service 
required a popular mandate. They hoped to capitalise on latent anti-conscription feeling in the 
electorate dating back to the defeat of the conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917, and direct it 
towards helping the ALP into power. Debates over conscription became debates about Australian 
citizenship, influenced by both historical memory and transnational ideas: those in favour of 
conscription who argued that inclusion in the Australian political community was paid for by 
military service, while those against it argued that the right of the citizen to make their own 
decision on military service should be respected by the state. The failure of Labor to win 
government in November 1966 revealed that the historical distrust of conscription for overseas 
service was outweighed by the fear of communist insurgency in Asia. Even though the election 
put paid to the appeal to historical memory, anti-conscription protest could still be justified in 
Liberal terms. Opposition to military service for Vietnam thus equipped Australian protesters 
with a language that would animate further developments in protest practice. 
This chapter refers to several distinct scholarly fields. It situates itself against the literature on 
the National Service Scheme and the memory of conscription in Australia; on liberal citizenship; 
on the transnational ‘New Left’; and on Australian women’s organisations. The National Service 
Scheme attracted considerable attention amongst historians, sociologists and political scientists 
in the 1970s and 1980s. In more recent decades, with the exception of Twomey’s recent work, it 
has largely disappeared from the agenda of historical inquiry.1 The bulk of the existing 
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historiography concentrates on the administration of the Scheme rather than activism against it. 
There are a small number of histories of anti-conscription protest which generally rehearse the 
preoccupations of anti-conscription protesters, attacking the legitimacy of the Scheme and noting 
the efficacy of activists’ successes in foiling it.2 Rather than repeating these assumptions, I use 
the notions of national historical memory, liberal citizenship and maternal citizenship to critique 
them. 
Some scholars of Australian citizenship have noted that Australian public political culture in 
the 1950s and 1960s was marked by a burgeoning liberalism. Davidson interprets the contest 
between Menzies and Evatt over the banning of the Communist Party in 1951 as indicative of a 
struggle between Menzies’ conception that “democracy and responsible government” were 
sufficient to secure civil liberties and Evatt’s concern for individual rights. He also notes that 
changes in the ALP under Whitlam led to a concentration on individual liberties as part of a post-
imperial shift to a ‘multicultural’ Australian identity.3 In a similar fashion, Beilharz identifies a 
“brief flourishing of social-liberal views of citizenship” in the labour movement in the 1950s, 
and its momentary reappearance under Whitlam in the early 1970s.4 Liberal influences were also 
evident in the transnational activist networks of the early 1960s. Geary argues that the radical 
influences of Herbert Marcuse and C. Wright Mills were detectable in the urtext of the New Left 
– The Port Huron Statement – and thus concludes that “key strands of postwar liberalism” 
influenced the New Left. He also notes the Statement’s acknowledgment of both Civil Rights 
and transnational anti-nuclear protest, both of which influenced the development of Australian 
activism in the period.5   
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There is now a rich literature on the gendering of citizenship. Feminist scholars have 
highlighted the pervasive gendered division between the public and private spheres; Cox 
describes the public sphere as “rule-driven” and rational, “manly” and “heroic” while the private 
sphere is feminised as “nurturing and emotional”.6 The long-standing assumption that men and 
women operated in different spheres and owed different obligations to the state produced the 
figure of the citizen-soldier, who traded duty to the nation for inclusion in the public life of the 
nation. That same division also relegated the woman-as-mother to the private sphere.7 Glenda 
Sluga has argued that members of international women’s organisations in the interwar years, like 
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “most commonly drew on  
conventional representations of sexual difference - of the especial maternal inclination of women 
to protect their race, or of the pacific qualities of femininity - rather than assert the liberal  tenets 
of individualism,  to  subvert  the  idea  that women had no national  or international political 
functions”.8 In her work on the Motherhood Allowance campaigns of the 1920s, Marilyn Lake 
has applied the feminist scholarship on citizenship to Australian labour history. She argued that 
Australian women activists in the interwar period made an explicit claim on public participation 
by framing the citizen-mother in similar terms to the citizen-soldier, as a bargain of service for 
citizenship.9 Historians of women’s activism in the United States during the Vietnam War have 
examined the ways that women protesters have appealed to – and critiqued – this easy 
connection of femininity and motherhood to pacifism.10 Though the women of SOS did not make 
explicit reference to the actions of their interwar antecedents and transnational counterparts, the 
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ways their protests invoked femininity and motherhood and the women’s networks through 
which they formed make it clear that the ideas of a politics based in essential sexual difference 
and the mother-citizen informed their actions.  
Situated between these four fields, this chapter will interpret four entangled threads that 
emerge from an examination of anti-conscription protest in this period. First, I will sketch out a 
history of the National Service Scheme and opposition to it. Then, I will look at the memory of 
the Great War anti-conscription referenda, and the ways activists in the 1960s mobilised those 
memories. In his election campaign, Calwell characterised the ALP as inherently opposed to 
conscription, while YCAC made much of the notion that overseas conscription required a 
popular mandate. These ideas owe their origins to the collective memory of the Great War 
conscription referenda.11 As Hirst argues, the ALP of 1965 harked back to 1916 in favour of 
Curtin’s “apostasy of 1942-3” of allowing conscripts to be sent to New Guinea and the South-
West Pacific region.12 Calwell’s election campaign flattened the more complex history of the 
ALP’s relationship to compulsory military service. These facts did not trouble activists, nor blunt 
their enthusiasm for the idea of a referendum.  
The next section explores the differing assumptions of YCAC and SOS. YCAC insisted that 
young men be left to keep “learning your trade, or using your uni degree, or just riding your 
board at Bondi”. 13 This was a demand that men, usually public subjects in Australian history by 
virtue of military service, be left to live their private lives free from the interference of the state. 
Conversely, by becoming a “kind of movable Sydney landmark,” the women of SOS made a 
claim on public space and the public sphere.14 The final two sections of the chapter offer 
interpretations of two different protest practices: the burning of draft cards and the support of 
high-profile Conscientious Objection cases. Australian anti-conscription activists were mindful 
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of ideas and practices circulating across national borders. The chapter will demonstrate that this 
shared liberal critique of democratic citizenship helped foster the adoption of the American 
practice of draft card burning by Australian anti-conscription activists. The final section of the 
chapter will argue that liberal conscience animated the Conscientious Objection cases that anti-
conscription groups threw their support behind. 
 
The National Service Scheme and Anti -Conscription Protest, 1964-1966 
In November 1964, the Menzies government announced the reintroduction of compulsory 
military service as part of a broad defence review. The massive spending program, which 
attracted significant press attention for close to a month, also included new, modern equipment 
and a significant reorganisation of all three armed forces.15 The new National Service Scheme 
attracted criticism because for the first time, conscription for overseas service was expressly 
allowed. The previous scheme, which had been in effect since 1949, had been suspended four 
years earlier. It had stipulated that only volunteers could serve overseas, though conscripts had 
been sent to Malaya in 1955 under this scheme.16  The Scheme took effect in January 1965 and 
required men aged 20 to 26 to register with the department of Labour and National Service. 
Young men registered during the six month “registration period” during which they turned 20. 
There were four intakes of new conscripts every year – one each in February, April, June/July 
and September. Conscripts were selected from registrants by a lottery of birthdays held twice a 
year. The ballots used the same rotating barrels and numbered marbles that Tattersalls used in 
state lotteries. One marble was placed in the barrel for each date in the registration period. From 
1965 to mid-1967, each lottery selected between 25 and 53 birthdates and thus furnished 
between 13 000 and 22 000 potential conscripts. Men whose birthdays fell on dates not drawn 
were ‘balloted out’ of the lottery and their service was deferred indefinitely.17 In total, 800 000 
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young men registered and 63 000 of those were conscripted.18 Men who were balloted in were 
directed to attend a medical examination. If they passed, they were inducted into the army and 
sent to basic training.  
The National Service Scheme was intended to bolster Australian capacity to meet perceived 
Cold War threats in Asia. Australians identified the violence that accompanied the 
decolonisation of Asia as the operation of the domino effect.19 There had been a permanent 
Australian deployment in Malaya resulting from Australian participation in the Commonwealth 
police action against Communist insurgents in that decolonising state in the mid-1950s.20 In the 
same period, Indonesian encroachments on West New Guinea began to cause Australian 
observers concern.21 By the time of the deployment of the Australian Army Training Team 
Vietnam (AATTV) in May 1962, Australian newspapers were concerned by long-term 
communist insurgencies in Laos and Vietnam, as well as an Indonesian revolution.22 In the same 
month the Australian government committed a squadron of RAAF sabres to Thailand in an 
attempt to bolster that nation’s defences against a possible Laotian communist incursion under 
the auspices of the SEATO treaty.23 In July 1964 the Australian noted fighting in Vietnam, Laos 
and a possible American deployment to Malaysia, and quoted Minister for External Affairs 
Hasluck as saying that “A dark shadow of fear hangs over all of South-East Asia”.24 By late 1964 
Australian commentators were overwhelmed by the variety of threats they saw emanating from 
the region. 
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Australian newspapers tended to conflate these Asian threats. In the context of the looming 
Defence Review, the Sydney Morning Herald referred to the tension between Indonesia and 
Malaysia as a “national emergency”.25 A letter to the paper in the week following the 
announcement argued that this emergency had been “perfectly foreseeable since Dien Ben Phu,” 
including the conflict in Vietnam as part of the national emergency.26 At the time of the Tonkin 
Gulf incident, the Australian reported on the possibility of Chinese involvement.27 A month after 
the announcement of Australian commitment to Vietnam, the Herald anticipated communist 
“offensives” in both Borneo and Vietnam, masterminded in Beijing, while the Australian 
suggested that the 200 million strong Chinese army was “ready to fight” in Vietnam.28 The 
defence review, and National Service, responded to a deep-seated Australian anxiety about 
international communism in Asia. 
The breadth of the expected Cold War threat meant that it took time for Vietnam to stand out. 
In part, the use of conscripts in a war zone was what made Vietnam so noteworthy in comparison 
to Indonesia, Laos, or Malaysia. On the day of the announcement of the Scheme, the Sydney 
Morning Herald argued that National Service was part of “preparing against war with 
Indonesia,” while the Australian noted that the aim of the new bases and deployments was to 
“encircle Indonesia”.29 By the time National Service was announced, Australian troops in 
Malaya had been engaging Indonesian paratroopers and repelling landings.30 Conscription was 
instituted as much to keep Australian deployments in Malaysia staffed against possible 
Indonesian encroachment, and the Malaysian deployment was maintained with conscripts until 
1967.31 Though the use of conscripts in Vietnam was expected as soon as Australian troops were 
committed and there was broad consensus on the need for an expanded defence force to meet 
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threats in Asia, there was no such consensus on the use of conscription to supply men to an 
active warzone.  Between March and August 1965 the deployment of conscripts to active service 
in Vietnam was still uncertain.32 When the first unit containing conscripts bound for Vietnam 
marched through Sydney, the Australian reported that there was “only sporadic applause and 
hardly any cheering”. This was in contrast to previous send-offs which were characterised by 
“wild enthusiasm”.33 Though National Service would later become synonymous with Vietnam, 
YCAC’s assurance a fortnight before commitment that “Conscription means Vietnam” was far 
from obvious to Australians in mid-1965.34 
The institution of conscription immediately attracted protest.  Within days of the 
announcement the Catholic newspaper The Advocate had called the Scheme “cynical and 
offensive,” and both the Victorian branch of the ALP and the Union of Australian Women had 
criticised it in publications.35  Within a week a Sydney rally sponsored by the Central Methodist 
Mission had passed a resolution in the same manner as anti-nuclear rallies had previously, noting 
that “this meeting of Australian citizens urges the United Nations to intervene in the Indonesian-
Malaysian-Australian conflict,” although three people present abstained from the vote.36 The 
next day, a group of thirty women in black hoods made a silent protest during a speech by 
Menzies at a Senate election rally in Hornsby. The women stood silently, instigating a raucous 
reaction from the crowd who both jeered and cheered them. As Menzies spoke on conscription, 
the women silently filed out of the town hall, handing out pamphlets as they went.37 Another 
Senate election rally became the site of protest when a group of men heckled Menzies in 
Brisbane, raising an anti-conscription poster at the side of the hall.38  
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It was as part of this early outburst of protest that the first YCAC group formed in Sydney. 
The organisation was inaugurated at a “packed” meeting at Sydney Town Hall.39 In August 
1965, a similar group of the same name formed in Melbourne, at a meeting of 40 people in a café 
in Carlton. A third group known as Youth Against Conscription started in Queensland around the 
same time. Five out of the six executive members in Sydney and all four office-bearers in 
Melbourne were members of the Young Labor Association. 40 The federal structure of Young 
Labor enabled interstate communication; as soon as the Victorian Youth Campaign was formed 
it began corresponding with its NSW counterpart.41 Individual branches of the party and Labor 
MPs donated towards YCAC’s operating costs.42 YCAC was sustained by the infrastructure of 
campus Labor Clubs, the Young Labor organisation, and the federal ALP. 
YCAC chose sites at which the operation of National Service was visible wherever possible. 
Victorian members protested outside the first drawing of marbles in Melbourne.43 The Sydney 
organisation protested at Central Station as the second intake of National Servicemen were 
transported to basic training in November 1965. Barry Robinson, Secretary of the Sydney group, 
reported to Trevor Ashton in Melbourne that  
[a]bout five hundred people turned up at the main railway station, causing temporary disorder 
even though we were met with a well-organised police, railway officials and army MPs 
brigade. One of our members was arrested, and subsequently charged in court.44 
They also pioneered the practice of burning registration papers – which they called ‘draft cards’ 
after the American example – at rallies. The first example of the practice was at a rally in 
Belmore Park, Sydney on February 2, 1966. Robinson and Wayne Haylen – who was Vice 
President of the NSW YCAC, set fire to their registration certificates in protest against the 
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National Service Scheme.45 The practice was used by other conscripts throughout 1965 and 1966. 
The three state groups met in January 1966 at the “First Australian National Youth Anti-
Conscription Conference” in Sydney. They acknowledged the need for greater cooperation 
between the three organisations and also their sense of a growing movement against 
conscription.46  
SOS was founded in May 1965 at a meeting in YCAC’s Phillip street rooms “for the purpose 
of opposing Federal Government decision to conscript 20 year old youths for service overseas.” 
The small inaugural meeting attracted nine “mothers and friends” and elected an executive, the 
two most active of which were President Joyce Golgerth and Secretary Pat Ashcroft.47 By the 
end of June, a loosely-organised women’s group in Brisbane had contacted the Sydney women 
and asked to affiliate. By August, organisations had formed in Newcastle, Melbourne, and 
Adelaide. By the middle of 1966, SOS Sydney had made contact with branches in Perth and 
Wollongong. The Sydney group appointed itself as the peak body for the various groups around 
the country, and circulated their Statement of Aims as a constitution for adoption.48 The Sydney 
branch operated as a central branch, circulating reports of successful practice and distributing 
literature.49 Like YCAC, SOS formed through established networks. The initial Sydney meeting 
was brought together through cooperation between Golgerth, YCAC and the Teachers’ 
Federation.50 Women’s and feminist organisations, chief among them the Union of Australian 
Women (UAW) and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) were 
instrumental in the ongoing operation of SOS.51 In Melbourne, the inaugural meeting was 
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organised by WILPF and the Victorian Women’s Organising Committee of the Labor Party.52 
The long-standing network of activist organisations that helped to nourish and sustain SOS were 
often obscured by representations of SOS as a spontaneous outpouring of maternal anger. The 
Sun reported that “the movement came into being in May, when the leader of the group, Mrs. Pat 
Ashcroft, and Mrs. Joyce Golgerth met in a Pennant Hills butcher shop.”53 SOS members 
initially attended protests organised by other peace or anti-war groups, like Hiroshima Day in 
Sydney in 1966.54 The organisation’s inaugural protest was a Silent Vigil for Peace organised by 
Methodist clergymen for May 20, 1965. It was attended by about 250 clergymen and laity. The 
word ‘vigil’ conjured up images of care and watchfulness, and SOS groups in Sydney and 
Brisbane mounted several vigils in mid-1965.55  
Like YCAC, SOS timed and targeted their protests according to the logic of the National 
Service scheme. SOS attended intakes of conscripts at barracks in Sydney and Melbourne, where 
they handed out leaflets to young men as they came in to answer their call-up notices.56 SOS in 
Brisbane conducted a town square vigil on the day that the conscripts left for basic training.57 
The protests shared qualities with picket lines at conventional strikes. SOS women, clustered 
near the entry, would try and force leaflets into young men’s hands as they were shepherded into 
the barracks by supportive parents. Irene Miller recalls that she felt nervous going to the 
demonstrations, and explained that “[g]etting up at 4:30am, especially in the winter in the cold, 
and when it rained, it was hard, but you knew why you had to keep going.”58 Another mother in 
Melbourne SOS, Dorothy Dalton, recalled that “those intakes were very frightening and 
depressing, I used to make myself go, but I hated seeing those young fellows going in, so many 
of them being pushed in by their parents.” Relations with the parents were tense: “I handed out a 
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leaflet one morning, and the father snatched it out of his son’s hand … he was going in but he 
wasn’t allowed to read it”.59 Along with Christian pacifist organisations and the AICD and 
CICD, SOS also focused on supporting unwilling registrants’ use of the Conscientious Objection 
provisions of the Scheme. The AICD kept files on individual conscripts who could serve as 
examples, and SOS organised support demonstrations outside magistrates’ courts when cases 
were being heard.60 Bill White, Simon Townsend, Brian King, and John Zarb all became key 
spokespeople for the anti-conscription cause after having a Conscientious Objection application 
refused.61  
Because of the anti-conscription platform of the ALP, YCAC and SOS collaborated on the 
‘Vote No’ campaign during the 1966 federal election campaign. The campaign was a stunt; its 
capacity to deliver anti-conscription candidates to the House of Representatives was limited. 
Neither of the ‘Vote No’ candidates and very few men subject to the Scheme could vote. The 
SOS Newsletter had suggested a leaflet campaign in swinging electorates as early as May 1966.62 
YCAC ran a candidate in the electorate of Chisholm, so “that in at least one electorate voters are 
given an opportunity to vote on conscription and the war in Vietnam divorced from party politics 
and attitudes towards party leadership.”63 Brian King, a Conscientious Objector who was 
appealing his case in the Supreme Court, ran against the Minister for Labour and National 
Service in Wentworth.64 YCAC claimed that they would not hand out how to vote cards, instead 
handing out anti-conscription leaflets. However, they planned to ask ALP candidates to place the 
words “Against Conscription” on their own how to vote cards.65 Sydney SOS noted in the 
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November issue of its newsletter that they had “distributed over 6,000 leaflets, mainly in 
swinging federal elections of Lowe, Parkes and St. George in the Sydney area”, and that SOS 
members were “canvassing for particular anti-conscription candidates” in marginal seats.66 The 
failure of Labor to win government in 1966 demonstrated that opposition to conscription in the 
electorate was not significant enough to foment a change of government. After their failure to 
bring about an ALP victory, YCAC ceased operation. SOS survived the election, and continued 
to work with and outside of the antiwar movement through the Moratorium Campaign and until 
the end of Australian involvement in Vietnam. 
 
Memories of the Great War 
Both the ALP and anti-conscription protesters worked to make National Service an election 
issue. Calwell had hoped to draw on a groundswell of Australian opposition to conscription, 
invoking the popular memory of the anti-conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917. Twomey 
argues that conscription for overseas service was contentious even amongst supporters of the 
Scheme due to the long shadow of the conscription debates of the Great War.67 The necessity of 
a popular mandate began to appear in letters to the editor.68 Opponents of conscription argued 
that without a popular mandate, the government had no right to conscript its citizens at all. One 
letter called the Scheme “dictatorial,” arguing that the parents of potential conscripts should have 
had a direct say in the matter via referendum.69 Another letter argued that the government did not 
have “a mandate from the people it supposedly represents” and that “the decision whether a man 
should undertake a career … which may cost him his life must not be allowed to be made for 
him” without such a mandate.70 Responses to the defence review also recalled the belief that 
Australian soldiers were always volunteers. A chaplain who had served in both wars and voted 
for conscription in the referenda wrote to the Age to bemoan the possibility of shirkers hiding 
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behind volunteers, arguing that this would leave the best men dead while those of “inferior 
character” survived to “lower the nation’s standards generally”.71 Veterans of the Great War who 
opposed conscription noted that they had voted against conscription in 1916 or 1917, and argued 
that volunteers made better soldiers.72  
It was this potent but ambivalent memory that Calwell hoped to convert into electoral success 
for the ALP. To this end, he constructed a specifically Australian ‘tradition’ of anti-conscription 
that was both nationalistic and firmly embedded in the Labor Party. In doing so, he obscured a 
more complex history of the party’s relationship to compulsory military service. It had been a 
Labor Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, who had pushed for conscription in 1916. 
Dyrenfurth has pointed to the myth that the Australian labour movement naturally opposed 
conscription, highlighting the acrimonious ALP split over conscription in 1916 and the fact that 
some in the labour movement advocated conscription of wealth alongside men.73 John Hirst 
argues that in the 1940s the ALP’s ideas about conscription were further complicated by the 
imagined demands of the American alliance, resulting in the creation of two parallel armies - one 
conscripted for use only in Australian territory, and a second volunteer army for use beyond 
Australian shores. Thus Curtin’s halting support for conscription was intended to demonstrate to 
MacArthur that Australians took home defence seriously. 74 The previous military service 
scheme had only been “suspended” in 1960, thus some form of compulsory military training had 
been part of Australian civic life for most people under 30.75 Defence preparedness had 
bipartisan support; Calwell himself had previously called for expansion of the defence forces.76 
Australian public attitudes to conscription were not as settled as Calwell made them out to be. 
Ignoring this complex history, Calwell offered a summary of the party’s stance on 
conscription in March 1966: “We have always been an anti-conscriptionist party and we are 
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proud of it. When we cease to be that, we cease to be an Australian Labor Party.”77 He was the 
one who rehabilitated a piece of Great War propaganda when he labelled the scheme the ‘Lottery 
of Death’ in parliament.78 Trade unionists continued to proclaim the natural connection between 
unions and opposition to National Service, citing the slogan “Peace is trade union business”.79 As 
late as 1969, the Seamen’s Union reprinted an anti-conscription pamphlet from the Great War 
titled ‘The Blood Vote’.80 Two members of the Victorian YCAC attended an Anti-conscription 
Jubilee celebration to mark the 50th anniversary of the First World War Conscription referenda, 
held one month before the 1966 Federal Election. Calwell was present on the podium alongside 
the two activists, along with Frank Hartley, one of the Peace Parsons.81 The YCAC policy 
statement explained that the lack of popular consultation and the requirement for overseas 
service were bones of contention.82 A second draft of the policy statement added the proviso that 
YCAC was not opposed to conscription in principle, but “holds strongly that conscription for 
overseas service cannot be justified at a time when Australia’s security is not threatened”.83 The 
organisation also put an advertisement in the Australian in June 1965 under the title “we oppose 
overseas conscription”.84 SOS was cited in the press as believing that “boys should have the right 
to choose whether they want to fight overseas or not”.85 YCAC also represented the Federal 
Election as a “virtual referendum” that would stand in for the referendum to enact conscription 
that had been “denied the Australian people”.86 The rich collective memories of the conscription 
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referenda nourished anti-conscription protest. YCAC’s critique of the Scheme rested in part on 
these memories, which linked the institution of conscription to popular mandate and implied that 
only volunteers ought to serve overseas.  
 
Citizenship, Gender, and the Public/Private Divide  
Opponents of national service fused this imagined historical tradition with the claim that the state 
had no right to interfere in the lives of citizens through conscription. Four days after the 
Scheme’s announcement, the Advocate noted that “those in authority had an obligation to restrict 
a citizen’s liberty only when the need was real and when it left no alternative”. 87 A Veteran of 
the Somme argued in a letter to the Age that even with a popular mandate, “no man has the right 
to demand that any fellow citizen must sacrifice his liberty and, perhaps his life for his own 
protection”.88 Some supporters of the scheme, notably the RSL, argued that compulsory military 
service would produce capable and good citizens while meeting Australian defence needs. 
Twomey argues that the Scheme had widespread support due to the sense that national service 
would instil discipline and “the core values of citizenship”. 89 She also notes that supporters of 
the Scheme referred to a sense of duty to the nation, or the obligation young men had to fight for 
the privileges they enjoyed, secured for them by that nation.90 Whether because it made men into 
better citizens or because it represented an obligation to the nation, National Service was first 
and foremost a question of citizenship. 
The YCAC claimed that the obligation of military service should be balanced by the right to 
vote and the opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation. The organisation’s policy 
statement noted that conscription affected 19 and 20-year-olds while the voting age was 21, 
framing this discrepancy between right and obligation as a “disregard of democratic rights,” and 
arguing that because potential conscripts could not vote, they were not represented by the 
government that conscripted them.91 The same critique informed a YCAC leaflet that advertised 
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a rally in April 1966 with the words “no vote, no voice, no choice”.92 Another leaflet pointed out 
the inequitable distribution of citizenship rights and obligations at the heart of the National 
Service Scheme, asking if young men were ready “to take up guns before you are given the 
vote?”93  
This concern was shared by the ALP, who proposed a bill in early May lowering the voting 
age to 20. A Labor spokesperson claimed that it was an attempt to “give every person within the 
scope of the Government’s infamous conscription policy the right to express their opinion at the 
ballot”. Though the bill never proceeded beyond debate, the discussion suggested several 
alternatives, including extending the franchise only to serving defence personnel. There was an 
attempt to offer this extension of the vote to women as well, otherwise the female citizen was 
absent from this debate over conscription.94 By offering to lower the voting age of only those 
subject to conscription the ALP was reinforcing the connection between military service – an 
opportunity only open to men - and participation in a democratic political community. The 
ALP’s attempt to balance rights and obligations with this bill thus points to the gendered 
implications of National Service as a citizenship obligation. 
Because they were not themselves subject to the scheme, the women of SOS mobilised 
concepts of motherhood when explaining their activism. The Newsletter quoted the 
organisation’s president as saying that the group was “instigated by myself and other mothers of 
20-year-olds,” and that she “started contacting other mothers of boys eligible for conscription”.95 
In a Sun article, Golgerth invoked the domestic and feminised activity of shopping for groceries 
as central to the formation of SOS. Jean McLean, of the Victorian organisation, remembered that 
the first meetings were held in shopping centers.96 SOS also invoked a community of mothers 
when its members laid a wreath for the first two conscripts killed in Vietnam. The wreath was 
“signed ‘on behalf of all mothers who oppose conscription for overseas’.”97 The invocation of 
this community was performative; not all members of SOS were mothers of conscription age 
sons, or even women. Curthoys notes that the sons of Margaret Reynolds, a member in 
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Townsville, were not of conscription age.98 The executive of the Western Australian SOS 
included men; this caused some confusion when Pat Ashcroft erroneously addressed a letter to 
the Perth secretary as “Mrs. Collie,” when her correspondent was in fact a man.99  
SOS was not the first Australian women’s organisation to attempt to generate political capital 
from motherhood. The UAW and WILPF both played a role in the establishment of SOS in 
1965, and both organisations had been involved in the interwar campaign for the motherhood 
endowment. SOS was part of a longer history of Australian women’s organisations. Crucial here 
is Lake’s model of Australian maternal citizenship. She argues that to secure the motherhood 
allowance, feminist activists between the wars constructed a model of citizenship for women that 
operated “like soldier citizenship, as a two-way contract through which mothers would be paid 
for their service to the state”.100 The construction of this mother-citizen brought women and 
motherhood out of the private realm and into the public, in an effort to challenge masculine 
power in parliament and the labour movement.  
Unlike the Motherhood Allowance campaigners of the interwar years, SOS activists never 
claimed that motherhood was a service to the state akin to conscription. They did promote the 
idea that mothers were naturally anti-conscription, nourished by a selective memory of the anti-
conscription activism of the First World War. The Newsletter quoted Great War anti-
conscription activist and WILPF member Eleanor May Moore who expressed her opposition to 
conscription in gendered terms:  
I am a woman. I can only be loyal in a woman’s way. I cannot give to the state what is not 
mine. … Voting away other people’s liberty is not patriotism – it is persecution. Forcing other 
people to risk their lives for me is not courage – it is cowardice.101 
Other anti-conscription activists shared this notion of anti-conscription motherhood. As late as 
1969 the Seamen’s Union reprinted a World War One anti-conscription poster featuring a poem 
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called “The Blood Vote”. Calwell also referenced the pamphlet during the election campaign.102 
The opening stanza read: 
Why is your face so white, Mother? 
Why do you choke for breath? 
O I have dreamt in the night, my son, 
That I doomed a man to death103 
In framing their anti-conscription protest by positioning themselves as mothers, SOS could tap 
into popular memories of the Great War as well as a tradition of women’s activism that 
understood mothers in public as political actors. 
The women of SOS engaged in public political activity not on their own behalf, but on behalf 
of their ‘sons’. The citizen-soldier, not the citizen-mother, remained the object of their efforts. 
While they offered a critique of the gendered hierarchy of Australian citizenship, their protest 
practice was hardly novel. In a 1992 interview Melbourne SOS member Jean MacLean 
expressed her own faith in the communicative reason of the public as a way to render stark her 
later turn to a more radical politics: 
There is no big problem, we’ll just alert the public to the fact conscription has been introduced 
to hoodwink us into being involved in Vietnam and everyone will vote against it in 1966.104 
MacLean understood the reason of the public as a tool for regulating the state and thus impelling 
legislative change. For this reason the organisation favoured a parliamentary approach. Their 
initial actions consisted of vigils, protests at intakes, and lobbying MPs. After the Silent Vigil for 
Peace four members of SOS met with Jim Forbes, then Minister for the Army. Delegates from 
Newcastle, Melbourne and Brisbane made a second trip in September 1965.105 The delegation 
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attempted to see seven separate Liberal members of parliament to lobby them to reverse the 
government position on conscription.106 SOS understood protest in similar terms to the peace 
committees and anti-nuclear protesters of the early part of the decade. 
The key to the vigil was its emphasis on quiet respect rather than noisy proclamation. The 
Melbourne SOS’s newsletter explains that “We feel there are many opportunities for individual 
discussions, but very few opportunities for the IMPACT OF SILENCE… HEAD BOWED, 
HANDS CLASPED.”107 The Brisbane group put on a silent protest every Friday in Anzac 
square, in which the women “all stand together with a white flower, and a word under it, which 
all together, reads, ‘800 Australian boys have gone to war in Vietnam. Send them back, and 
negotiate for a peaceful settlement’”. 108 The Melbourne group reported that: “We feel that we 
are creating a good image in the minds of the public when our vigils are described as ‘quiet’, 
‘silent’, ‘orderly’, and we commend every woman who remained silent when she longed to 
express her feeling vocally.”109 The Australian reported that the demonstration was nothing like 
“the usual mob meeting” with “blaring loudspeakers, noisy interjections, cheering, jeering and 
clapping” and “mundane and crude banners”.110 The respectability that SOS sought reflected the 
‘hat and glove’ approach of the UAW, and distinguished the group from other protest 
organisations.111 The Sun called them “mysterious” and talked about how they “appeared” at 
army bases and train stations.112 The women disrupted understandings of political protest. When 
compared to later coverage of protests, especially by university students, this language 
demonstrates that SOS’ attempt to create political capital out of the combination of respectability 
and the public figure of the citizen-mother was successful. 
By contrast to SOS’ performance of citizenship as something purchased with service, YCAC 
classified conscription as an immoral usurpation of citizens’ inalienable liberty and an 
illegitimate interference in the lives of young men. Material produced in support of the ‘Vote 
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No’ campaign asked: “Has the government the moral right to force 20-year-old youth to fight in 
a foreign war for which they are unwilling to volunteer?”113 Correspondence between the 
Victorian and NSW YCAC placed the emphasis on the unfair distribution of duty:  
Australians under threat have never needed coercion to defend themselves. Clearly they feel 
no sense of threat, and thus have not volunteered for this war. Hence it is surely grossly 
immoral that a minority should bear this appalling burden while the majority say, in effect 
‘nothing doing mate’”114 
A YCAC leaflet explained the Scheme as an improper imposition on young men’s lives, asking 
them if they were ready  
[t]o give up the next two years and possibly your life? … Instead of learning your trade, or 
using your uni degree, or just riding your board at Bondi … Are you ready to fight outside of 
Australia wherever your Government decides to send you?”115  
YCAC’s central claim was that conscription was immoral; in some cases this argument rested on 
the Scheme’s unjust interference in citizens’ lives or its lack of moral legitimacy, in others it was 
the unjust and unequal curtailing of some citizens’ rights in contrast to others. 
YCAC framed their demands in the language of liberalism. Its complaint against the method 
of selection – the lottery – was that because it was open to abuse, and was inherently random, it 
threatened civil liberties.116 The ‘Vote No’ campaign demanded  
the formation of a Civil Liberties Bureau, with a Government financed Secretariat to report on 
all proposed legislation affecting the lives and liberties of citizens. This Bureau to report 
directly to Parliament at the time of the introduction of the Bill.117 
A YCAC pamphlet from 1966 argued that “personal liberty is not to be surrendered lightly” 
under the heading “Australians like freedom, not compulsion. Conscription is a last resort for a 
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real emergency”.118 Other organisations opposed to conscription used this language as well. The 
Association of Ex-Servicemen and Women for Peace listed “promote individual liberty and the 
democratic rights of all citizens” and “to recognise the right of dissent as an integral part of 
democratic society” amongst their aims.119 As well as nourishing anti-conscription protest, the 
language of liberalism fostered the adoption of one of YCAC’s most visible practices: the 
burning of registration certificates, or ‘draft cards’. 
 
Translating Registration Certificates into Draft Cards  
On February 2, 1966 Wayne Haylen and Barry Robinson, Vice President and Secretary of the 
Sydney Youth Campaign Against Conscription, set fire to the certificates sent to them by the 
Department of Labour and National Service to acknowledge their registration for the National 
Service Scheme.120  Robinson wrote of the protest that “I feel that drastic action must be taken in 
protest against this infringement of personal liberty of conscripts.”121 In March three member of 
YCAC in Melbourne burnt their cards outside Prime Minister Harold Holt’s house.122 The next 
day the Australian reported that the Department of Labour and National Service was considering 
stiffer penalties as the practice, which was “an anti-Vietnam war protest gimmick acquired from 
the United States is not exactly covered in National Service regulations”.123 By June the practice 
had spread to WA.124 Though other methods of anti-conscription protest gained a higher profile 
after 1967, the burning of draft cards had longevity. Five Labor MPs, including Jim Cairns, burnt 
three draft cards in front of a rally in November 1969.125 The registration certificate that young 
men were sent as a receipt for their registration forms was a visible artefact left behind by a 
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young man’s passage through the Scheme. By burning them in public, YCAC activists attempted 
to turn them into a symbol of the arbitrary interference that YCAC deplored.  
As a symbolic act of civil disobedience, the practice had its intellectual roots in Gandhi’s 
1896 burning of his South African work papers. As the Australian suggested, the practice was 
adopted after activists observed its use in the United States. American draft card burning formed 
part of a symbolic conversation between activists and Congress. Michael Foley notes that after 
Life magazine published a picture of an American Catholic activist burning his draft card, 
Congress passed a law banning the mutilation or destruction of draft cards. On the same day as 
the law passed, David Miller stood in front of a crowd in Manhattan and burned his draft card as 
an act of protest against both the war in Vietnam and the new law. Miller’s action garnered the 
attention of law enforcement and media alike. Miller was taking part in the Berkeley 
“International Days of Protest” of October 1965, for which the Australian anti-war movement 
put on a solidarity action.126 A national anti-conscription conference in January 1966 passed a 
motion “[t]hat this conference urges all anti-conscription groups to consider draft card burning at 
future demonstrations as an effective means of protest.”127 The first Australian draft card burning 
took place in Belmore Park in Sydney a month later. Acknowledging the source of the protest, 
the April newsletter reported that burning of draft cards was a “form of protest taken from the 
United States”.128  
Despite their common vocabulary, the practice required translation before it could be 
understood in the Australian context. In 2007 former YCAC activist Michael Caulfield explained 
that “unfortunately, we did not have draft cards as the Americans did, so they burnt registration 
notices instead”.129 The pieces of paper burned by conscripts in both countries therefore operated 
differently. Australia’s National Service Scheme was organised at the federal level through the 
Department of Labour and National Service. The United States’ system required individual local 
draft boards to assess each candidate for conscription. American conscripts carried two pieces of 
paper: a registration certificate and a classification certificate. Which piece of paper they 
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identified as ‘draft cards’ and burnt is not always clear from accounts of the practice. The 
classification certificate identified men who had already been before a draft board and been 
classified as fit (or unfit) for service. Burning it hindered the capacity of the state to track the 
conscript.130 In Australia, the scheme was administered federally. All information was sent into a 
central federal department and held there. The pieces of paper that men eligible for National 
Service burnt at protests in Australia were receipts, not identity cards. They were not integral to 
the process of conscription; a man could be tracked and conscripted with the information held 
about him in Canberra. 
Australian registration certificates were a useful way for government officials to ascertain a 
registrant’s compliance with the scheme, but the different administrative functions of registration 
certificates and draft cards meant that different penalties were attached to their destruction. 
YCAC noted in March 1966 that “the government is now considering legal action” and that 
“some newspapers have been urging the government to prosecute under the appropriate sections 
of the Crimes Act”.131 However, the Federal Government lagged behind the US Congress in 
legislating against draft card burning. While there were penalties for destroying it, they were 
limited until 1968. According to Roy Forward, before 1968 the National Service Act levied a 
penalty of $20 for failure to notify the registrar of the loss, damage or defacement of the 
certificate. This penalty did not differentiate between deliberate damage and failing to report a 
certificate that did not arrive in the mail. If reported, the cost of replacement was 25c, and the 
registrar could waive this fee at their discretion. In all cases, the onus was on the registrant to 
avoid the penalties.132 In March 1966, the YCAC newsletter recognised the differences between 
American and Australian government and police responses: “[a]s yet there has been no FBI or 
any legal moves against draft card burning. VASTLY DIFFERENT TO THE AMERICAN 
SCENE.”133 Despite the Department of Labour and National Service’s expressed concern in 
March 1966, it was not until 1968 that the National Service Act was amended to increase the 
penalty for “willfully destroying, damaging or defacing a registration certificate” to $200.134 
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The burning of registration certificates indicates that the student activists of YCAC were 
conversant in American student politics. This was not unusual for Australian students in the 
1960s. As well as noting draft card burning, Scalmer outlines the translation and incorporation of 
the “Freedom Rides” from an American Civil Rights practice to an Australian practice in service 
of Indigenous rights in 1965.135 The word ‘draft’ was not used by Australians to describe the 
Scheme until late 1965, and it was newspapers not activists who were the first to import the 
American term, albeit in the context of “draft-dodgers”.136 Anti-conscription protesters adopted 
the phrase alongside the practice, but a month after the first draft card burning, the Sydney 
Morning Herald still referred to them as “call-up cards”.137 Though the term ‘draft’ was in 
common use by 1967, it took time for Australians to interpret it in local political terms. 
The burning of draft cards was rendered comprehensible to YCAC activists by a shared 
vocabulary of liberal individualism, though the peculiarities of the two schemes meant that the 
meaning of the act changed substantially. Burning an American ‘draft card’ symbolically 
disrupted the administration of the Selective Service Scheme by obstructing the draft boards’ 
capacity to process the individual in question. Burning an Australian registration certificate, on 
the other hand, symbolised the retraction of previously-given acceptance of the scheme. In the 
context of Australian activism against the National Service Scheme, burning a registration 
certificate framed conscription as an infringement of personal liberty. 
 
Conscientious Objection 
The tension between the notion of military service as payment of a debt to the nation and the 
characterisation of conscription as an infringement of individual liberty played out most keenly 
in high-profile Conscientious Objection cases. The National Service Act stipulated that 
Aboriginal men, students, married men and those in the Citizen Military Forces could apply for 
deferment of their service. The Scheme allowed exemption for the physically and mentally 
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disabled, theology students, monks and clergymen. Registrants who held conscientious pacifist 
beliefs could also apply for exemption, and the interpretation of this exemption became the most 
visible and debated. 138 Murphy has noted that opposition to the Vietnam War in particular was 
not sufficient to secure an exemption.139 Nevertheless, most exemptions were granted. Even anti-
conscription organisations noted the high success rates. The Save Our Sons newsletter reported 
that of a total of 168 applications for total exemption made by August 1966, exactly half had 
been granted.140 In all, 72% of the 1012 conscientious objection claims made between 1965 and 
1971 were granted, and in total over 1200 young men were exempted as Conscientious Objectors 
during the life of the Scheme.141 Despite these statistics, several key court cases were used by 
anti-conscription organisations to claim that the scheme failed to adequately allow for the 
exercise of individual conscience. 
Though they represented a tiny minority of potential conscripts, high-profile conscientious 
objectors who failed to gain exemption became focal points for anti-conscription activists in 
1965 and 1966. Bill White and Simon Townsend were the two most prominent examples before 
the election. White was a school teacher who was called up in the second ballot. SOS claimed his 
case “was the first one of refusal to serve” under the National Service Act. His cause was 
promoted by anti-conscription organisations as the first prominent test of the exemption 
provisions of the National Service Scheme. In March 1966 he was refused exemption and in July 
he refused to serve after receiving his call-up notice. SOS was one of a number that supported 
the establishment of the Bill White Defence Committee in the same month. As well as protesting 
the exemption provisions of the Act, the committee campaigned on White’s behalf and raised 
funds for his legal costs.142 
SOS reprinted and distributed White’s objections to military service.143 He argued that “our 
own right and desire for self-preservation” must be balanced against “the rights of self-
preservation of others”. White also used the language of liberal rights to talk about the 
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Government’s side of the relationship, making it clear that he was “opposed to a State’s right to 
conscript a person”. The conclusion to White’s statement articulated a clear connection between 
liberal individualism and democracy: 
I believe very strongly in democracy and democratic ideals - and I believe that it is in the area 
of the State’s right over the life of the individual that the difference lies between totalitarian 
and democratic government.144 
Murphy notes that the advocates for White “spoke entirely in terms of liberal conscience and 
rights”.145  
Townsend was a journalist whose application was also rejected in 1966. His reasons for 
refusal were based in conscientious opposition to killing, though he admitted he would take up 
arms to defend his mother were she under threat.146 The rejection of both applications indicates a 
conflict between the liberal vocabulary of individual conscience, and the court’s assumption that 
only conscientious pacifism could justify exemption. Though on first glance it appears there 
ought to have been little conflict between liberal conscience and pacifist conscience, in practice 
it meant the difference between objection to all wars and objection to one war in particular: 
Vietnam. The ‘particular war’ objectors became visible out of all proportion to their tiny 
numbers, but they were indicators of shifting attitudes towards Australian citizenship in the 
1960s. 
One source of contention was the assumption that conscientious pacifism could only be 
religious in origin. This connection had been laid down during the Great War; it shaped activists’ 
assumptions as much as it shaped the institutional memory of the courts. In an effort to improve 
applicants’ chances, the Federal Pacifist Council produced a document for potential objectors 
that listed questions conscripts should prepare for at their hearing. The questions made it clear 
that conscientious objection required a theologically informed pacifist position. Questions 
included: “Do you belong to any Church?” and “Christ healed the sick. Why do you, as His 
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follower, refuse to serve in the medical corps?”147 One conscript recalled that “beat it or skip 
were my options, because conscientious objection was out of the question unless you were a 
Quaker”.148 Church groups were prominent supporters of Conscientious Objectors, but the 
clergy’s relationship to conscription was far from simple. Despite the prominence of Catholic 
Archbishop Mannix in the anti-conscription referenda of 1916 and 1917, the Catholic Church 
remained silent on conscription during Vietnam.149 A number of Anglican bishops wrote to 
Menzies to protest involvement in the war, but gave no statement on National Service.150 
Religious anti-conscription activists tended to come from Unitarian, Presbyterian or Methodist 
denominations, and spoke as individual clergy, not on behalf of their churches.  
The National Service Act’s definition of conscience as compulsive implied that conscience 
preceded the law and acknowledged that the state could make no claim on an individual 
possessed of a compulsive belief. In this regard it was similar to the liberal models of conscience 
that animated YCAC. Smith argues that the legal definition of conscientious belief varied from 
court to court and case to case.151 Most judges attempted to gauge the authenticity of 
conscientious pacifist beliefs, though this rubric was not consistently applied. According to a 
ruling referred to in White’s appeal, any “consideration of personal advantage or disadvantage” 
ruled out conscientious belief.152 Another judge claimed that the compulsiveness of the belief 
“must be carefully distinguished from mere intellectual persuasion which by its very nature may 
be transient”. In White’s case the Judge found that “the thoughts and concepts which have been 
developed in the mind of the appellant are the result of ignorance rather than good reasoning 
founded on learning and on logic.”153 Moreover, troubling questions about the length of time the 
belief had been held undermined cases and vexed attempts to legally define conscientious belief. 
Though the Act did not stipulate religious belief as the only motivation for Conscientious 
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Objection – “learning and logic” was not a synonym for faith - it did require a belief to be 
framed in objective terms unaffected by the applicant’s contemporary political context. 
For White and Townsend, and the activists who supported them, the exercise of individual 
conscience overruled the state’s claim on male citizens. For the judges that presided over their 
cases, administering a clause of the Scheme that understood a conscientious aversion to violence 
as compulsive in the religious model, activists’ secular conception of conscience was difficult to 
comprehend. Townsend’s judge instead mobilised ideas of duty and obligation when refusing 
exemption. He argued that it was Townsend’s responsibility to pay for the twenty years of 
freedom he had enjoyed, as a result of his Australian citizenship, with military service. In 
response, Townsend argued that he had paid his dues to those who served in the Second World 
War by being a “good citizen” and “furthering the cause of peace for which [they] thought they 
were fighting”.154 White’s framing of his application was echoed by YCAC’s Policy Statement, 
which argued that the Conscientious Objection provisions of the Act were insufficient because 
they failed to account for opposition to the Vietnam War in particular, and thus invalidated the 
exercise of individual conscience. 155 The possibility of particular war objection concerned anti-
conscription activists. The SOS newsletter reported in late 1967 that unlike applicants in NSW, 
Melbourne conscript Daniel Monaghan obtained Conscientious Objector status on the grounds of 
his objection to the Vietnam War in particular.156 Conscientious Objection sat directly over the 
fault lines that ran through the conscription debates of the early 1960s.  
 
Conscription Means Vietnam 
Public discussions of the National Service Scheme revolved around three broad issues. First, 
whether conscription for overseas service was appropriate, and whether a referendum or popular 
mandate had a role in this decision. This question was debated with reference mainly to the 
memory of Australian conscription schemes. Second was the question of citizenship right versus 
citizenship obligation. On the one hand, supporters of the scheme claimed that conscription 
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would make good citizens and was payment for the benefits conferred on Australians by the 
nation or state. On the other, anti-conscription activists argued that the citizen’s liberty was not 
the state’s to take away. Entangled with both of these questions was the third concern: whether 
different conflicts that made up the falling dominoes of the Cold War in Asia constituted a 
‘national emergency’ requiring deployments across the region. The overlapping arguments about 
these three major points of debate – historical memory, citizenship obligation, and national 
security – meant that it was difficult to separate discussions of commitment and conscription. 
Because defence preparedness assumed a regional scope, it took time for Vietnam and 
conscription to become synonymous. In offering their answers to the questions of historical 
memory, individual liberty, and national security, YCAC and SOS elided conscription and 
Vietnam. YCAC distributed a leaflet publicising a protest a fortnight before commitment was 
announced titled “Conscription means Vietnam”.157 The draft YCAC policy statement offered 
interpretations of the conflict in Vietnam, rejecting the Menzies Government’s contention that 
the war threatened Australians and calling it a “largely indigenous uprising”.158 The “National 
anti-conscription conference” held in January 1966 requested that future discussions of 
conscription be placed in the context of “the Vietnam conflict and the containment of 
Communism”.159 The “Suggested Policy” document for the ‘Vote No’ Campaign listed 
withdrawal of recognition for South Vietnam and recognition for the Democratic Republic as 
aims for the campaign.160 Even before commitment, YCAC understood commitment and 
conscription as entangled questions. 
SOS attempted to maintain the distinction for longer. The report on the September 1965 
lobbying mission claimed that the organisation had “no official policy on Vietnam”. However, 
the report noted that government ministers “associated conscription with the Vietnam War” 
when they “claimed it was necessary to send conscripts to stop Communists invading 
Australia.”161 A second lobbying group a year later no longer treated conscription and 
commitment as discrete categories. When they met with Gordon Freeth, the Federal Attorney-
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General, they took a standard liberal international line on the conflict: that Australian 
involvement in Vietnam was in direct contravention of the UN-backed Geneva accords of 
1954.162 The two lobbying missions were organised by different branches of the organisation, 
and the Melbourne women who organised the 1966 mission were more radical than their Sydney 
counterparts. Nevertheless, SOS’ lobbying demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to exclude 
discussion of the Vietnam conflict from discussion of National Service.  
Because of this conflation, anti-war and anti-conscription protesters used many of the same 
practices. The YCAC and SOS both conducted leafletting drives and took part in public marches 
and rallies. These continuities of practice are evident in SOS’s faith that a rational public would 
be convinced by the right argument – an assumption shared by members of the state peace 
organisations that organised anti-war and anti-nuclear campaigns, as well as supporting anti-
conscription activism. Reading the YCAC and SOS alongside the anti-nuclear campaigns 
discussed in the previous chapter, and the anti-war campaigns discussed in the next one, another 
continuity begins to emerge: that of Australian activists critically adopting protest practice from 
overseas examples. In the case of the YCAC, the adoption of draft card burning was not the 
result of a direct communication from the United States, but the result of Australian activists’ 
observation of a potent symbolic act, and their adaptation of it to suit their local political context. 
The federal election in November 1966 was a terrible defeat for the ALP. The YCAC’s close 
alliance with and reliance on Calwell’s anti-conscription stance meant that the organisation 
folded soon after. In the immediate aftermath of the election defeat, SOS’s faith in the 
parliamentary process was reinforced rather than undone. SOS’s Newsletter for December 1966 
promised that despite Holt’s victory at the polls, “As women, as mothers, we will not give up in 
our determination to make the facts known and to change present wrong policies!”163 The 
preoccupation with the public continued to shape protest in Australia until the late 60s, but the 
impact of liberal individualism on Australian protest was more pronounced. Liberalism survived 
in anti-conscription practice because the federal election campaign had put paid to the other 
major plank of anti-conscription arguments: the memory of the Great War referenda. Calwell’s 
loss demonstrated that Australians were not in fact naturally opposed to conscription, not even 
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for overseas service. The Cold War logic of commitment had overpowered Australians’ 
attachment to their anti-conscription past. Though the YCAC collapsed, the liberal ideas that 
underpinned its protest survived. 
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Chapter 3: From Public Opinion to 'Noisy Minority'  
In the eighteen months between the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 and the visit to 
Australia of Air Vice-Marshal Kỳ, Prime Minister of South Vietnam, in January 1967, 
newspapers, politicians and activists contested the meaning of street demonstrations and other 
forms of public protest in Australian political life. Some activists thought that their role was to 
educate an otherwise ill-informed public, while others felt that the visibility of protest, not just its 
content, was key to its success. This imagined relationship to the public was vigorously contested 
by supporters of the war effort. Reporters in the mainstream press and many Parliamentarians 
argued that peaceful protest was a legitimate part of the democratic process but by labelling 
protesters a ‘noisy minority,’ they were countering the protesters’ claim to represent public 
opinion. In response, protesters argued that the government was not acting in accord with the 
public’s wishes and lacked a real mandate for their actions. The failure of the protests during 
these two visits made evident the ways in which the media and opinion-makers largely 
succeeded in undermining the legitimacy of anti-war protest. The Johnson and Kỳ visits helped 
cement a public view of demonstrators as a noisy minority in a crowd of well-wishers.  It was 
clear that public opinion was not going to shift through the gathering of facts and the assertion of 
truth claims, driving the anti-war movement towards more radical forms of civil disobedience 
and conscious lawbreaking. 
The early phase of protest was split along a division between utopian, liberal, and commonly 
religious underpinnings and a narrow, ‘Old Left’ or Communist Party worldview that lionised 
class struggle. Murphy’s survey history of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War notes that 
during this time “the left experienced a number of shifts which diluted the ponderous influence 
of the CPA, began to fracture the peace movement’s alignment with cold war divisions and, to an 
extent, opened the movement to the participation of the ALP rank and file”.1 Ann Curthoys, who 
took part in early protests as a member of the Communist youth group the Eureka Youth League, 
characterises the early years of the anti-war movement as a period dominated by old peace 
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organisations, trade unions and student or youth political organisations.2 Summy and Saunders – 
also both participants, though after 1967 – wrote a brief history of the Australian peace 
movement that deals with the early 1960s only to set up the “bifurcation” of the movement into 
radicals and moderates after 1967.3 Only Summy’s 1971 Masters Thesis deals with anti-war 
protest in this early period, despite the fact that the experience of anti-war protest before 1967 
was formative for the later, better known period of protest.4 As a consequence coverage of the 
Johnson visit is surprisingly thin, focusing mainly on the impact of the visit on the 1966 
Australian election or the consequences for the Australian-US alliance.5 Coverage of the Kỳ visit 
is even more neglected.6  
Rather than focus on changes in organisational structures or alliances in a broader anti-war 
movement, this chapter will examine the changing meaning of protest in Australian public 
political life during this crucial transition phase in Australian anti-war protest. As such, it is 
devoted to analysis of the representation of protest in newspapers. It will look in detail at the 
formation and activities of two ad hoc committees formed in 1965 and 1966 to protest 
involvement in the Vietnam War - the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) and the Project 
Vietnam Committee (PVC). In the middle of 1965, most public commentators understood public 
discourse as a process of rational-critical debate that would naturally produce a worthwhile 
outcome. This is visible in the rhetoric of the state peace committees as well as other public 
debates about the war and about protest. The ad hoc coalitions, on the other hand, drawing on 
experience in anti-nuclear campaigns, thought of protest as a didactic exercise, and intended to 
shape it into a democratic weapon. When they chose to begin staging teach-ins – a practice 
translated from the example of Berkeley in California – the press reported them as part of a 
public conversation intended to both educate and promote public debate. This changed with the 
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visits of Kỳ and Johnson. Close analysis of the words used to describe protesters in relation to 
the welcoming crowds reveal that by the end of 1966, protest had become an uncontrollable 
threat to civic order. Although high-profile figures in the ALP attempted to take advantage of the 
rising status of political protest during the Kỳ visit, this strategy helped neither the ALP nor 
protesters recover their political legitimacy in public discourse. By the end of 1966 it was no 
longer possible for activists or their supporters in the press to claim that protesters represented 
the Australian public. It was this declining legitimacy that prompted activists to look to civil 
disobedience and ‘New Left’ or Marxist radicalism for possible ways to revitalise their protest 
practice. 
 
Anti-war Protest Begins 
Until the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964, Vietnam was only mentioned occasionally in 
peace activist publications and conferences. Rumours of the War in Indochina reached 
Australian ears early, but at first caused little concern amongst Australian peace workers. 
Isabelle Blume, a Belgian socialist and Vice-President of the World Peace Council, attended the 
1959 Melbourne Peace Congress. Fresh from a tour of Diem-controlled South Vietnam, she 
spoke on her recent experiences to the Citizens’ Conference. Her speech made an impact on 
some activists at the time, but did not place Vietnam on the agenda for the peace committees, 
which were at that time heavily involved in anti-nuclear campaigns.7 In 1961, the most radical of 
the three Melbourne ‘Peace Parsons,’ Reverend Victor James, published an article called 
“Vietnam for the Vietnamese,” in The Beacon, a Melbourne-based Unitarian publication. The 
article was reprinted by the Victorian Peace Council as a pamphlet. James predicted a future war 
in Vietnam that would “involve not only the South but the whole of Vietnam and then South-
East Asia [and] may begin at any moment.” He argued that Australia was inextricably entwined 
in Vietnam’s destiny through regional treaty obligations and alliances, and thus Australian peace 
activists had a responsibility to “point out the possible consequences of our country’s support of 
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the foreign policy of the USA”.8 By July 1962 the Association for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament’s (AICD) monthly publication Peace Action was asking if South Vietnam would 
be the “flashpoint for war”. It jostled for space amidst articles on Cambodia, Cuba, nuclear 
disarmament and French nuclear testing.9 As the conflict in Vietnam escalated it began to receive 
more attention in peace publications. The August-September 1964 issue of Peace Action featured 
a two-page report by Wilfred Burchett on the “Vietnam Crisis,” and advertised an American 
book about South Vietnam called The Hidden War. It also contained a reply from the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom to the Minister for External Affairs, who had argued 
in the House of Representatives that there was “no alternative” to force in Asia.10 
As the conflict in Vietnam increased in intensity, so too did anti-war activity. Two days after 
North Vietnamese boats apparently fired upon the USS Maddox in what would become known as 
the ‘Tonkin Gulf incident,’ Jim Cairns used his Hiroshima Day speech to frame the war as a 
possible site for escalation to a nuclear conflict and to call for a negotiated settlement of the 
conflict through the United Nations.11 Just before Australian commitment, the Communist Party 
of Australia purchased an advertisement in the Australian advocating negotiation, and arguing 
that external involvement in the war was preventing a “peaceful life” for the people of South 
Vietnam.12 The day after the advertisement appeared Cairns spoke to a group of Sydney 
University students, arguing that negotiation was the least dangerous of the options confronting 
the United States and that the US policy on Vietnam just “extended the war” and “brought 
communist control of the Viet Cong and the greater part of South Vietnam”.13 Throughout 
March and early April, Menzies engaged in an open correspondence with a number of Anglican 
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Bishops, debating the merits of negotiation over involvement.14 In early April a collection of 
citizens unaffiliated with peace organisations presented a petition to the American, South 
Vietnamese and North Vietnamese embassies in Canberra calling for a negotiated end to the 
conflict. The text of the petition claimed that “Australians abhor” a war characterised by “brutal 
and callous indifference to the suffering of innocent people”.15 When the US ambassador-at-
large, Henry Cabot Lodge, was visiting for talks with senior officials of the Menzies government 
in late April, students in Canberra staged a demonstration calling for an end to the “carnage,” and 
against “too many innocent dead,” demanding that the United States “Leave Vietnam alone,” and 
that there be “No nuclear war from Vietnam”.16 At this time, Australian opposition to the war 
rested on the claim that the US, not North Vietnam, was responsible for prolonging the conflict 
and preventing peace, and that UN mediation and negotiations were the only acceptable 
resolution to the conflict. 
The Australian Government’s announcement at the end of April of a battalion of regular army 
troops produced a flurry of protest actions. The earliest protests were organised by trade unions, 
students, and peace committees; these groups used their existing organisational networks to 
quickly organise opposition to commitment.17 Students protested at US Consulates and army 
barracks; the Seamen’s Union imposed a black ban on the visiting US warship USS Vancouver; 
the ACTU organised Australia-wide protests; a group of pacifist clergy brought together a prayer 
vigil in Canberra; and the state peace organisations framed their annual Hiroshima Day protest in 
late May as a debate on the Vietnam War.18 Similar to the anti-nuclear campaigns discussed in 
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the previous chapter, the Federal Parliament and foreign consulates and embassies were frequent 
sites of protest, as they symbolised the federal government and international relations. In July 
and August, teach-ins on Vietnam were held at the Australian National University and Monash 
University. By the middle of the year, ‘Vietnam’ had emerged as the central political issue facing 
Australian activists. Rather than protesting as pacifists, unionists and anti-nuclear activists, 
activists opposed to the war began to form ad hoc coalitions specifically to protest against the 
Vietnam War. The Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD) 
Committee’s 1965 Annual Report noted this shift, reporting that “diversity and at the same time 
co-operation in peace action arising from various sources has never been greater” and that they 
had “attempted to assist and encourage” such groups. The committee identified that “common 
objectives and mutual respect” gave these broad coalitions coherence that overcame their 
organisational heterogeneity.19 If organisational structures are the determiner of a movement then 
the inauguration of these coalitions mark the moment of the Australian anti-war movement’s 
organisational birth. 
The first of these coalitions was the VAC in Sydney. In early August, Bob Gould, the 
convener of Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (SCND), wrote to activist organisations 
in Sydney noting the lack of “any central body which sees as its function to organise specifically 
against the Vietnam War” and suggesting  
the energetic mounting of a public campaign of activity for the ending of the Vietnam war, 
taking as its point of departure the demand for the withdrawal of Australian troops from 
Vietnam, and introducing firmly to people’s minds the essentially unexceptionable proposition 
that the solution of the affairs of Vietnam must be left to the people of Vietnam.20 
Gould’s letter highlighted SCND, student and union protests as the most successful anti-war 
protests yet, and expressed hope that coordination between the disparate organisations protesting 
the war could bring about demonstrations on the scale of the American or British protests being 
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reported in the press.21 The VAC’s first action was a “Week of Protest” against the Vietnam War 
in September 1965, culminating in a demonstration of around 200 outside the Commonwealth 
Bank building in Martin Place on the 17th of September. Although the Sydney Morning Herald 
repeated the VAC’s claim to be “formed of many individuals and organisations, including trade 
unions, student groups, churchmen, academics, peace bodies and housewives,” the paper sought 
to diminish the protests as youthful enthusiasm, adding that “most of the demonstrators were 
young people, many of them students”.22 Like the SCND, the VAC resisted this marginalisation, 
characterising its membership as diverse and thus representative of broader public opinion. 
Given his previous experience in Sydney CND, it is unsurprising that Gould lionised British 
and American examples. One of his colleagues wrote that  
During this period, the American protest movement was developing rapidly, and several 
people in Sydney were watching with interest. Among these was Bob Gould of CND, who 
came to the conclusion that an organisation in Sydney similar to the Berkeley Vietnam Day 
Committee should be launched. To this end, he called a meeting of people who had 
participated in the previous demonstrations, and the Vietnam Action Committee was born.23 
The Berkeley organisation had been formed after a 35-hour on-campus teach-in in May 1965, 
and the International Committee of the American organisation had been writing to Australian 
student unions and Labor Clubs suggesting that they also hold teach-ins. In late August, 
Australian activist organisations received letters from the Berkeley committee publicising the 
internationally-coordinated “International Days of Protest” on the 15th and 16th of October, 
1965.24 In Melbourne, the letter was the catalyst for the formation of an ad hoc committee that 
shared the Berkeley group’s name. As with the VAC, the Melbourne Vietnam Day Committee 
(VDC) drew on established activist networks for membership. The President of the Melbourne 
VDC was the Reverend David Pope, who was also the President of the Victorian Campaign for 
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Nuclear Disarmament (VCND). The Secretary of the VDC, Roger Holdsworth, put together 
regular publications for both organisations, and had also previously been the treasurer of the 
Melbourne University Labor Club.25 Just as the VAC preferred “mass” actions and made claims 
about the diversity of their organisation to foil claims they were not representative of public 
opinion, the VDC in Melbourne called for “wide representation of all interested groups”.26  
The Sydney and Melbourne organisations initially intended to hold protests synchronised with 
the Berkeley request, but the VAC delayed their solidarity action by a week because “Sydney’s 
Aldermaston Support March is always held a week later than overseas, with good results from 
TV publicity about the overseas event”.27 The Melbourne rally drew around 200, though the 24-
hour vigil that preceded it was disrupted by National Servicemen.28 The delayed VAC protest in 
Sydney drew 500. Somewhere between 47 and 80 were arrested after they occupied George 
Street, during peak hour, ignoring police directions to remain on the footpaths, in what the 
Australian described as “Sydney’s wildest demonstration in years” and the Age called a “riot”.29 
Both ad hoc coalitions also worked alongside existing activist organisations. On December 13th, 
the VAC put on a “poster parade and leaflet distribution” in Martin Place alongside the AICD’s 
“Vietnam emergency protest rally”.30 Each organisation promoted the other’s event. The AICD 
also supported VAC through allowing use of their Parker Street rooms for meetings.31 The VDC 
sponsored a folk concert alongside the VCND, CICD, and the Youth Campaign Against 
Conscription (YCAC), among others.32  
Another ad hoc group was formed in Sydney around a similar request for international 
solidarity from an American protest organisation. The Project Vietnam Committee (PVC) was 
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initiated by the AICD and church groups over the 1965 Christmas break in response to news of 
further internationally coordinated protests. The ad hoc committee focused its efforts on 
publicity for “Project Vietnam,” a public rally to be followed by a series of concurrent public 
meetings to be held on March 16th, 1966 at the Trocadero and Sydney Town Hall.33 By the time 
of “Project Vietnam,” the terms of the Vietnam debate had shifted. When it became clear in 
February 1966 that the Menzies Government would send conscripts to Vietnam, the issues of 
commitment and National Service became entangled. Protest marches took place in all East 
Coast capitals on the 26th of March. Marchers held banners conflating the two questions - “No 
conscripts for Vietnam” – alongside other banners denouncing the war itself.34 A second set of 
protest marches took place over the weekend of the 15th, 16th and 17th of April in East Coast 
capitals. These were also arranged in response to an international appeal, this time from “U.S. 
National Coordinating Committee to end the War in Vietnam”.35 Curthoys has pointed out that 
April and November were important dates to American protesters, lining up with American 
university calendars, but making little sense to Australians.36  
Neither high-profile participants like Calwell nor the newspapers that reported the rallies 
acknowledged the international connections that were so important to the activists who organised 
the solidarity actions. Although it was publicised by the organisers as “part of a world-wide 
demonstration on this day called by the United States National Co-ordinating Committee to End 
the War in Vietnam,” newspapers saw the March and April protests in local terms; largely an 
effort by Opposition leader Arthur Calwell to make National Service an election issue.37 The 
ALP candidate for the Kooyong by-election – caused by the retirement of Menzies – had spoken 
to the Project Vietnam crowd in Melbourne, accusing the Government of “trying to stifle protest 
against the decision to send national servicemen to Vietnam”.38 In the wake of these 
demonstrations, Calwell also called for more protests over conscription, implying a relationship 
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between public protest, public opinion, and the election. In Sydney, newspapers linked the April 
protests, which included a candlelit vigil in Wynyard Park on the 20th, to the looming possibility 
of a confrontation between demonstrators and troops departing for Vietnam, who would be 
parading through the city.39 Though the increased pace in protest in March and April was driven 
by a desire for international coordination, it coincided with the increased local intensity of the 
conscription debate. Local participants framed the March and April protests as part of the 
mounting controversy over the use of conscripts in Vietnam.  
After the frenetic period of activity between March and May 1966, the pace of protest flagged 
somewhat. Nevertheless, established pacifist networks and ad hoc coalitions continued to agitate 
against conscription and involvement. In May the Federal Executive of the Seamen’s Union 
refused to crew the Boonaroo because it was carrying supplies to Australian troops in Vietnam.40 
After the ACTU involved itself as mediator and the government began planning to crew the ship 
with military personnel, the Union eventually agreed to provide crews.41 The Seamen’s Union 
and the VAC staged a protest at the ship’s berth at Garden Island on the 20th, and another protest 
on the 26th that delayed the departure of the ship by several hours  but the steam had gone out of 
the Union action.42 A weakening in protest fervour was also evident when the VDC sponsored a 
28 May protest in Melbourne. Although they were hoping to attract 2000 marchers, there was no 
press coverage and it seems unlikely that many turned up; support fell short of organisers’ 
expectations.43 In Sydney, the PVC had taken over the work of the Hiroshima Day Committee, 
and in both cities the marches listed the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam amongst their 
demands.44 The annual Hiroshima Day marches drew 1500 in Sydney and 4000 in Melbourne, 
though given the low numbers at anti-war marches, these crowds probably owe more to the 
momentum of anti-nuclear feeling than to the intensity of the Vietnam issue. 
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It was the high-profile international visits of President Johnson in October 1966 and Premier 
Kỳ in January 1967 that brought the debate over Australian involvement in Vietnam to a head. 
Johnson planned to visit Australia in October 1966 on his way to the seven-nation Manila 
conference on Vietnam. In June, Prime Minister Harold Holt had given a speech in Washington 
in which he characterised Australia as “an admiring friend, a staunch friend that will be all the 
way with LBJ.” The critical reaction to Holt’s pithy statement, which referenced Johnson’s own 
election slogan, ranged from curt admonitions that Australia was not merely an American 
satellite in the region to outright condemnation of Holt’s characterisation of Australia as an 
American lapdog.45 Johnson’s visit was only a month before the Federal Election, which Calwell 
had framed in terms of Australian involvement in Vietnam. As the President who had responded 
to the Tonkin Gulf incident with large-scale troop deployment, Johnson could not be untangled 
from the Vietnam War. Neither could Air Vice-Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, leader of the South 
Vietnam military junta, who visited Australia in January 1967. When Holt had met Kỳ at the 
Manila conference in late October the latter had asked for an invitation to visit Australia. Even 
the mainstream press was troubled by Holt’s agreement. The Age called Holt’s invitation to Kỳ a 
“blunder,” and raised questions about the legitimacy of Kỳ’s junta and his distaste for 
negotiations with the North.46 The Australian wondered if Holt had been “outwitted” by Kỳ, who 
hoped to use the visit to bolster his election campaign in the looming South Vietnam elections.47 
Anti-war activists understood both visits as opportunities to gain exposure to the media, and 
planned multi-state protests in response. 
As the leader of Australia’s most powerful Cold War ally, Johnson was easily turned into a 
symbol of Australian anxieties and ambivalence about independence. A Mirror editorial in early 
October noted the “doubts” surrounding the relationship between Australia and the US, but 
concluded that such doubts would not “lessen the traditional warmth Australians show to a 
distinguished visitor and proven friend”.48 The Sun ran a front-page editorial the afternoon before 
the visit titled “an ally, not a colony,” in which it acknowledged that there was “nothing to be 
ashamed of” in needing a great and powerful protector, but also noted the “near absurdities” of 
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the “American-style” welcome planned for Johnson in Sydney. The paper stressed that though 
the relationship would “inevitably grow closer,” future conflicts would be met with dignity as an 
ally and friend rather than a dependent.49 At the same time, Johnson also signified the escalation 
of the war and heightened concerns about Australia’s involvement. Anti-war activists hoped his 
visit would reflect a lack of consensus on Australian commitment and conscription and planned 
to capitalise on the media attention that Johnson would attract. 
Two competing narratives about Johnson’s visit jostled for dominance. Those in favour 
treated it as a gala occasion to celebrate the special relationship between Australia and the USA. 
Those opposed increasingly saw it as the symbol of a Cold War or imperialist American 
expansionism that threatened world peace, endangered young men and stifled the aspirations of 
the Vietnamese people. Inevitably, these views clashed in colourful ways. In anticipation of 
public celebration, metropolitan dailies and the Australian published timetables and maps 
detailing Johnson’s processions through the major capitals.50 Sydney papers in particular 
concentrated on the exuberant preparations for the visit, detailing red white and blue bunting, the 
enforced fast of a thousand white pigeons (to prevent accidental defecation on the presidential 
motorcade), the creation of a patch of “instant bush” at Circular Quay, and the addition of extra 
trains and parking restrictions to ease the flow of the expected 500 000-strong crowd.51 On the 
other hand, anti-war activists began to plan the most visible protests they could manage.  
Johnson arrived in Canberra on the Thursday, and had lunch at Government House with Lord 
Casey. From there he was to proceed to the Canberra Rex hotel, where a crowd of 1000-3000 
protesters had been waiting for him all afternoon. At the last minute, Johnson opted to avoid the 
crowd and dine at the Prime Ministerial lodge with the Holts.52 The next day he visited the War 
Memorial and spoke to Parliament.53 Though it contained very little concrete detail, Johnson’s 
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speech was hailed as a promise of peace in Vietnam.54 The Melbourne Herald recognised it as a 
speech about Western-Asian relations rather than a pronouncement of the Administration’s 
Vietnam policy.55 In the afternoon Johnson flew to Melbourne, where half a million people lined 
the roads. The motorcade was re-routed twice to avoid planned demonstrations, and a counter-
cavalcade of cars draped in anti-war posters and banners and crewed by Monash University 
students was prevented by police from entering the city.56  
By this point in his visit, Johnson’s informality had become legendary. The press in New 
Zealand had reported his habit of stopping the motorcade so he could shake as many hands as 
possible, much to the consternation of his security staff.57 On one such informal stop in 
Melbourne the President was confronted by a man bearing a placard saying “L.B.J. – 
BLOODFINGER”. The President asked him “Aren’t you ashamed of yourself?”58 After a stop at 
the Town Hall for a civic reception, Johnson was driven to Elm Tree House, the home of Dame 
Mabel Brooks, with whom he had stayed as a visiting G.I. during the war. Protesters chanting 
“Hey! Hey! LBJ! How many kids have you killed today!” lined St. Kilda Road, and the 
President’s limousine sped up to avoid them. As the car passed, the protesters broke barricades, 
swarmed into the road, and what the Age described as a twenty-minute “near-riot” ensued.59 A 
crowd of anti-conscription protesters identified as Save Our Sons were reported shouting 
“murderer” and “Go home Yank!” outside Elm Tree House.60 After a reunion with Dame Mabel 
Brooks described in familiar and sentimental terms by the press, the motorcade left for 
Government House and a parliamentary reception, two hours behind schedule.61 
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The most spectacular protest in Melbourne occurred just outside the gates of Elm Tree House. 
Two young Melbourne men, John and David Langley, splattered the Presidential limousine with 
red and green paint – the colours of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front flag. Like other 
protesters, they were caught off-guard by the change of route but raced to Dame Brooks’ house 
once news reached them through the crowd. The press missed the significance of the colours of 
the paint and reported the incident from the perspective of the motorcade. The Langley brothers 
were rarely named, though the President’s bodyguard, Rufus Youngblood, was named in several 
stories.62 At Government House there was a Parliamentary reception and Johnson gave a speech 
in which he warned Australians that the Vietnam War was “on Australia’s own doorstep” and 
reiterated that he was “all the way” with Australia.63 
On the Saturday, even larger crowds and more contentious protests awaited Johnson in 
Sydney. A million Sydneysiders came to see Johnson as his motorcade drove from the Airport to 
the Art Gallery.64 Crowds of well-wishers broke the barricades and surged into Anzac Parade, 
delaying the motorcade.65 There were also organised demonstrations at the airport and at several 
prominent points along the route, interspersed with the welcoming crowds. Demonstrators threw 
toilet paper, black streamers and bomb-shaped balloons at the Presidential limousine.66 The VAC 
had set up to protest at the eastern end of Hyde Park. Gould recalled the tension between those 
welcoming Johnson and the protesters. As the crowd expectantly waited for the motorcade to 
arrive,  
The Mormon Tabernacle choir started up, and they had an enormous organ which drowned out 
our chants. Dave Taylor, an engineer from New Zealand, said, “Bob, we can’t have this”. He 
went to Woolies and brought some wire cutters and all of a sudden the Mormon Tabernacle 
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Choir went off the air. Then it’s on the air. Then it’s off the air. Then it’s on the air. After 
about ten minutes of this, it went off the air for good.67 
As the motorcade approached the intersection of Liverpool and College Streets, protesters broke 
through the barricades and threw themselves in front of Johnson’s car.68 According to the 
Mirror, “the barriers seemed to explode” as young people – the papers characterised them as 
young women and bearded men – rushed onto the road.69 After the lie-down protest at Hyde 
Park, the motorcade sped up and there were no further impromptu stops until it reached the Art 
Gallery, where the President was to make a speech. Protesters from Hyde Park filtered through 
the Domain to join the 2000-3000 strong crowd of demonstrators on the Art Gallery steps.70 That 
night the President returned to Canberra. The President’s tour ended with a brief trip to Brisbane 
and Townsville before he departed for Manila.71  
Like Johnson, Kỳ was the leader of an allied co-belligerent who was standing for election at 
home. Unlike Johnson, public representations of Kỳ were ambivalent at best. In October 1966, 
the New York Times acknowledged that Kỳ was unpopular everywhere but the United States, and 
voiced concern at the continued military governance of South Vietnam.72 With Calwell’s 
support, anti-Kỳ demonstrations took place in each of the four cities that Kỳ visited. The first 
protests took place outside Parliament House on the Wednesday, when a crowd of between 400 
and 700 protesters led by Calwell demonstrated and a breakaway group of 200 marched to Kỳ’s 
hotel. Calwell was quoted as calling Kỳ a “Fascist,” a “dictator,” and a “miserable little 
butcher”.73 The next day, Kỳ visited the War Memorial, where he was met by a crowd of 
supporters carrying placards, one of whom shouted “Good on you mate!”74 Later he gave a 
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speech at the National Press Club after a government reception. The press commented warmly 
on Kỳ’s eloquence and charm, drawing a contrast with the small “flat” protests of only 200 
people.75 Kỳ flew to Brisbane on the Friday, where a crowd of 2000 gathered outside the hotel 
where he was being hosted at a state dinner. Protesters repeated Calwell’s cries of “fascist 
butcher” and shouted “murderer” as they repeatedly rushed the barricades.76 In Sydney the 
following day 4000 demonstrators massed under the northern end of the Harbour Bridge in 
preparation for a march on Kirribilli House, where Kỳ was being hosted at a reception. After 
state police put Kỳ on a launch from Circular Quay instead of a car, the protesters marched to a 
tense confrontation with police in riot gear, bolstered by fire hoses. The superintendent addressed 
the crowd by megaphone, telling them that “We were informed by Commonwealth authorities 
that you would approach this area in an orderly manner,” that they were “supposed to approach 
in single file” and that as a result, “not one single person will break these police lines”.77 After 
the reception, Kỳ was taken on a harbour cruise on a boat owned by a local hotel owner after the 
Maritime and Dredge Workers’ Union had refused to crew the government’s VIP craft.78 Kỳ’s 
Melbourne visit attracted the largest crowds; 6500 grouped in Alexandra Gardens where they 
were addressed by Calwell.79 The Age reported that most of them had dissipated by the time Kỳ 
decided to have his driver take the car through the protest so he could see the demonstrators up 
close.80 From Melbourne, Kỳ flew to New Zealand to continue his tour. 
 
Protest as Participation in Public Debate  
Throughout this period, protest formed part of a public debate about involvement in Vietnam. 
Murphy calls the competing positions for and against involvement the logics of commitment and 
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dissent.81 A public debate held in March and April 1965 between a group of Anglican Bishops 
and the Prime Minister laid out early examples of both of these positions, and hinted that the 
assumptions about the role of public debate in the formation of public opinion were not limited 
to anti-war activists. The conversation was carried out through a series of letters, some of which 
were reported by the metropolitan dailies and in some cases republished in full by the 
Australian.82 Menzies laid out the logic of commitment as it stood just prior to Australian 
intervention, positioning it as an attempt to prevent “aggressive communism” from “moving near 
[Australian] shores”. Negotiation, he argued, could not take place in preference to armed conflict 
because Communists were intent on armed revolution and were opposed to elections. He argued 
in Parliament that “America would discuss South Vietnam when the communists accepted that 
the US would not abandon the South and that the South was free from attack from the North”.83 
“Surely nobody will deny,” he claimed in his reply to the Bishops, “that North Vietnam is under 
complete communist control, and that free elections simply cannot happen”.84 In Menzies’ view 
of the conflict, the existence of North Vietnam and peace in Vietnam were mutually exclusive, 
the free elections stipulated by the Geneva Agreements were impossible because of Northern 
intransigence, and therefore the South was blameless for any breach of the Agreements. In 
response, the bishops laid out the initial logic of dissent: the South was not a free or democratic 
polity but a military regime that did not enjoy popular support; the US and Australia’s support 
for South Vietnam was in direct contravention of the UN’s 1954 Geneva Agreements; and the 
war was an example of the failure of international agreements to ensure Vietnamese self-
determination.85 In Menzies’ view the North had to be defeated to save democracy because it 
would not negotiate, while in the Bishops’ competing narrative the Southern regime’s legitimacy 
had to be tested in democratic elections overseen by the UN. Because both the North and the 
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South would only be satisfied with the destruction of the other, the debate over intervention or 
negotiation in Australia was irreconcilable. 
Australian commentators thought that public debate would bring about resolution. The 
conversation that ensued between Parliament, the Press and the protesters over the next two 
years in the newspapers and in the streets was an attempt to make one logic or the other 
hegemonic by actively attempting to shape public opinion. Thus Menzies acknowledged that his 
conversation with the Bishops had served a “valuable public purpose.”86 Here he was arguing 
that any laying out of facts in a reasoned argument was an inherent public good. Jim Cairns 
agreed. When speaking about the ‘Freedom Rides’ through country NSW at Sydney University 
in early 1966, he said: “I think anything done reasonably to bring these things to the notice of the 
public is justified and bound to give a good result”. 87  Anti-war activists shared Menzies’ and 
Cairns’ faith in the power of public debate. In January 1966, the AICD Newsletter argued that 
the movement’s role was to “ensure that the great debate is resumed and extended … through the 
media of forums, teach-ins etc.” Such action had the capacity to bring about “the revitalisation of 
the democratic process”.88 A group of academics from the University of New South Wales 
formed the University Study Group on Vietnam in mid-1965 and published a book of documents 
titled Vietnam and Australia: History, Documents, Interpretations in 1966. The stated intent of 
the collection was to present “facts and opinions” in order to “stimulate readers to discuss them 
with us and with their fellow citizens. A continuing and informed discussion is vital if the truth is 
to be made known, and a more humane policy to be evolved”.89 The preface quoted American 
sociologist and New Left theorist C. Wright Mills in support of the political righteousness of 
public education: “Democracy requires that those who bear the consequences of decisions have 
enough knowledge to hold the decision-makers accountable”.90 Australian protest practice was 
shaped by the assumption that the public, once correctly informed, could not fail but to reach a 
position in accord with their own. 
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The language anti-war activists used implied that an informed public would also be an active 
and participatory one. For the Chairman of the AICD, Dr. A. G. H. Lawes, the role of 
organisations like his was to “build an overwhelming force of well informed, active, and well 
organised public opinion,” which could then be “directed to those quarters where the vital 
decisions affecting the whole future of this country are made”.91 The AICD Annual Report for 
1965 characterised the “informed and active public opinion” that the organisation had 
“endeavoured to create” as “the weapons which democrats have by inalienable right”.92 The 
AICD newsletter accorded public opinion with the capacity to “force” the “Establishment” to 
“enter the arena of the public forum where many myths are being devastatingly exposed and 
demolished before the eyes of hundreds of thousands of television viewers”.93 The language of 
weapons, devastation and force characterised the public as a powerful and righteous ally of anti-
war protest. 
The VAC likewise understood the public as a political force, but one to be engaged through 
spectacle as well as education. For the VAC, mass participation was the only measure of success: 
“To be more effective, we would have to aim for an even larger number of people in the 
demonstration”. To achieve this, the Committee was to “carefully prepare more spectacular 
forms of protest, with a view to attracting the widest possible public attention.”94 Anti-war 
activists were agreed that reaching the public was the goal of protest, and that the claim to be 
part of a majority was an important one. However, as a noted Trotskyist, Gould’s sense of mass 
was related to the Marxist concept of political consciousness.95 The notion of mass mobilisation 
implied workers’ realisation of their objective class situation, a different ideological emphasis to 
the notion of a democratic majority made up of equal citizens. In a similar fashion, the idea of 
political consciousness as the moment of realisation of one’s true class position was different to 
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the idea of public opinion as the result of rational debate. The rhetorical differences between 
majority and mass was accompanied by different emphases on education and spectacle. 
When Gould invited anti-war organisations to the inaugural VAC meeting in August 1965, his 
letter cited examples of successful and spectacular protests, including civil disobedience in the 
form of the ‘sit-down’. His letter also indicated the Marxist fetishisation of radicalism, mass and 
scale; he conflated ‘militant’ and ‘successful’ in the same way he elided ‘large scale’ and 
‘effective’.96 For Gould, the occupation of George Street during the “International Days of 
Protest” in October 1965, during which between 47 and 80 protesters were arrested, was an 
example of a successful protest. The arrests fulfilled the VAC’s desire for spectacle and 
delighted Gould, who saw this as the beginning of a genuine campaign of civil disobedience. 
Gould had watched these tactics unfold in Britain in the early 1960s during his time in SCND, 
but until the VAC’s September 1965 protest, Australian anti-war demonstrators had not 
experimented with them or incorporated them into their demonstrations. 
The VAC’s interest in events in Berkeley indicates that contemporaries interpreted local 
protest in relation to overseas examples. Thus the organisation’s newsletter understood the 
organisation’s protests as an attempt to provide a “flash point for the public conscience,” arguing 
that the ‘International Days of Protest” in October 1965 had served a similar function for the 
US.97 Continuing anti-nuclear activists’ practice of imagining a global movement, the AICD 
newsletter argued in February 1966 that the “now highly diverse world peace movement,” could 
“rightly claim a major share of the credit” for the development of an “embarrassingly well 
informed” global public. In keeping with this sense of a global movement, Australian activists 
again were anxious to keep abreast of overseas protest actions. Australians beyond the 
established peace and anti-war organisations had become conversant enough in the ‘sit-in’ or 
occupation from reportage on Civil Rights protests in the United States that the NSW Legislative 
Assembly warned the NSW Home and Property Owners’ Association in November 1964 that 
any attempt to occupy the public gallery in protest would be met with forcible ejection.98 Even 
the Defence Minister read Australian protest in relation to protest elsewhere in the world, noting 
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“all of the protest that is going on throughout this country” in connection to “protest rife in the 
world today”.99 Local reportage provided examples of protest from overseas: the Berkeley 
Students for a Democratic Society’s 20 000 strong Easter 1965 “March on Washington to End 
the War in Vietnam”; a resurgent CND Easter demonstration of a similar size in Trafalgar 
Square, London; and a small protest in Wellington, New Zealand, against a potential New 
Zealand commitment to the Vietnam conflict.100 Thus when the Berkeley VDC wrote to local 
organisations in August, calling for “dramatic, large-scale actions … to increase public alarm 
about the war in Vietnam,” Australian anti-war activists were already speaking in similar terms 
to their counterparts in California.101 
 
Translating the Teach-in 
The local staging of teach-ins in July and August 1965 highlights the adaptation of practices 
gleaned from international examples. The teach-in had been developed at UC Berkeley, and the 
“Vietnam Day” teach-in of May 1965 had provided the impetus for the formation of the VAC in 
Sydney and the VDC in Melbourne. One of the suggestions that the American VDC had made to 
Australian student unions and peace groups was that they organise teach-ins on the Berkeley 
model. Teach-ins were held at the Australian National University (ANU) and Monash University 
in July and August 1965. The ANU teach-in was reported in both the Australian and the Sydney 
Morning Herald, while the Monash teach-in was televised on Channel 2.102 Capitalising on the 
momentary publicity surrounding the teach-in, two Anglican Bishops, a Methodist and a 
Presbyterian also staged a “preach-in” at the State Theatre in Sydney.103 A televised debate in 
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late July on Channel 7 was also billed as a ‘teach in,’ including Jim Cairns and Bob Santamaria 
on the panel.104  
The ANU and Monash teach-ins garnered significant press interest. Local newspapers 
identified them as “a form of public protest” and noted their international provenance, 
characterising them as part of a “teach-in movement” that had begun at the University of 
Michigan earlier that year.105 Craig McGregor covered the teach-ins for the SMH, and noted the 
“direct parallels” between burgeoning Australian anti-war protest, American Civil Rights 
activism and the British CND. He claimed that these international “movements” had “jolted the 
student body out of its apathy and produced a profound and continuing commitment to political 
and social causes”. Betraying his radical sympathies, McGregor hoped a similar transformation 
would take place in Australia as a result of the teach-in.106  
The ANU and Monash teach-ins were intended as public debates on the Government’s 
Vietnam policy. C P Fitzgerald, ANU Professor of Far Eastern History and chairman of the 
organising committee for the ANU teach-in, characterised the event as “a discussion on Vietnam 
… [that] will continue until the subject is ‘talked out’.”107 McGregor argued that “at face value” 
it was “a purely uncommitted meeting of people, wanting information,” although he argued that 
the “Left-wingers [sic]” at the meeting “regarded it as a form of public protest”. He concluded 
that the audience “came not just to learn but to have their emotion given intellectual 
reinforcement”.108 In contrast, his colleague James Hall argued that “this was hardly a protest 
meeting engineered by the Left over Vietnam,” and that  
If the teach-in proved anything it was that a lot of people are deeply emotionally concerned 
about Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, even if, as was manifestly the case in that audience, 
they were not precisely sure where they stood.109 
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Although Hall concluded that most audience members left “feeling somewhat wiser about some 
aspects of the Vietnam situation if somewhat more confused on others,” he also felt that “I don’t 
suppose anyone went away with his or her opinions changed”.110 Another Sydney Morning 
Herald journalist argued that the event was demonstrating that Australian public opinion on 
Vietnam had a wider scope than the Cold War consensus credited it with: “the Prime Minister 
has more than, as he puts it, ‘Communists, pacifists and philosophic doubters’ on his hands over 
Vietnam.”111 McGregor did not equivocate. For him the teach-in was “in a profound sense … a 
failure; because what it clearly failed to do was to formalise and reflect the extraordinary 
emotional intensity of the people who attended it”. 112 A televised teach-in organised by the 
Department of Adult Education at the University of Sydney attracted similar criticism from 
Leicester Cotton in the Sydney Morning Herald: 
But did it teach or do anything more than confirm those who took part in their own previous 
convictions? Did it alter by a single degree the varying and vehement viewpoints of the panel? 
We very much doubt it. Or of the audience? There was no evidence of it.113 
The organisers and some participants interpreted the teach-ins as an attempt to shape public 
opinion, and assessed their success or failure according to their capacity to do so. 
 
The Noisy Minority 
As the Vietnam War emerged as a bone of public contention, protest became the subject rather 
than the agent of public debate. At the peak of anti-war protest in March and April 1966 a 
number of Government spokespeople began to argue that protesters were knowingly or 
unknowingly acting as enemy agents. This tactic echoed the dismissal of the 1959 Melbourne 
and 1964 Sydney Peace Congresses by Menzies and a number of his government’s ministers.114 
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The Defence Minister Allen Fairhall noted in question time in March that “confusion in the 
public mind” over conscription and commitment was “a more powerful asset to the Communists 
than any weapon they have in the field”. In April he made the accusation more concrete when he 
labelled anti-war and anti-conscription activists an active “fifth column”.115 Like Fairhall, 
External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck accused local anti-war protest of aiding the enemy, 
arguing that the Melbourne VDC protest in September 1965 had been part of a Hanoi-led “month 
of hatred” directed against America.116 William McMahon, then Minister for Labour and 
National Service, characterised protest organisers as “people who did not believe in the ideals of 
Western democracy”.117 When Kỳ gave a speech on the last day of his visit, he engaged in the 
same sort of red-baiting, arguing that the “ordinary people” he had met, “not the organised 
demonstrators, reflect more truly the feeling of most Australians”. In response to a question 
about what “the Communist countries” would think of Calwell’s demonstrations, Kỳ noted that 
some demonstrators had carried “the communist flag” and responded “I am sure that the 
Communist bloc in Asia are very happy with Mr. Calwell’s demonstrations”.118 Protest itself 
came under scrutiny, distracting from the questions of commitment and conscription. 
The most telling Government comment on the protests came from Fairhall. Although he 
agreed that protest had a relationship to public opinion, in a speech to a parade of conscripts the 
Defence Minister rejected anti-war protesters’ claim to be expressing it. He stated that the 
protests “do not emanate from the Australian people as such but from a noisy minority”.119 Not 
happy with simply arguing that they did not have the support of the public, Government 
ministers excluded protesters from the body of the public entirely. Activists refuted this 
characterisation. The AICD Chairman condemned the efforts to paint peace activism as a 
Communist attempt to confuse the public mind and aid the Viet Cong, arguing “no longer is it 
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possible to silence protests by calling people nasty names like Commo and fellow traveller.”120 
Three months later the Project Vietnam Committee explained that  
A major objective of the March 16th project will be to expose the establishment myth 
propagated at home and abroad that only an insignificant and misguided minority of the 
Australian community is opposed to its slavish adherence to the US collision course policy in 
Vietnam.121 
The Australian, often sympathetic to protesters in debates over the democratic ‘right to dissent,’ 
implied in an editorial in April that public protest more authentically represented public opinion 
than the lax and rowdy assembly elected to represent the Australian people. The editorial argued 
that “reasonable argument” was heard in Parliament only at “exceptional times,” with “name-
calling and emotional twaddle” the more frequent texture of parliamentary discourse.122 Just as 
Liberal parliamentarians rejected protesters’ claims to represent an Australian democratic 
community, those who supported public demonstrations claimed that Parliament was failing in 
its own representative duties.  
Ironically, Government ministers appeared to interpret protests elsewhere in the world as the 
sign of a healthy democracy. On the same day as its editorial in support of anti-war 
demonstrations at home, the Australian quoted External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck as saying 
that Buddhist demonstrations in Vietnam were evidence of a “degree of liberty of expression and 
liberty of political organisation” that indicated “the degree of political freedom that exists in 
South Vietnam”. Such demonstrations, he concluded, “could not possibly have taken place in 
North Vietnam”.123 The Australian editorial noted the apparent hypocrisy of a government that 
could argue that protest in Vietnam was a truthful expression of the people’s will while in 
Australia it was an illegitimate expression in contrast to that will. It concluded by asking “who is 
undemocratic – he who takes part in anti-Vietnam demonstrations, or he who seeks by law or by 
smear to prevent those demonstrations?” The editorial hinted at Hasluck’s claim that protest was 
a hallmark of democracy: “Those who try to do away with demonstrations because they are anti-
social or irritating should remember that they are espousing the kind of action they would 
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condemn if it took place in another, say, communist country.” 124 Throughout March and April 
these three conflicting interpretations of protest - as legitimate democratic process, as 
Communist fifth column, and as noisy minority at odds with public opinion – demonstrated that 
the meaning of protest itself was contested. 
The comparatively small numbers of protesters during the Johnson protests stood out as both 
noisy and a minority. Sound in particular played an important role in representations of the 
protests. Gould recollects cutting the power to the Mormon Tabernacle Choir’s organ to create 
aural space for the chants of demonstrators. NSW Premier Askin predicted in a speech 
welcoming Johnson at Sydney Airport that “the demonstrators are going to be drowned out by 
the loudest, most penetrating, most clarion-like voice of the people”.125 The Mirror confirmed 
Askin’s prediction, noting that “the booing was more than matched by the cheers and shouts of 
welcome”.126 Liberal parliamentarians and hostile newspaper editors could not have hoped for a 
more literal example of protesters as noisy minority. By establishing a hierarchy of types of 
sound, Askin anointed the welcoming crowds as “the people,” and framed the protesters as being 
opposed to the will of the people. The aim was to drive a wedge between protest and public, and 
thus undermine any claims by the anti-war movement to represent public opinion. 
Even then, it was the crowds welcoming Johnson that were so large and so chaotic that they 
seemed to threaten civic order. At the Sydney Town Hall, Daily Telegraph and the Age described 
a “carefully prepared civic welcome” that was “just swept aside” by the press of a crowd so large 
and uncontrollable that  
Civic dignitaries and their wives were crushed, bruised and pummelled. Fist-fights broke out, 
police, soldiers and American security men fought desperately but unavailingly to keep the 
frenzied crowd clear of the President’s car.127 
The Daily Telegraph reported a welcome that became a “near riot” at the airport.128 The papers’ 
coverage evoked huge and intractable crowds by using the violent language of civil unrest. By 
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the next day, those same words were attached to the protesters in Canberra, Sydney, and 
Melbourne. The Melbourne Herald dubbed the protests in Sydney at Hyde Park and the Art 
Gallery a “near-riot” under the headline “Sydney goes mad”.129 The Sun labelled the Hyde Park 
protest the “College Street Riot”.130 The Mirror called the protests “wild”.131 Along with the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Sun, the paper also characterised the Sydney protests as 
“brawls”.132  
Between Johnson and Kỳ’s visit, newspapers and state officials imagined the violent 
possibilities of anti-Kỳ protests through the experience of the anti-Johnson protests. An 
Australian editorial ahead of Kỳ’s visit implied a comparison when it suggested the possibility of 
“rancour and violence,” and the “ugliest demonstrations and the bitterest feelings”.133 When the 
NSW State Cabinet approved new fines for protesters who disobeyed police directions, Askin 
denied that the fines were a response to the demonstrations during Johnson’s visit, nevertheless 
invoking that violence in relation to protest.134 The word “brawl” was also used to describe the 
anti-Kỳ protests in Brisbane.135 Where the massive welcoming crowds had threatened civic order 
by accident, the protesters appeared as a violent, noisy minority in their midst. 
As the language of the uncontrollable, threatening mob shifted from the welcoming crowds to 
the protesters, the papers began to concentrate on violence between police and protesters. The 
Sun called the Sydney protests “300 yards of hate,” and described “teenagers” at the Art Gallery 
breaking through the police cordon. It also noted a “bearded man” pushing a policeman off his 
motorcycle.136 The Daily Mirror reported “grim-faced American journalists” who were “shaken” 
by the violence at the Art Gallery.137 The Melbourne Herald described “fights and scuffles” in 
which “anything could have happened as police and security men swapped punches with the 
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shouting demonstrators”.138 Concern with the violence was exacerbated by the sense that 
Americans were watching; American journalists made appearances in several Australian stories. 
The Daily Mirror quoted an American cameraman at the Art Gallery who characterised the 
protesters as a “real hostile group,” said the protests were more violent than American anti-war 
protests, and noted that the police were “really laying into those people”.139 The paper quoted 
another American reporter as saying that the Art Gallery was the site of “the worst demonstration 
since he’s been in office. I was terrified that this might be it for him”.140 The Daily Mirror 
relayed the New York World Journal Tribune’s story about an “enraged” and “noisy crowd” of 
anti-American demonstrators made up of “bearded youths and T-shirted girls”.141 The Sun noted 
American interest in the Langley brothers’ paint-throwing protest, and cited American officials 
who were “worried about the safety of the President and his wife”.142 The Mirror reported 
“highly coloured accounts” from the American press of the “worst” protests Johnson “had ever 
experienced,” and a “loud and dissident” minority and “widespread hostility,” under the headline 
“Sydney accused”.143 The Australian noted “prominent coverage” given to “the Vietnam protest 
incidents during President Johnson’s visit”, but reported that the World Journal Tribune had 
called the visit a “triumph”.144 The Daily Telegraph also noted the “triumph,” and reported that 
the consensus in the New York broadsheets was that “despite the hostile groups, the President 
enjoyed an overwhelmingly friendly welcome”.145 The violence caused concern not only because 
it upset well-wishers and upset order, but also because of the sense that international observers 
might judge Australians based on the small number of protesters amidst the large welcoming 
crowds in Sydney. 
On the final day of his visit, Johnson gave a speech in Townsville in which he argued that 
although the protesters expressed “the view of a minority,” 
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That does not make it mistaken, but it does require us to see it in a larger context. … Because 
we have put our trust in democracy, we are bound to preserve and protect the minority’s right 
to express its opinion, and we cannot insist that it speak in a whisper.146 
Johnson’s speech connected the right of Australian and American minorities to be heard to the 
right of the South Vietnamese minority to be heard, in a deft rhetorical move that Hasluck and 
Fairhall had failed to make in April. Press commentary took up this fusion of the noisy minority 
and the right to dissent. The Melbourne Herald repeated Johnson’s claim that “It is right that he 
should hear such views and weigh them along with what members of the Government have to 
say,” and noting that such dissent was the hallmark of a political community “free to think for 
itself and deeply concerned about the trend of events in Vietnam”.147 The Mirror called the 
American press’ claim that the protests were “the most concentrated abuse and hostility” of the 
President’s time in office “nonsense,” defended the right to dissent, and praised President 
Johnson for being “a big man in every way” and going “out of his way, before leaving, to defend 
the right of this tiny but strident opposition to say their piece”.148 Johnson’s speech gave 
reporters and parliamentarians a way to talk about street demonstrations that meant they could be 
safely ignored without being discredited. They would use it to respond to Calwell’s attempt to 
appropriate anti-war protest as an alternative form of Parliamentary opposition. 
 
A Pitiful Spectacle 
Calwell’s call for protests over Vietnam was an attempt to bind the democratic force of an 
assumed anti-war public to the Labor Party in the wake of the devastating election defeat. He 
was not the only federal ALP member to see the utility of this strategy. In early October Senator 
James Keeffe, Federal President of the ALP, “called on Australians to demonstrate their 
opposition to the Vietnam War” during Johnson’s visit, using “every peaceful and constitutional 
means” to show their opposition to involvement and conscription.149 Jim Cairns was also an 
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outspoken advocate of public protest. Johnson’s visit had not helped the Labor Party. Johnson’s 
visit was something of a publicity coup for Holt. The Australian called it a “whirlwind vote-
catcher” for the Prime Minister, predicting that “the huge hand and silver tongue of President 
Johnson set the seal on electoral victory for Mr. Holt at the polls next month”. Johnson had 
“openly” gone “on the hustings” for Holt. Calwell, on the other hand, was represented as a 
clumsy and awkward speaker whose jokes fell flat and whose views clashed with those of the 
popular President.150 The Age noted that the visit indicated that “Australians are all the way with 
LBJ and therefore with their own government”.151 One of the paper’s political correspondents 
argued that Calwell and the ALP “could find no electoral mileage from the visit”.152  
On the other hand, between early 1965 and mid-1966, public demonstrations had reached a 
peak of democratic legitimacy. Kỳ, far less popular than Johnson, seemed to offer an opportunity 
to re-shape public perceptions of the war. Calwell took the bold decision to play a leadership role 
in the anti-Kỳ protests. He tried to tap into public ambivalence towards Kỳ. He had called Kỳ a 
“second Hitler” in parliament in October, referencing a comment Kỳ had made much earlier in 
his career that he felt that South Vietnam could use a man with Hitler’s sense of discipline to root 
out corruption.153 Anti-war activists also tried to get political mileage out of the claim, using it in 
leaflets and press releases.154 The Australian argued that the visit was “virtually uninvited and 
certainly unwanted by 40 per cent of the population,” and hoped that Holt had the good sense not 
to call for “the kind of public hoopla that greeted President Johnson”.155 Using similar language 
to more radical anti-war protesters, Calwell called for “massive demonstrations”. He also 
announced his refusal to attend any reception in Kỳ’s honour.156 Calwell’s strategy generated at 
least as much suspicion as sympathy for street marches amongst Labor MPs. His request to other 
ALP members that they join the marches produced very little enthusiasm. Four days after 
Calwell announced his intention to protest, Whitlam made it apparent that he would not join the 
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marches, although two other possible leadership contenders – Cairns and Frank Crean – 
would.157 The Australian interpreted Calwell’s actions as a statement to Whitlam, assumed to be 
ready to challenge Calwell for the leadership.158 The paper called Calwell’s move “foolhardy,” 
and “irresponsible,” and concluded that he was a “tired man carried away on one last puff of 
emotionalism”. By attempting to conduct regular parliamentary opposition through the high-
profile but questionable method of street protest, he appeared to be “determined to bow out of 
public life surrounded by sensational headlines”.159 Calwell’s efforts were poorly pitched and too 
late to save his party or his career. On the morning of Kỳ’s arrival in Brisbane, the Sydney 
Morning Herald reported that it had located only three NSW parliamentarians intending to 
march and ten who refused.160 Cairns criticised his colleagues for not marching.161 Though 
Calwell tried to use Kỳ’s visit as an opportunity to rally the public discomfort evident in anti-war 
protest in support of his party’s fortunes, his strategy struggled to find favour with his 
Parliamentary colleagues. 
As a result of his call for protests, Calwell was easily caricatured as a noisy anti-war protester. 
For the press, the comparison between the confrontational crowds with Calwell at their head and 
the eloquent Kỳ addressing rooms of well-heeled politicians reflected poorly on Calwell. During 
the four days of his visit, reporters began to warm to Kỳ’s charm and eloquence. Shucking off 
his previous reputation as an impetuous playboy, Kỳ emerged in the pages of the dailies as 
refined, intelligent, and eloquent.162 The Sydney Morning Herald called him a “serious young 
man” with “charm,” the Age characterised him as a quick thinker who “beat the press”.163 This 
performance prompted the Australian to declare that Kỳ had “won the first round,” while the Sun 
trumpeted that “this man has earned a hearing”.164 Calwell’s public fortunes waned as Kỳ’s 
waxed. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial during the visit contrasted Calwell’s blunt and 
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uncompromising rhetoric – he had by this time called Kỳ “a squalid little murderer,” and a 
“Quisling” in addition to his earlier remarks – with Kỳ’s impressive performance:  
His willingness to answer difficult questions, addressed to him without warning in a language 
which he speaks well but far from perfectly, must have impressed all those who heard him. 
Many a Western politician, for instance, would have tried to dodge the question about his 
alleged admiration for Hitler. He did not and came out of it with dignity. 
The editorial argued that in the “unofficial contest” between Kỳ and Calwell, Kỳ was “so far in 
front that Mr. Calwell is in danger of being lapped”. It ended with the admonition that “Mr. 
Calwell’s personal abuse and pathetic demonstrations have … insured that Air Vice-Marshal 
Kỳ’s visit, which might otherwise have passed with little notice, will be something of a triumph.” 
165 The next day the Mirror reported that at the site of “some of the worst anti-Johnson 
demonstrations,” people in Hyde Park “seeking relief from the rising temperature and lounging 
in the shade of the trees did not even bother to raise their heads as the cavalcade passed”.166 Far 
from revitalising the ALP’s flagging fortunes by binding it to a groundswell of popular 
discontent, Calwell’s high-profile support to anti-war demonstrations throughout the visit made 
him seem increasingly out of touch with the electorate. 
For Holt, Kỳ’s visit was a political windfall to complement the publicity coup of Johnson’s 
tour. In the wake of his departure, politicians and the press characterised the public as resolved to 
continue the fight in Vietnam. Holt said that as a result of the visit, “Australia’s participation in 
Vietnam would receive greater support”.167 A Sydney Morning Herald editorial on the same day 
implied a connection between public acceptance of Holt’s trebling of the Australian force in 
Vietnam and its appreciation of Kỳ.168 In an editorial in the protests, the Age characterised the 
protesters as “poor in numbers and lacking in steam,” and asked “Did they prove anything? 
Surely very little”. The editorial concluded with the assertion that: 
There is something slightly pathetic about the sight of an earnest protester carrying an over-
simplified slogan down the street. … Public opinion is not formed by slogans but it is 
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sometimes given a prod into thinking about issues which are vital to all of us at election 
time.169 
While “in a democratic society,” that protester “should be allowed the right to express himself,” 
he could not represent the majority of Australians in early 1967 if he disagreed with the logic of 
involvement in Vietnam. As Johnson had outlined, protest was something to be suffered in a 
democracy. After Kỳ it was also to be pitied, and could be safely ignored. The visits of President 
Johnson and Marshal Kỳ had resolved the complex debate on Vietnam in favour of commitment. 
Though Calwell had attempted to capitalise on protest’s reputation as a legitimate political force, 
he was too late. The disproportionate visibility and audibility of protesters amongst hundreds of 
thousands of Australians welcoming Johnson rendered them a literal noisy minority. By the time 
of Kỳ’s departure it was no longer possible to claim that protests were expressions of the will of 
the Australian people.  They would not escape this characterisation until the Moratorium 
Campaign of 1970, and a second, more intense debate about the right to dissent. 
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Chapter 4: Students, Violence, and ‘Law and Order’ 
Between 1967 and the Moratorium Campaigns of 1970 and 1971 the question of violence and 
confrontation dogged Australian protest and shaped government responses to it. Fatigued by the 
idea of yet more marches and responding to the discrediting of protest by the resounding defeat 
of the ALP at the election, for six months after the anti-Kỳ protests, newspapers relegated reports 
of local protests to page 3 or 5 or stopped reporting them altogether, in preference to more 
spectacular news of political violence from the US or UK. As more confrontational international 
protests began to garner column inches, newspapers became more sensitive to the language and 
practices deployed by university students. After protests outside US Consulates in Sydney and 
Melbourne in July 1968, newspapers began to use code words like “wild,” “brawl,” or “near 
riot,” as well as militarised language like “charged,” “battled,” “stormed,” or “invaded,” to mark 
out student protesters as violent. Over the next three years, newspapers and parliamentarians 
increasingly elided students, protest and violence, resulting in a protracted debate in mid-1970 
over the use of new laws to curtail fractious street protest. In this period students emerged in 
Australian newspapers as a signifier or harbinger of violence. Rather than indicative of an 
increase in civil unrest on Australian streets or of the impact of the radical New Left, discussions 
of violent students in Australia and consequent debates about ‘Law and Order’ in this period are 
evidence of contemporary anxieties about protest. 
These anxieties emerged in relation to news of growing violence in the United States and 
elsewhere. The appearance of the radical student in the Australian imagination cannot be 
disentangled from the growing literature on the global ‘New Left’. American and European 
scholars have produced significant work in the last decade concentrating on the transatlantic and 
intra-European connections forged by student radicals in the ‘long 1960s’.1 Suri has 
characterised the global sense of “cultural rebellion” as an “international counterculture” 
constituted not by adherence to a specific politics but by an ephemeral ‘spirit’ of youth rebellion 
amongst urbanised, first and second world youth, united by a sense of alienation and a collective 
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desire for individual self-fulfillment.2 Australian scholars have also started to situate Australian 
radicals from the ‘long sixties’ in transnational or cosmopolitan networks of protest.3 The small 
literature on anti-Apartheid campaigns from the late 1950s until the 1980s also assumes a 
transnational network, arguing that it could not have existed without international co-ordination.4 
Though Australian historians have not yet situated them against similar global trends, the ‘Law 
and Order’ campaigns of 1971 were also part of a broader global trend in responding to radical 
protest practice.5 As Suri argues, the “fall” of the international counterculture was produced in 
part by a worldwide adoption of ‘law and order’ campaigns.6 Though this chapter does not take 
the transnational ‘New Left’ as its subject, it does focus on the ways in which that identification 
shaped representations of protest as well as the ‘Law and Order’ debates in Australian public 
political culture. 
The chapter begins with a history of violent protest as reported by newspapers between 1968 
and 1971. Prior to the fourth of July protests in 1968 students were represented as disruptive but 
not necessarily violent, but after this watershed the assumed presence of students was 
increasingly enough to trigger anxieties about looming violence. The chapter then turns to the 
development of the idea of the students as a ‘hard core’ of radicals who led other protesters 
astray. Central to this concern was a transnational awareness of protest violence elsewhere in the 
world, and that elements foreign to the Australian body politic were influencing otherwise 
peaceful Australian dissent. Australian observers predicted violence at home based on reports of 
violence abroad, and interpreted peaceful protests as exceptional hallmarks of Australian 
democracy. Anxieties about transnational influence also informed government responses to the 
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apparent surge of confrontational demonstrations. Finally, I turn to a discussion of the ‘Law and 
Order’ debates of July and August 1970. New legislation instituted by State and Federal 
Governments to curb violent student protest initiated a debate about civil liberties. Debate over 
the laws became a debate about democratic rights, which played into the rhetoric of the ‘right to 
protest’ championed by Jim Cairns, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
Confrontational Protest on Australian Streets between 1967 and 1971  
After the anti-Kỳ demonstrations, Australian anti-war protest organisers returned to the same 
practices they had used since the early 1960s in an effort to regain public legitimacy: peaceful 
street marches organised by ad hoc committees, in solidarity with an international movement. 
Impressed by the success of the American Spring Mobilisation to end the war in Vietnam in 
April 1967, NSW activists formed their own August Mobilisation Committee. Claiming once 
again to be a representative cross-section of the Australian public, publicity material for the 
march argued that it would “provide the widest possible co-ordinated participation of all opposed 
to the Vietnam War” and display the “identity and diversity of community groupings opposed to 
the war”.7 Publicity material for the 6,000-strong Sydney march listed the same coalition that 
earlier anti-nuclear campaigns had claimed to represent: “Churchmen, academics, students, 
professionals, actors, artists, writers, women, youth, trade unionists, etc.”.8 At the request of 
American correspondents the Committee organised local marches in October 1967 and April 
1968, and changed its name to the American-inspired “Vietnam Mobilisation Committee”.9 The 
October Mobilisation in Sydney was the largest Australian march against the war to that date, 
with between 6,000 and 10,000 in attendance.10 The marches made little impact despite their 
size, perhaps because the Johnson and Kỳ protests had undone the legitimacy of the mass street 
                                                 
7 Simon West, “August Mobilisation to end the war in Vietnam, Sunday August 13th,” (leaflet advertising rally), 
[July-August 1967], Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 2(3),” Box 41 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament 
Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter PND Records). 
8 Ibid.; “6000 in march for peace,” SMH, August 14, 1967, 3. 
9 August Mobilization Committee, “A Bigger and better mobilisation projected for October, 1967” (leaflet), 
[September-October 1967]; and “Minutes of Meeting of August Mobilisation Committee,” September 4, 1967, 2; 
both in Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 1(3),” Box 41 (74), PND Records. 
10 “Biggest march yet in Sydney,” Australian, October 23, 1967, 1; “6000 in NSW protest march,” Age, October 23, 
1967, 3. 
120 
 
march; Murphy describes the period between the 1966 election and the Moratorium campaign as 
one with “all the features of a pause”.11 
During the same period a number of new student organisations began to gain public notoriety 
for their sensational, disobedient acts. In March 1967, the Monash University Labor Club 
announced its solidarity with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF), arguing that the 
war in Vietnam was an indigenous struggle for independence from colonialism.12 In July, the 
club formed sub-committees to oversee two separate funds for the NLF - one for “medical aid to 
civilians in NLF controlled areas”, and an “unspecified” fund that was for “direct financial aid” 
for the NLF.13 In a broadsheet titled Which Way Treason? produced at around that time, the 
Labor Club explained its support for the NLF: 
Gradually we came to realise that it was no use simply condemning the war and demanding 
that it stopped. We were logically forced to move from denouncing the United States as an 
aggressor to supporting the victims of aggression - the Vietnamese people led by the National 
Liberation Front.14 
Newspapers heard of the Monash students’ plan, and it was debated in the Federal Senate after a 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) senator excoriated the students, threatening to have them charged 
with treason.15 Though the Age characterised the move as foolish, the Senate proceeded to debate 
the bill, and the eventual result was the passage of the Defence Forces Protection Act in 
September, which made any such aid illegal.16 In addition to the radicalisation of existing student 
organisations, new groups began to form. Bob Gould and brothers Jim and John Percy formed an 
organisation known initially as SCREW in July. There are conflicting accounts of what the 
acronym stood for; it was either the “Society for the Cultivation of Revolution Every Where,” or 
the “Sydney Committee for Revolution and Emancipation of the Workers”. It would eventually 
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change its name to ‘Resistance’ in 1968.17 By 1969, Universities in Sydney, Melbourne, 
Newcastle and Hobart hosted chapters of Students for a Democratic Society, Adelaide Labor 
Club had become Students for Democratic Action, and students in Queensland had formed the 
Revolutionary Socialist Alliance, which grew out of the Society for Democratic Action.18 
Throughout the latter half of 1967 these radical student organisations began to receive attention 
out of proportion to their numbers. 
With peaceful street marches becoming de rigeur Australian newspapers began to devote 
greater coverage to confrontation and violence at protests. Among the October Mobilisation 
protests, only the Sydney march was reported in the newspapers. The 10,000-strong local 
solidarity protest was relegated to page 3 by the spectacular front-page images in most dailies of 
the American protests, in which 30,000 to 35,000 demonstrators massed outside the Pentagon, 
confronted police, and smashed the building’s windows.19 Though the Australian acknowledged 
that the crowds attending the April Mobilisation in Sydney were double the size of the ANZAC 
Day crowds the previous day, it remarked on the Mobilisation only in passing in a story about a 
welcome home march for returning Vietnam Veterans. 20 The following day there was a tiny but 
rowdy counter-protest at the ANZAC shrine in London at which marchers carried placards that 
read “Bury Anzac” and “Anzac Justifies Vietnam Murders,” and a fight broke out between 
protesters and police, although it too was buried in later pages.21 By the time of the protests on 
July 4th, 1968, Australian newspapers had made it clear that confrontation, not mass, was 
newsworthy. Their appetite for protest violence was thus far sated only by international 
examples, and the connection between the size of a protest and its impact was unsettled. 
                                                 
17 Beverley Symons and Rowan Cahill, eds., A Turbulent Decade, (Sydney: Australian Society for the Study of Labour 
History, 2005): 27; and John Percy, A History of the Democratic Socialist Party and Resistance, vol. 1 (Sydney: 
Resistance Books, 2005): 89-94. 
18 Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (hereafter CDNSA), “A Directory of Draft Resistance and Anti-
Conscription Groups,” [1969-1970], unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records; Brian Laver, “Towards a Spring 
Offensive,” Nick Origlass Papers, MLMSS 6614/13, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter Origlass Papers); Murphy, 
Harvest of Fear, 220-1. 
19 “Demonstrators storm U.S. military centre,” SMH, October 23, 1967, 1; “Anti-Vietnam protests span world,” 
SMH, October 23, 1967, 3; “World-wide Vietnam protest,” Age, October 23, 1967, 1; “Troops swing rifle butts to 
beat back raid on pentagon,” Courier-Mail, October 23, 1967, 1. 
20 “Big crowds cheer march of Vietnam veterans,” Australian, April 27, 1968, 1. 
21 “The ranks grow thinner as time takes toll,” Australian, April 26, 1968, 3; “Anzac Day scuffle,” Australian, April 
27, 1968, 5. 
122 
 
It was in this context that protests in Sydney and Melbourne around July 4th 1968 became 
iconic forms of student protest for contemporaries. On the 2nd, the Sydney University SDS 
chapter protested against conscription at a Federal Cabinet meeting being held at the Federal 
Parliamentary offices at Martin Place. A crowd of around 100 including the chapter president 
Mike Jones picketed the entrance to the building and shouted at Cabinet Ministers as they 
arrived.22 Three students tried to impede Prime Minister Gorton’s entrance, and several others 
tried to sneak into the lobby in the middle of a group of photographers, but were intercepted by 
police.23 The crowd surged to between 300 and 600 by the close of the meeting, and the 
demonstrators linked arms to prevent Gorton and other ministers from reaching their cars.24  The 
Herald claimed that it was “Sydney’s most violent student demonstration since President 
Johnson’s visit two years ago”.25 The Daily Mirror declared that students had “provoked” police 
with their behaviour.26  
Two days later the papers crafted a more complex story about the protest in Melbourne. The 
Melbourne protest was made up of clergymen, trade unionists, and other off-campus activists as 
well as contingents from RMIT, Melbourne, Latrobe, and Monash Universities, but the students’ 
actions eclipsed the newsworthiness of the other members of the crowd. The Age and the Daily 
Telegraph acknowledged older activists trying to calm their violent student confederates, but the 
Age stated that they were “screamed down” by others shouting “If the police want to fight, they 
have a fight”.27 The rally turned violent in the early evening when demonstrators seized the flag 
from the flagpole in front of the Consulate and burnt it.28 Protesters attempted to raise the NLF 
flag in its place, burnt flags they had brought with them, threw rocks, cans, bottles, razors, and 
punches, smashed the windows of the Consulate and police cars, sat down in front of paddy 
wagons to prevent the arrest of their fellow protesters, and set off firecrackers and smoke bombs 
to cover their actions or startle police horses. The police, for their part, met the protesters with a 
mounted charge “at full canter” as “[t]he horses rearing and frothing from fright sent men and 
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women reeling to the bitumen”.29 Both the Age and the Telegraph noted the nervous 
equivocation of one policeman who had been ordered to charge the protesters.30  
Newspaper coverage of the July protests indicates the complex dynamics of reportage. 
Several dailies interpreted police behaviour as an attempt to maintain public order, and blamed 
students for provoking extreme police action. The Australian quoted a “senior policeman” at the 
Melbourne consulate protest as saying that “It was the law of the jungle. We had to meet 
violence with violence”.31 In Sydney on the 4th there was an anti-conscription sit-in at Recruiting 
House, and an attempt to occupy the Liberal Party headquarters. The Australian and the 
Telegraph explained it as a “police-student clash”.32 The Age positioned students as both 
instigators of violence and as victims.  The paper described students being lifted, dragged and 
thrown by police, and students trying to tear off police identification numbers and strike out as 
they were manhandled by police.33  
Similar violence marked July 4th demonstrations the following year. Activist publicity 
referenced the 1968 protest, framing the expectation of violence as “scare stories” put about by 
the federal government, and resolving that “[w]e must show we are not intimidated by these 
measures”.34 Once again, US Consulates were the target in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane and Adelaide. Consulate windows were again smashed by a hail of hand-thrown 
missiles.35 In Melbourne the students charged the police, and in Sydney they adopted a “flying 
vanguard” tactic whereby the body of the protest fell back in front of police, staging 
demonstrations as they withdrew from the oncoming police cordon.36 In Canberra, students 
staged a sit-in in the South Vietnamese embassy, questioning the ambassador until removed by 
police.37 Following the nation-wide protests, Gorton criticised the use of violence in service of 
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political dissent, noting that “this is the type of violence we have never had before”.38 The Age’s 
editorial on the protests argued that the “right to dissent” was sacred but violence could not be 
tolerated. Nevertheless, it adopted a liberal position, arguing that although some might argue for 
tougher laws to stamp out student protest, this should be resisted as it would “play into the hands 
of the fanatical minority”.39  
Between July 1969 and May 1970 American and Australian commitment to the Vietnam 
conflict seemed to waver and the anti-war position seemed to become more certain. In July and 
September Nixon announced the beginning of the phased withdrawal of American troops. In 
August, a local Australian Gallup poll showed that 55% of Australians were opposed to 
continued involvement in the war, representing a majority opinion against involvement for the 
first time.40 In October and November, hundreds of thousands of Americans marched in multiple 
cities across the country in support of the American Moratorium. In the wake of the American 
marches, an Australian Moratorium Committee was formed to replicate the campaign locally. On 
the 16th of December, Gorton announced that Australian withdrawal would begin, and on the 
22nd of April 1970 announced the withdrawal of a full battalion. According to Murphy, the 
Gorton and McMahon governments were surprised by American withdrawal and unable to 
formulate an autonomous Australian response. In the context of uncertainty and the wavering 
resolve of the Nixon Administration, the continued use of anti-communist rhetoric by Liberal 
politicians and conservative commentators like B.A. Santamaria now seemed “shrill and self-
serving”.41 By early 1970, the idea that Australian involvement in the Vietnam War was an effort 
to forestall the southward push of international Communism was no longer uncritically accepted. 
In this context anti-war protest gained new momentum, most evident in the emergence of the 
Moratorium Campaign.  
The Australian Vietnam Moratorium consisted of three coordinated nation-wide protest 
campaigns, the first in March 1970, the second in September 1970, and the third between April 
and June 1971. It was instigated in response to news of American protests, and there is a 
noticeable American influence even if there was no direct request for international coordination. 
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John Lloyd recalls a short conversation with other CICD members after a committee meeting in 
1969, which began with Lloyd’s question: “couldn’t we actually try and do this in Australia?” 
After a short discussion, the general consensus was “Yeah, let’s … have a crack.”42 In a letter he 
wrote to potentially interested parties, Lloyd expressed his plans in terms of “an escalation of the 
support which various Australian bodies have been giving to US Moratorium Day activities.”43 
Charles Debenedetti notes that the idea that produced the American Moratorium was for “a kind 
of national strike … called in case the war were not settled by a specific date … that one-day 
‘deadline strike’ could be extended by a day each subsequent month that troops were still in 
Vietnam”. The word strike was eventually moderated to ‘moratorium,’ or as Debenedetti puts it, 
“a simple pause in business-as-usual for the purposes of reflection on and protest against the 
war”.44 In late 1969 Cairns framed the Australian Moratorium campaign as an attempt to “hold 
up the commercial and industrial life of the country”.45 In this regard, Cairns was drawing on the 
language of industrial relations shared by Trade Unions and the Labor Party, but he was also 
referring, perhaps unknowingly, to the discussion in Massachusetts that had informed the 
American campaign. The advertisement posted in the Age by the Moratorium Committee called 
on “people of conscience” to “stop business as usual” and to “take time off to think”.46 The sense 
of the Moratorium Campaign as a solidarity action did not last long. Unlike the Aldermaston 
support protests, the International Days of Action or the Vietnam Mobilisations, the 
Moratorium’s publicity betrayed no signs of its transnational provenance. The four-page 
broadsheet produced for the first march framed the protest as a patriotic exercise, identifying that 
the war was being waged “in our name,” and that ending it was “the most urgent task facing the 
Australian nation,” essential to retrieving “the last vestige of our national self-respect”.47  
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The new politics of confrontation in the streets played a role in the Moratorium Campaigns. 
While the idea of lawbreaking as protest would come to influence the development of the 
Moratorium campaigns, the idea of violent confrontation caused disagreement during the 
planning stages. Saunders’ analysis of the Moratorium divides activists up into ‘radicals’ and 
‘moderates’, the former category containing most of the students, some academics and trade 
unionists, and the latter containing most of the older peace activists and clergymen. He tracks the 
effects that the radicals had on the planning stages of the marches in each state.48 Planning for the 
first Moratorium began in November 1969 with a national consultation in Canberra followed by 
the establishment of a Committee in each state. The state committees adopted a sponsorship 
model in which organisations could pay a fee to the Campaign and in return send members to the 
planning meetings. Activists remember a growing fault line between students and their older 
confederates that dominated the planning of the Moratorium campaigns. John Lloyd, the 
secretary of CICD and the Victorian Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), recalled being 
suspicious of some of the groups that sponsored the Campaign: 
...there were all sorts of organisations coming in saying, “We want to belong to it,”, and one 
was the Monash Strawberry Club, and we thought this was bogus. Apparently there was such 
a thing as the Monash Strawberry Club, I don’t know, to this day I’m not sure how genuine it 
was. But people wanted to get in and get votes, so that they could shape the direction of the 
Moratorium.49 
Val Noone felt the Victorian student groups in particular, such as SDS and the Monash Labor 
Club, created a “debating atmosphere” designed to prevent figureheads from the old peace 
movement like Sam Goldbloom or Jim Cairns from “hav[ing] power, behind the scenes or 
whatever.” He felt that “those meetings were wrecked” and that “it’s a miracle that the 
Moratorium happened, granted the state of those Richmond meetings.”50 In Sydney the radical 
critique was of the organisational structure of the campaign, not the aims, with radical activists 
attempting to wrest control of the nascent campaign away from the AICD, who they saw as 
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attempting to dominate proceedings.51 In most states the radicals were committed to the new 
repertoire of political lawbreaking, and attempted to remove the section of the Statement of Aims 
that “all moratorium activities in pursuance of these objectives be of a non-violent nature”.52 
These motions would shape the planning of the Moratorium marches as well as public attitudes 
towards the campaign. 
Anxieties about violence meant that nobody involved in the Moratorium was sure that the 
march would be peaceful. On the morning of the march, the Age’s front-page story reflected 
conflicting assumptions about the protest. The front-page headline read “Helmeted police get 
ready for sit-down”, juxtaposed with a photograph of Katie Wenk, a 23-year-old assistant 
manager of a city modelling agency in a helmet. The story led with the police preparations: 
police leave cancelled, hundreds of reinforcements brought into Melbourne from country 
stations, and Crime Squad men in crash helmets. The story also noted that the sit-down was a 
“flashpoint for violence” and that the crowd would reach 50,000. Wenk explained the helmet by 
saying that “There’s been so much talk of violence that I decided to protect myself.”53 Cairns 
received multiple death threats, and recalled feeling “nervy and worried” before the march.54 
Two Victorian policemen visited Jean MacLean at home the night before the march, asking her 
to call it off.55 Uncertainty about the march was not limited to sitting members of parliament and 
the state police. Denis Freney described the negotiations with the police before the march as “a 
nail-biting test of nerves with [Premier] Askin”.56 Val Noone recalls emptying his pockets and 
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taking his watch off just in case the march became violent, while Betty Blunden was frightened 
she would be beaten by police and wore a fur hat to protect her head.57  
Despite these fears and with the exception of a confrontation between police and protesters in 
Adelaide, the Moratorium marches were peaceful. The numbers represented an extraordinary 
escalation in public involvement in anti-war protest. In Melbourne alone, between 75,000 and 
100,000 marched from Treasury Gardens to Bourke Street.58 In Sydney there were activities 
spread across the city and across three days. On the Friday night three marches - from the 
Universities of Sydney and NSW and Teachers’ Federation headquarters - converged in the city, 
forming a crowd of between 20,000 and 25,000 who were addressed by speakers from the Town 
Hall balcony.59 The next day there was a candlelight march from Hyde Park to a rally in the 
Stadium in Rushcutters’ Bay.60 In Adelaide there was a student-led march of around 2,000 on the 
Friday night during which there was an hour-long running brawl between the marchers and a 
number of young servicemen. On Saturday morning there was a march of 5,000 from Elder Park 
to the center of the city in Victoria Square. 61 5,000 marched in Brisbane, 3,000 in Perth, and 
2,000 in Hobart. Regional centers like Wollongong, Newcastle, Fremantle, Burnie and 
Launceston saw crowds from a few hundred to 2000.62 In total, somewhere between 100,000 and 
120,000 people marched in mass peaceful protests against the National Service Act and 
Australian involvement in the Vietnam War in urban centers across Australia over two days. 
When the expected violence did not ensue, newspapers interpreted its absence as significant. The 
Age reported that although police waited with pistols and shotguns, “The riots did not happen. 
The city’s Vietnam moratorium was peaceful.” The Sun argued that the absence of violence 
confirmed the legitimacy of the protest, stating that “democracy wins the day” and that “mankind 
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was richer for it”. The paper claimed that for both police and marchers, the 8th of May was “a 
day to be proud”.63  
Nonetheless, state and federal governments continued to treat violence at protests as the norm. 
Throughout July and August 1970, a series of student protests attracted press interest and 
Government opprobrium, playing out as a cycle of student confrontation and government 
crackdown. In early July, students at Sydney University “jostled and abused” the Federal 
Attorney-general, Tom Hughes, letting down the tires of his car, writing slogans on it and sitting 
in front of it to prevent it moving off, forcing Hughes to shelter in St. Paul’s college while “every 
available police car in the city” was called to the campus.64 Only days later it was revealed that 
the New South Wales Cabinet had been planning a new bill called the Summary Offences Act, 
which would allow a maximum penalty of two months in gaol or a $100 fine for demonstrating 
without police permission, and increase penalties for assaulting a police officer.65 Five days later 
sixteen students occupied the Premier’s Department, in protest against the new legislation.66 
Following a string of well-publicised and violent protests in Victoria a state government 
committee recommended that penalties be toughened for protesters whose conduct “exceeded 
reasonable grounds”. The planned changes to the Crimes Act instituted penalties for using 
violence or threats of violence to obstruct police and other state officials, and would also carry a 
penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment.67 In mid-August, Hughes again became the focus of 
student protest when thirty students went to his Sydney home, and Hughes emerged from the 
house with a cricket bat to chase them off.68 After a sit-in that took place at the Melbourne Office 
of the Department of Labour and National Service in which files were destroyed and an official 
injured, the Federal Government proposed a “Public Order” Bill in late August that would stiffen 
penalties for trespassing on Commonwealth property and attacking federal MPs and officers.69  
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As the protests against Johnson and Kỳ had done two years earlier, the debate over these new 
laws shifted the focus from the Vietnam War and National Service to the question of the legality 
and morality of street protest. The Age argued on the eve of the second Moratorium that the first 
campaign had 
…hardened community opinion against the political basis of the dissenters. It is certainly true 
that political issues are being forgotten in the growing controversy over “law and order”. 
Governments now feel sufficiently alarmed, and sufficiently confident of public support, to 
instigate new laws with undertones of repression.70 
By the time of the Federal Government bill, ‘Law and Order’ had become a catch cry that 
drowned out discussion of Vietnam or Conscription. The Age published a cartoon in response to 
the proposed bill that suggested the campaign to quiet student dissent was a deliberate 
Government effort to hide its lackluster record in Parliament.71 The leader of the Opposition, 
Gough Whitlam, said that violent protest was “an inflammatory issue,” concentration on which 
was intended “to take the minds of the Australian people from the real issues facing the nation”.72 
The meaning of ‘Law and Order’ was as contested as the meaning of street protest itself.  
The panic over ‘Law and Order’ was exacerbated by the national consultation meeting that 
took place after the first Moratorium. While planning the September marches, the meeting made 
a series of decisions based on the success of the first campaign, advocating further civil 
disobedience and encouraging the state campaigns to “carefully consider occupation of city 
streets for a considerable period.” The meeting also recommended 
to all supporters that they realise that the achievement of the VMC depend upon the decisions 
by the government, and that they should therefore work to remove the present government of 
Australia and replace it by (sic) one which is consistent with the aims of the VMC.73 
In this resolution, the national consultation had directly tied the “occupation of city streets” to the 
removal of a sitting government. Doing so in the context of the ‘Law and Order’ debate only 
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confirmed the arguments of the Moratorium Campaign’s most strident opponents: that the 
Campaign had been infiltrated by radicals who intended the violent overthrow of civil order and 
the state. 
The second Moratorium was thus conducted in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion 
between organisers, the police and various governments. In Sydney there was evident friction 
between large numbers of police and protesters at various points along the various march routes. 
The radial march from the University of Sydney was pushed onto the footpaths by police and 
directed to Wynyard Park, while marchers on King Street were directed to Hyde Park by police 
with loudhailers.74 After a brief meeting in Wynyard Park, the crowd of between 8000 and 15000 
demonstrators moved out into York Street against police directions and were “dispersed by a 
flying wedge of more than 100 police”.75 The marchers attempted to walk on the roadway in 
George Street but were redirected to Hyde Park. From there, two groups of protesters attempted 
to get to the Town Hall without success. The march dissolved into isolated brawls between 
pockets of protesters and police, and police arrested between 200 and 300 protesters.76 In 
Saunders’ estimation the Sydney march was “not simply dispersed, it was destroyed”.77 The 
worst violence again took place in Adelaide, where the organisers attempted to stage a sit-down 
in defiance of the police. After a gathering of 5000 in Elder Park, marchers attempted to occupy 
the first intersection they reached. Only a few hundred metres from their start point, the 
demonstrators filled the intersection of North Terrace and King William Street. The police 
immediately began to break the march up with waves of uniformed and plainclothes police, 
while a line of mounted officers looked on.78 There were 141 arrests.79 Where Moratorium 
protesters attempted sit-downs or other confrontational tactics, they were met with a visible and 
forceful police presence. 
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Where organisers acquiesced to police demands there was no violence. In Melbourne the 
crowd assembled in Treasury Gardens before moving off along Spring Street and Bourke Street, 
where there was a 30-minute sit-down. The Australian and the Age estimated a crowd of 50,000, 
though Cairns later claimed 75,000.80 After the sit-down, the march was to proceed to the Princes 
Gate Plaza. At the corner of William and Lonsdale Streets it was met by a line of 100 police 
backed by steel barricades and a line of buses, vans and trucks, preventing access. The 
Moratorium Committee decided to comply with police directions and march back to Melbourne 
University. In Brisbane, Canberra, Hobart and Perth, there were very few arrests. With the 
exception of an abortive attempt by 300 students in Brisbane to occupy Adelaide Street, there 
were no sit-downs in those cities.  
Those invested in confrontation expressed their disappointment in the outcome of the second 
Moratorium. One Sydney protester remarked that the march in Brisbane was only peaceful 
because the marchers “did as they were told”.81 In Melbourne, another complained that the 
Moratorium had been “run out of town” because its marchers were reluctant to meet police 
provocation with violent resistance.82 Students in Melbourne had attempted to provoke 
confrontation with police with little success. Several hundred radical students flying National 
Liberation Front flags attempted to reach the Princes Gate Plaza through the police barricade. 
After four arrests and an hour of trying to break through aided by smoke bombs and firecrackers, 
they gave up. Cairns gave a speech asking the marchers to remain calm and orderly, during 
which a number of students booed and shouted profanities. At Melbourne University after the 
march, Michael Hyde of the fractious Maoist Monash Labor Club told the crowd that they should 
have “stormed the barricades”.83  
The third Moratorium was overshadowed by developments in the Vietnam War and protests 
against the Springbok rugby tour. Participants often forget the third Moratorium in memoirs and 
recollections. The chapter that deals with the year 1971 in Greg Langley’s collection of protester 
interviews contains only three excerpts and none mention the third Moratorium.84 Freney wrote 
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recollections of the May and September marches in his autobiography, but by the time his 
narrative reaches June 1971, he only talks about anti-Apartheid protests.85 Michael Hyde also 
recalls the first and second marches, but ends his memoir of the period with his graduation, 
mentioning the Springbok tour but not the third Moratorium.86 The protests attending the South 
African Rugby Union tour of June and July 1971 were not the first anti-Apartheid protests in 
Australia. Curthoys mentions a protest about the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.87 Freney 
mentions participating in a protest against touring South African tennis players in January 1971, 
and a protest at Coogee beach in March against South African lifesavers.88 The Age reported a 
crowd of 1000 anti-war and anti-Apartheid students who had been attending the “Aquarius 
festival” at ANU attempting to “storm” the South African Chancery in May 1971.89 Freney 
compares the Anti-Apartheid protests to the Moratorium, stating that the Movement’s aim in late 
1970 had been to “form a broad coalition similar to that which had developed around the 
Vietnam Moratorium,” and noting the confidence amongst activists that “the protests would rival 
those held during the Vietnam Moratorium”.90 The third Moratorium paled in comparison with 
the spectacle of the Springbok tour. 
The third Moratorium also lacked the interstate consensus and organisational clarity of the 
first two campaigns. By late October 1970 it had emerged that there was no agreement between 
the individual state organising committees about the date of the third campaign. NSW and 
Tasmania wanted to organise a march on Friday April 30th. Queensland preferred Friday the 16th. 
Western Australia wanted the march to be held on Saturday the 24th. Victoria had not committed 
to a date. Two international events muddied the decision further. The first was a letter received 
from the United States, indicating that Dr. Benjamin Spock, the famous American child 
specialist and celebrity anti-war campaigner, wanted to discuss a possible tour of Australia in 
June 1971.91 The second was the return of Jim Cairns from the WPC-organised Stockholm 
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Conference on Vietnam in November 1970. That conference advocated an international 
campaign against the war in Vietnam around June 30th, 1971.92 Attempting to cover all its bases, 
the National Co-ordinating Committee recommended to the states that:  
…they attempt to make the months of April, May and June months of intensive activity, 
publicizing the Indo-Chinese withdrawal deadline for U.S. troops by June 30. In particular, 
there should be nation-wide mass actions on Friday, April 30, and Sunday, May 30, and that 
Wednesday, June 30, be planned as a day when as many people as possible should stop work 
if U.S./Australian troops are not withdrawn from Indo-China.93 
Unable to decide between the original April campaign and the June campaign suggested by the 
Stockholm conference and Spock’s visit, the National Co-ordinating Committee decided in 
December to spread the campaign across three months. 
Saunders claims that the federal government took a “completely new approach” to the third 
Moratorium: where it had “directly attacked” the first march and “indirectly attacked” the 
second, it “completely ignored” the third.94 This characterisation accords more malice to the 
government than is perhaps warranted, and ignores the Moratorium Committee’s own lack of 
consensus and focus. The April 30th marches were small compared to previous Moratorium 
crowds: 5000 in Sydney and Brisbane, 2500 in Canberra, 2000 in Adelaide, 1000 in Melbourne. 
There were very few arrests, and there were no confrontations with police over permits or march 
routes. The Adelaide march ended in confusion with a debate about whether to follow a police 
“request” to change the route of the march, and though the Sydney Morning Herald drew 
attention to the fact that the Sydney march was “in defiance of [a] council ban,” the council 
seemed disinterested in enforcing the ban with their spokesperson noting that “technically” the 
marchers had been refused permission to use Hyde Park, but the council “saw no breaches of the 
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by-laws to justify any action”.95 Press coverage of the April march was minimal, and the May 
30th protests did not make the papers at all. 
The June marches were eclipsed by more spectacular developments in the Vietnam War. In 
mid-June, the news broke that Daniel Ellsberg had leaked the ‘Pentagon Papers’ to the New York 
Times.  In the context of the leak, the reasons for Australian commitment to the war given by 
Menzies and his successors faced greater scrutiny. McMahon commissioned a report into the 
ramifications of the leak for the Australian government, while the federal ALP executive called 
for a royal commission into the commitment to Vietnam.96 The Australian reported that the US 
Government had pressured the South Vietnamese government into asking Australia for troops, 
while McMahon was asked by a This Day Tonight interviewer whether he knew anything that 
“cast doubt on the propriety of the original commitment”.97 Stories in the Australian continued to 
implicate both Menzies and McMahon in an act of diplomatic subterfuge.98  A protester writing 
in the Australian argued that “now that the Pentagon papers have spelled out the duplicity of 
politicians … the interpretation of events offered by those ‘extreme elements’ in the peace 
movement has been more accurate than the government line all along.” The editorial ended with 
an advertisement for the final Moratorium March.99 The response to the Pentagon Papers helped 
marked the collapse of the logic of commitment. By June 1971 it was no longer exceptional to 
oppose involvement in Vietnam; far from bolstering its profile, the Pentagon papers helped 
remove any sense of urgency around anti-war protest. 
At the same time, press interest shifted to the protest campaign against the Springbok tour, 
with sustained, front-page coverage of violent student protests. The first protest was in Perth, 
four days before the culminating marches of the third Moratorium campaign. The Australian 
noted that most of the demonstrators were university students, and reported that police were 
guarding the planes in which the South African team would travel against possible “sabotage”.100 
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The Adelaide match was on the same day as the Moratorium, and some protesters moved straight 
from the march to the Springbok game. Protesters disrupted the match by “invading” the field, 
throwing smoke bombs and blowing whistles. The protesters kept up a noisy vigil at the South 
African team’s hotel all night, blowing whistles, setting off firecrackers and driving cars past the 
hotel while sounding their horns in an attempt to keep the team awake.101  
Protesters in Melbourne acknowledged the international influences on their protests saying 
that they would “blow whistles, throw smoke bombs and generally follow the trends during the 
1969-70 Springbok rugby tour of England”.102 The police arrested 200.103 Sydney protesters 
maintained a similar vigil outside the team’s motel and staged protests at the two games in 
Sydney.104 Freney recalls a number of innovative protest practices being developed for the 
Springbok games, including having an inter-racial couple stay in the Springboks’ hotel and kiss 
in the corridors, launching rocket flares at the hotel, spraying the grass at the field with green dye 
to mark the players, and sabotaging the goalposts at the ground. Friends of his planned to release 
a greased pig – named ‘Snowball’ for the character in Animal Farm - onto the ground, though 
they became too attached to the pig in question to go through with the plan.105 When the tour 
reached Queensland, Premier Bjelke-Petersen declared a “State of Emergency,” granting police 
widespread powers to shut down demonstrations.106 In Canberra, police erected a barbed-wire 
fence around the oval.107 The protests in Brisbane on the 21st turned violent, with students 
shouting “pigs” and “fascists” during confrontations with police.108  
Amidst this flurry of Springbok coverage, the final phase of the third Moratorium campaign 
involved nation-wide marches on June 30th. In Sydney, the Moratorium attracted about 7,000 to a 
rally outside Town Hall after separate marches from Sydney University and Chifley Square.109 In 
Brisbane the march of about 5,000 was stopped twice for brief sit-downs in Queen Street and 
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Adelaide Street.110 The march in Adelaide was characterised by a public disagreement over the 
march’s route between the police chief and the Chairman of the South Australian VMC which 
resolved when the marchers voted for a route that would avoid confrontation with police. Some 
of the 3,000 marchers forced their way through the police cordon across Rundle Street and there 
were around 40 arrests.111 The march in Hobart was very small.112 Although 6,000 marched in 
Perth it was uneventful.113 Only the 100,000 strong Melbourne crowd was larger than previous 
Moratorium marches, in large part due to the presence of Cairns and Spock.  
The press represented the protests as routine and even boring. Troop withdrawals in 
December 1969 and April 1970 caused the Age to note as early as August 1970 that “[t]he prime 
cause of recent demonstrations – the Vietnam war – appears to be on the wane”.114 After the 
Pentagon papers and the small crowds at the third Moratorium, other papers took up this line. 
After the April march, the Courier-Mail disparaged the “now familiar Vietnam moratorium 
campaign” as forming part of the “seasons of dissent” alongside the trade union staple of May 
Day and the burgeoning campaigns for Aboriginal land rights.115 A week after the protest the 
Australian published an opinion piece that proclaimed the death of the Moratorium Campaign: 
In the park, the ritual began – ritual can be fun, but this one was pure boredom. Separated 
from the “masses” in their wrought iron podium, the speechmakers repeated the same clichés 
about “building organisationally,” about “reaching out to the industrial working class” as they 
always do.116 
According to the Australian, the Campaign was preaching to the choir. Citing Marcuse, the paper 
argued that it had been reduced to a “harmless ritual, a pacifier of conscience, a star witness to 
the rights and freedoms available under the status quo”.117  The Age’s editorial on July 1st 
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summed up the pervasive sense of fatigue and purposelessness that characterised the third 
Moratorium: 
But is today’s march really necessary? This is a reasonable question. Surely the white-heat has 
gone out of the Vietnam issue. The veterans of May, 1970, marched to bring the troops home. 
Now they are coming, and disengagement is a fact of the war. At a time when the Pentagon 
Papers reveal just how dubious was the manner of involvement there is little doubt that the 
United States, and Australia with it, will make a total withdrawal.118 
The paper argued that the Moratorium’s aims had been all but achieved: the troops were being 
withdrawn and the case for involvement was discredited. With withdrawal a fact, the rationale 
for commitment undone, and focus shifting to other political issues, Australian anti-war 
campaigning had all but come to an end. 
 
The Figure of the Violent Student in Protest Reportage  
Beginning with the July 4th protests of 1968, the figure of the university student emerged in the 
pages of Australian metropolitan newspapers as the harbinger of confrontational protest violence. 
Newspapers understood violence at street marches as a relationship between police and 
protesters, and the question of who instigated violence at any given protest was open to debate. 
However, the presence of students in a crowd of demonstrators came to signify the threat of 
violence. It took time for the word ‘student’ to be invested with these meanings. Confrontations 
between protesters and police in 1966 neither identified the demonstrators as students, nor did 
they tend to use the word ‘violence,’ preferring words like “clash,” or ‘riot,” or phrases like 
“wildest demonstration”.119 When protests against LBJ’s visit became unruly, papers talked 
about “bearded youths and T-shirted girls” rather than students.120 It was demonstrators and not 
students who broke barricades during the LBJ visit in Sydney or Melbourne, and “rushed” at 
Marshal Kỳ in Brisbane.121 Before 1968 the marker of student protest was not violence but the 
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occupation; students sat down in city streets, as with the VAC protest in Martin Place in October 
1965, or sat-in, as with the Draft Resistance Movement’s occupation of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary offices in Melbourne in support of Conscientious Objector Dennis O’Donnell in 
April 1967.122 When in June 1968 a policeman died of a heart attack during a student sit-in 
against conscription, the Sun’s editorial noted that “[a] lot of people will blame the death ... on 
the students involved,” but argued that “whatever your feelings about students and their 
demonstrations ... we cannot, in fairness, blame them for constable Weaver’s death”.123 Prior to 
July 1968, Australian students were fractious and confrontational, but they were not yet 
synonymous with protest violence. 
The Australian practice of solidarity actions with international protest campaigns meant that 
local and international demonstrations occupied column inches in the same editions of 
metropolitan papers. In 1967 the adoption by local protesters of American practices were 
noteworthy rather than cause for alarm. At the August Mobilisation protest newspaper coverage 
singled out young members of the crowd for their dress and coiffure rather than their rowdy or 
violent behaviour. The Sun noted “40 hippies, draped in beads,” in the 1,000-strong Sydney 
march, while the Herald dubbed them “flower children draped in beads, hippies and long-haired 
youths”. The Sun also noted five ministers amongst the marchers. The difference between the 
young demonstrators and the staid collection of unionists, clergy and academics attracted the 
press’ attention because they adopted the aesthetics of the international counterculture.124 In 1967 
young protesters were an oddity, not yet a threat. 
Over the next two years, the word “student” emerged as a signifier of protest violence. 
Beginning with the July 4th protest in 1968 students and violence often appeared together in news 
stories. The word ‘student’ was used in headlines to signify disruptive and fractious behaviour. 
Headlines like “Students may face riot charges,” “Students held in march,” and “Student’s long 
wait for arrest,” normalised the connection between students and unruly behaviour at protests.125 
A Melbourne Herald editorial following the protest supported “calls for stronger action against 
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mob violence”. Despite identifying the subjects of these calls as “demonstrators,” it later 
narrowed the focus to “those university students and others who want to express political 
views”.126 The Daily Telegraph reported on the protest under the headline “56 arrested as 
students fight police” and stated early in the piece that “[t]he demonstrators were students from 
Melbourne, Latrobe and Monash universities ... armed with stones, tins, bottle and some with 
razor blades”.127 When reporting on an inquiry into a brawl between students at Sydney 
University at which the Governor of NSW had fruit and toilet paper thrown at him, the 
Australian ran the story on the front page under the headline “Student violence probe”.128 In 
September 1970, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Queensland circulated an appeal to 
students and staff that asked for a return to “a campus free from violence, ugly and intemperate 
language, and march and counter-march,” once again implying the connection between students 
and violence.129 Parliamentarians also assumed that the presence of students at demonstrations 
and protest violence were mutually entangled. After the 1968 July 4th protests Gorton asked the 
Attorney-General, Bowen, to investigate possible legal avenues to penalise violent protesters.130 
The category of violent protester was immediately conflated with the category of the university 
student, with the Victorian state secretary of the DLP advocated stripping student lawbreakers of 
their Commonwealth scholarships, with support from the leader of the Country Party and the 
head of the RSL.131 When the Daily Telegraph reported that the Minister for Education was 
considering the idea, it framed the problem as “violence in recent student demonstrations”.132  
 From 1968 onwards, increasingly violent verbs were attached to the noun “student” in 
newspaper reportage. Some of these words denoting violence – such as “wild,” “brawl,” or 
“near-riot” – pre-dated the press interest in student violence, but they were easily redeployed.133 
The Sydney Morning Herald described “hundreds of university and other students” at the July 4th 
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protest in 1968 who “struggled and scuffled with police”.134 The Courier-Mail identified students 
as the principal instigators of violence the following year in Brisbane:  
Melees erupted in Brisbane last night when a breakaway group of about 80 anti-American 
demonstrators played cat and mouse with police through city streets. The demonstrators were 
mainly students.135  
Before the second Moratorium the Age reported on students at the University of Queensland 
who “seize[d]” the University Regiment Headquarters building, “smashed furniture,” and “wrote 
revolutionary slogans on the walls”. Rather than the more common “occupy,” the paper used the 
verb “invaded” to describe the students’ behavior.136 Two days later, the paper reported that 
“[p]olice fought an hour-long battle of fists, elbows, boots and obscenity against radical 
students” as they attempted to prevent a South Vietnamese dignitary leaving the campus.137 An 
anti-war march in Melbourne was characterised by the Age as a “battle with police” in which 
“police charged” the students and “[p]olice and students fought on the roadway and on nearby 
nature strips”.138 The Sydney Morning Herald framed the same protest as a “wild demonstration,” 
that quickly became a series of “running battles with fists, stones and batons,” in which 
“Students and police punched and kicked each other and wrestled on the ground”.139 When the 
Age reported on an anti-Apartheid protest in Canberra, after the story first pointed out that most 
of the crowd was students, before describing how the students “stormed” the embassy.140  
This is not to suggest that students were the only violent protesters. At times, the newspapers 
were forced to acknowledge the presence of other activists at violent protests. In its report of the 
1969 July 4th protest in Melbourne protest, the Courier-Mail described a “pitched battle,” and an 
“ugly riot” at the U.S Consulate after the crowd “erupted” through the police cordon, throwing 
rocks and fire-crackers while shouting “the streets belong to us”. The crowd was made up of 
“trade unionists, students and ‘peace’ demonstrators” – the scare quotes denoting a return to red-
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baiting consistent with the paper’s anti-communist editorial line.141 The Australian’s coverage of 
the second Moratorium identified the violent parts of the Sydney crowd as consisting of 
“[s]tudents, unionists and white-collar workers”.142   
Despite the involvement of off-campus activists, the papers returned inevitably to students as 
the harbingers of protest violence. The Sydney Morning Herald marked students at the 1969 July 
4th protest as bringers of disruption, noting that “it was evident when 50 Sydney University 
Labor Club members arrived with red flags on red and white striped poles and a blue and white 
Cuban flag that the demonstration would not be a meek walkabout”.143 Students predicted 
violence even when they were not present at protests. A demonstration in the public gallery of 
the House of Representatives in Canberra in March 1969 demonstrates the extent to which 
anxieties about violent students shaped newspapers’ interpretations of protest. The protest was 
part of a national lobby to Canberra, planned as the climax of a series of demonstrations in 
support of Melbourne conscientious objector John Zarb.144 The lobbying mission to Canberra had 
been a staple of anti-war and anti-conscription protest since the 1960s, and the 1969 lobbying 
trip had been organised by the AICD, not campus organisations. Nevertheless, the Sydney 
Morning Herald turned a rumour that Melbourne students had been “stockpiling Molotov 
cocktails for possible use at the demonstration,” into a headline that read “Petrol bomb fears at 
Canberra protest”. Despite this sensational opener, the story quoted the Inspector of Canberra 
police as saying that “We are not treating this demonstration as if it going to be an especially 
riotous one,” and the secretary of the AICD saying “We are not interested in a negative or violent 
sort of demonstration”.145 Though students played no major part in the demonstration, the Herald 
could not make sense of the possibility of violence without invoking the figure of the student. On 
the day, it was 30 mostly “middle-aged” protesters who provided the paper its most spectacular 
image, chanting “Free Zarb,” from the public galleries while displaying anti-conscription posters. 
The protesters had gained entry to Parliament House using passes they had obtained to meet with 
MPs, and were ostensibly in parliament to witness ALP Senator Lionel Murphy asking a leading 
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question about gaoled conscientious objectors on the floor below.146 Though the violence of the 
July 4th protests of the previous year was absent, its memory survived in journalists’ choice of 
words: the “rowdy” protesters “invaded” the gallery and “scuffles” broke out as police tried to 
eject protesters from the gallery.147 
Just as not every violent protester was a student, not every press outlet agreed that the blame 
for violence should always be laid at the feet of students. The Sun argued in July 1968 that “both 
students and police were carried away by their zeal”.148 The Mirror took a similar line, 
explaining dissent as a “function” of students in a democracy, just as it was the function of the 
police to keep the peace. This characterisation allowed that “[b]oth parties were there for the 
right reasons,” even if things got out of hand. The paper argued that both police and students 
“should have learned” from “facing each other in similar situations for the past three or four 
years”.149 Journalists sometimes empathised with students if they witnessed them becoming the 
targets of police violence, or became targets themselves. At the 1968 July 4th protest in Martin 
Place, a press photographer was injured by police and reporters noticed that some policemen had 
removed their identification badges. The Herald argued in an editorial that the removal of police 
badges was “the most disturbing feature” of the protest, even if “the students got out of hand”.150 
The paper’s coverage described the police forming an “arrow” and “charging” the protesters, 
“throwing” them aside to allow Gorton to reach his car.151 Active verbs like ‘charged’ and 
‘threw’ described what police did to protesters, while passive verbs – ‘sat,’ ‘fell’ – described the 
students. Where the Daily Telegraph claimed that the protesters rocked Gorton’s car as a tactic, 
the Sydney Morning Herald attributed the rocking of Gorton’s car to police pushing the students 
back.152 In a similar fashion, the Australian noted the possibility of “police brutality,” at a 
Springbok game in Melbourne and mentioned that “[j]ournalists travelling with the Springboks 
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said the police used tougher measures than those used in Adelaide although they were under less 
pressure”. Once again, the protesters became subjects of the violence, and the police the 
instigators:  
A police superintendent grabbed a woman holding a placard and pushed her back into the 
crowd. Police on horseback charged into the demonstrators. ... Police grabbed protesters and 
threw them to the ground. Many demonstrators were dragged to police vans by the hair. 
Scores of young demonstrators were injured by police horses and truncheon-swinging police. 
... One constable sent a demonstrator sprawling down the side of the grass area of the hill. 
Asked why he had pushed the demonstrator, the constable said: ‘No reason.’153 
Students unsurprisingly tended to lay the blame for the violence at the feet of police. Michael 
Hyde and Warren Osmond of Monash University’s New Left Group both agreed that more 
violent demonstrations were a probable response to police-led confrontation, arguing that though 
students were accelerating the violence, it was only because police had begun it.154  
Even if the causes of violence at protests was still open to debate, by mid-1969 students 
signified its possibility. The presence of radical students at Moratorium planning meetings meant 
that outside observers worried about the possibility of violence. The day after the removal of the 
non-violence clause in Victoria the Melbourne Sun ran the headline “Violence ‘in’ for protest on 
Viet”.155 In the last few days before May 8th instances of violent protest, especially by students, 
made headlines: students had thrown rocks at the headquarters of ASIO and smashed several of 
Honeywell’s windows because of its perceived connection to the Vietnam War. On the day of 
the Moratorium, the company hired guards for their offices and sent their female employees 
home.156 Though the Age supported the march, it predicted violence at the Moratorium, instigated 
by “the idiots who actually seek violence”.157 In the end, the marches were peaceful, but so 
widespread was the assumption that student protest preceded violence that its absence required 
explanation. One Age correspondent reached for Australian exceptionalism: the Moratorium 
“made you proud to be an Australian ... because it showed that in this country we can still make 
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democracy work by turning out in the street to exercise the right of dissent”.158  The notion that 
the Australian national character somehow inoculated against the actions of a small hard core of 
activists faded as the sensational actions of a small number of campus activists began to garner 
more attention and pushed peaceful protest to the margins of public attention. 
 
From ‘Noisy Minority’ to ‘Hard Core’  
Observers of Australian protest in the late 1960s increasingly imagined that protest violence was 
caused by a small number of radicals or provocateurs who led the majority of protesters astray. 
The idea of a ‘hard core’ of radical student provocateurs was developed from the idea of the 
‘noisy minority,’ visible during the anti-Johnson protests in 1966. Thus the Sydney Morning 
Herald described “hundreds of university and other students” at the July 4th protest in 1968 who 
were “urged on and led by a spearhead of radicals bearing red flags”.159 The Age described “a 
hard core of trouble makers” at the same protest which it classified as “angry young men” who 
“came prepared – and armed – for battle”.160 The Melbourne Herald argued in an editorial that 
“some demonstrators are trying to commit supposedly peaceful movements to an irresponsible 
and dangerous course”.161 In July 1969 the Daily Telegraph admonished the “riot-prone minority 
of university students,” and exhorted them to “get down to work and become educated 
responsible, self-disciplined citizens”.162 At the anti-Apartheid protest in May 1971 in Canberra, 
the Age described a “hard core” of 200 students staging a sit-down outside the police station to 
demand the release of those arrested at the protest.163 In March 1969 the secretaries of the NSW, 
Victorian and Queensland committees for International Cooperation and Disarmament wrote to 
Prime Minister Gorton in March 1969, explaining that the democratic process was “clearly in 
some danger of being written off as a phony façade not only by tertiary student groupings but 
many of older vintage”.164 The letter took advantage of the widely-held assumption that tertiary 
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students were a fractious and radical minority on the fringe of a wider movement, implying that 
if older activists agreed with students, then something must be very wrong indeed.  
The idea of an extreme cadre influencing the moderate majority echoed the red-baiting of the 
1950s, in which the Communist Party was understood as having infiltrated peace organisations, 
turning other members of pacifist organisations into dupes or fellow travellers. Traces of this 
infiltration narrative were visible in Liberal and Country Party parliamentarians’ statements on 
the Moratorium. In 1968 the famous anti-communist B. A. Santamaria claimed that the 1968 
July 4th protest in Melbourne “had been planned by anarchist and Communist university 
students”.165 David Fairbairn, a member of the federal Liberal government, characterised the 
Moratorium as part of a “world-wide propaganda campaign to weaken the will of Allied 
countries on the home front”.166 On the day before the first Moratorium, Fairbairn read a 
statement in Federal parliament that “the Vietnam Moratorium is an assault upon democratic 
processes, based on fraud and designed to promote widespread disruption and dislocation” and 
read off his own list of Communists in the Moratorium including Laurie Carmichael, Mavis 
Robertson and Bernie Taft.167 Victorian senator Ivor Greenwood argued that the Moratorium 
organisers could only bring succour to Australia’s enemies: 
... it may possibly achieve, if there is noise, nuisance and violence, widespread Press and 
television publicity which will go round the world and may therefore achieve one object of 
strengthening the intransigence and aggression of the North Vietnamese.168 
The Herald was more forthright in its naming of the ‘hard-core’: it excoriated “the manipulators 
and the communists” who “tend to become a dominant minority” and who had a “vested interest 
in violence”.169 While visiting Canberra, the South Vietnamese Ambassador asserted in a public 
speech that the Moratorium was “designed to bring about a communist victory” and that it was 
being managed by “political speculators and Communist instigators, who will exploit the 
genuine desire for true peace of other people to foster their own political purpose and to help 
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their Communist comrades in Vietnam.”170 Though these observers did not pick out students as a 
part of this transnational communist conspiracy, the rhetoric of the ‘hard core’ of student radicals 
reflected the older idea of communist infiltration of pacifist organisations. 
The idea of the ‘hard core’ also made sense because of a Marxist revival amongst Moratorium 
activists. Unlike the activists of 1966 who resented the ‘noisy minority’ label, the activists who 
made up what the Press and Parliament characterised as the ‘hard core’ embraced the 
characterisation, describing themselves as a revolutionary vanguard. These activists were an 
active and influential minority in the Moratorium coalition, and their presence was evident at the 
National Anti-War Conference held in Sydney in February 1971. At this conference 81 papers 
were split across three themes, and fed into a “business section” that produced a strategy 
document for the third Moratorium campaign. The conference program led from “sessions 
analysing the international situation, through sessions discussing the political context of the 
Australian anti-war movement and ideological positions associated with the anti-war movement, 
to sessions discussing strategies and tactics for the future”.171 A considerable number of the 
papers at the conference described the political project of the Moratorium as a revolutionary one, 
in which activists worked to raise the level of ‘political consciousness’ of Australian workers 
until the ‘objective’ ideological linkages between Australian Labor relations and Vietnamese 
colonisation were revealed. 
To Marxists at the conference there was no difference between Australians marching in the 
streets and the Vietnamese fighting imperialism and thus between anti-war protest and 
revolutionary activity. In this context, violence at protests was an appropriate political tool, 
intended to confront and undo the power of the imperialist state. Thus Barry York’s paper argued 
that Moratorium’s effectiveness was “measured in terms of the degree to which political 
consciousness of the masses is raised as a prerequisite to achieving the avowed aim of the 
movement”.172 For Brian Medlin the Moratorium represented an opportunity to “make operative 
and visible certain contradictions in capitalist society” and it could thus play a role in Australia’s 
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achievement of a “pre-revolutionary” level of political consciousness. He argued that the 
Moratorium’s role was to “lean on history so that when it is ready to give way our weight is 
already on it”.173 Jim Percy of the Sydney organisation Resistance argued that any anti-war 
activity could be considered anti-imperialist simply by virtue of opposing an imperialist war:  
The creation of a specifically ‘anti-imperialist’ consciousness is best done by engaging in 
objectively ‘anti-imperialist’ action and mass actions around the demand for immediate 
withdrawal has proved to be the formula that offers the best chance in defending the 
Vietnamese Revolution and thus dealing blows to imperialism.174 
In the same vein, Phil Sandford explained the reluctance of workers to engage with the 
Moratorium as a result of a “false consciousness” instilled in them by imperialist propaganda that 
obscured the “objective link” between themselves and other workers elsewhere in the world. 
This allowed him to reconcile the lack of worker engagement with the Moratorium with the 
Marxist assumption that “[t]he industrial working class ... are the only class with the power to 
fundamentally challenge capitalism”.175 
Marxist activists wielded considerable influence at the conference, and attempted to use that 
influence to re-shape the third Moratorium. They raised four separate amendments to the 
Moratorium aims during the Business Section, which were eventually amalgamated into one 
amendment and passed. Lynn Arnold from South Australia and Laurie Aarons, scion of a NSW 
CPA dynasty, argued that Third World liberation forces were essential to the Moratorium’s aims. 
Bob Gould’s amendment insisted that the working class was the only force capable of 
challenging capitalism. Laurie Carmichael moved an amalgamated amendment committing the 
“the whole anti-war movement” to orienting “the main direction of its activities towards 
achieving a forthright effort at all levels of the working class and labor movement for mass 
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consciousness and action for the aims [of the Moratorium Campaign]”. 176  The resulting strategy 
document reconfirmed the Campaign’s function as a political strike, stipulating that 
The main slogan directed to the workers and the labor movement for their participation in anti-
war action be ‘stop work to stop the war’, with all necessary varieties of action enlisted to lead 
to the goal of a mass political strike. In particular, rank and file action should be developed 
through the formation of workshop rank and file committees in all industries.177 
With Australian commitment to the Vietnam War all but over, these activists were attempting to 
turn the political goodwill they saw in the Moratorium towards Marxist consciousness-raising. 
Activists not committed to the Marxist revival criticised this view. Sam Goldbloom, long-time 
secretary of the CICD, acknowledged that the input of the radical ‘hard core’ had re-shaped 
Australian protest for the better. He argued that the methods and beliefs of the peace movement 
of the 1950s and early 1960s “can no longer be considered wholly valid” and that “defiance and 
resistance” – code words for what the papers described as violence and confrontation - were 
“tactics that have considerable potential for future development”. However, he cautioned his 
listeners that 
it cannot and should not be assumed that of the 70,000 who demonstrated in Melbourne ... that 
more than a small minority of the participants were ready to accept the advanced position of 
the left with respect to imperialism, the NLF or revolutionary socialism.178 
Others were more scathing. Ken McLeod, the Secretary of the NSW VMC and AICD, argued 
that the Marxist New Left’s concentration on the industrial working class and their own role as a 
revolutionary vanguard had “become magical totems whose function is to act as mystical 
resolutions of real contradictions.” The “destructive invective” of the New Left was harmful, 
McLeod argued, and the movement must move beyond the “sloganizing [and] ‘radical cheer 
leading’ that amounts only to self-verification and posturing”.179 Though long-term activists were 
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aware of the effects the new radical language of confrontation was having on their protests, there 
was no consensus on what violence at protests signified, or whether it should be pursued as a 
political objective. Regardless of this lack of consensus, the idea of the ‘hard core’ of radical 
instigators neatly echoed the Marxist New Left’s Leninist assumptions about themselves as a 
political vanguard or cadre, working to raise the political consciousness of the working classes. 
Echoing the Marxists’ identification with a global working class, observers outside the 
Moratorium interpreted this ‘hard core’ of student provocateurs as the product of an international 
counterculture in which Australian activists were enmeshed. The Vice-Chancellor of Monash 
University predicted student revolt on his own campus after observing events at Berkeley.180 
Newspapers used examples from the United States and Europe to make sense of the violent July 
4th protests. The Age argued that “[i]f the angry young men are imitating the street fighters of 
Europe and America, then we are heading for serious trouble unless a halt is called”.181 In the 
same vein, the Telegraph argued that 
If the indulged young people of our universities think that “student power” can express itself 
in this country with the license to run riot suffered by other countries, the notion needs to be 
stamped out promptly and firmly. ...  
If these students believe that Australians will tolerate the sort of violence inflicted on Paris, 
London or New York, they are sadly mistaken.182 
The Courier-Mail called violence “an American or European monopoly”.183 Reflecting on 
student violence in March 1969, the Chief Justice of NSW interpreted 1968 and 1969 as the 
beginning of “a period of world student revolt” in which “young people in capitalist countries 
had less respect for authority, while intelligent student leaders were advocating organised 
anarchy as an answer to social evils in society”.184 In May 1969 students at Sydney University 
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threw “fruit, streamers and rolls of toilet paper” – an inquiry later added “fire crackers,” - at the 
Governor of NSW, who was inspecting the University Regiment.185 The Australian argued that  
Extremist student tactics and, as often as not, the motives for them, have a striking 
international character. The Sydney University affair could almost have been a scale model of 
the troubles at Harvard three weeks earlier. Next week or next month the events could be 
repeated with local variations at any other Australian, British or Japanese campus.186 
Like the Marxists in the Moratorium, Student leaders’ pronouncements did not contradict this 
narrative. The President of the Melbourne University SRC said that students “who wanted to 
imitate what is happening overseas” would “use police repression as an excuse for stronger, 
more violent demonstrations”.187 Where protests were peaceful, they were used as evidence of 
Australian democratic exceptionalism. Where they were not, the violence was the result of the 
Australian body politic having been infiltrated by alien influences. Australian students were cast 
as the impressionable mimics of American or European behaviours.  
The image of a worldwide network of violent students shaped expectations of violence at the 
nationwide Moratorium protests. In 1973 O’Hara noted that newspapers juxtaposed stories of 
violent American protests in 1969 and 1970 with reportage of local protests, suggesting that 
American and Australian protesters were cut from the same cloth: 
Suddenly and for no apparent reason they begin shouting, and sending death threats and crying 
‘Nazi’, just as the university students in America set fire to a fire-truck.188 
Stories of American protest violence made headlines five days before the first Australian 
Moratorium, when the Australian ran a story about a US protest under the headline “Troops 
ready for violence by anti-war protesters”.189 After the deaths of four students at the hands of the 
National Guard at Kent State University in Ohio on the 4th of May, Australian politicians and 
newspapers began to link American protests to the imminent Australian Moratorium. The day 
before the Moratorium, the Sydney Morning Herald ran a story on the front page under the 
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juxtaposed headlines “Dead Students Honoured” and “Student Arson, Riots and Shooting 
Revenge”.190 On Moratorium day the paper covered a discussion in Federal Parliament of the 
Kent State shootings. A Labor backbencher, Fred Daly, asked the government for an assurance 
that the police would not use firearms against protesters. McMahon, then Minister for External 
Affairs, was quoted as saying that the lesson of Kent State “ought to be taken to heart” by 
Moratorium protesters, and “ought to be heeded” by members of the Opposition who planned to 
march.191 On the day of the march, the Sydney Morning Herald ran an editorial simply titled 
“Violence” in which it argued that the “real danger of violence” existed because “the campaign 
is so assiduous an imitation of its US model”.192  
 
‘Law and Order’ and Rights  
Newspapers situated the ‘Law and Order’ debate of mid-1970 in the same transnational context 
as the students who the new laws targeted. A book review in the Age on the 15th began by calling 
the obsession with ‘Law and Order’ “Agnewitis” after one of its most vocal American 
proponents, Vice-President Spiro Agnew.193 At an address to a Presbyterian women’s group in 
early September, the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, used another of Agnew’s recognisable 
catchphrases when he asked “Who gave the permissive society permission?”194 The Australian 
observed the adoption of this vocabulary in much the same way as the Sydney Morning Herald 
reported the protesters’ “assiduous imitation” of American protesters: 
the government could make political capital out of a “law and order” campaign, and an appeal 
to the “silent majority” just as the Republican Party under Mr. Nixon had before the last US 
Presidential election.195 
The next day the paper’s editorial argued that the “law and order” campaign “seems to have been 
borrowed straight from the American context without regard to the diverse and often tragic 
consequences it has had there”, including the shootings at Kent State University that had made 
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the news just before the first Moratorium march.196 The Moratorium organisers also used the 
violent confrontation outside the American Democratic National Convention in 1968 that 
became known as the ‘Battle of Chicago’ as an example of the result of police intransigence in a 
press statement two days before the second Moratorium: “There is an unfortunate parallel, if on a 
smaller scale, with the time of the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968”.197 Unconvinced by 
the connection between violent protest and civil disorder, and thus by the need for new 
legislation to deal with protesters, opponents of new pieces of legislation targeted at protesters 
explained them as mimicry of American actions rather than a response to local political needs. 
As the debate evolved, the Premiers began to use the now-familiar language of the “noisy 
minority” or “hard core” to justify clamping down on protests. In New South Wales, Premier 
Askin explained the announcement of the Summary Offences Act as targeting “professional 
agitators and rabid communists, who attach themselves to what start off as lawful 
demonstrations, and do their best to turn them into riotous incidents”.198 In Queensland, Premier 
Bjelke-Petersen said that Moratorium organisers “... wanted to defy “law and order” and cause 
maximum inconvenience to the general public,” and that “...it was regrettable there were sections 
of the community who were prepared to act in such an irresponsible way in a democratic 
society”.199  The Premiers began to conflate the violent hard core with the protest organisers, 
implying that they were planning for violence. In May, the Victorian Premier had announced that 
“our government will not tolerate law-breaking from any section of the community”, and told the 
press that “the fewer attending ... the less chance of violence.”200 Before the September 
demonstration, he repeated that warning, this time singling out organisers as the instigators of 
such violence: “[i]f there was mass occupation, the government would take ‘appropriate action’”. 
He also repudiated that the 1000 rally marshals promised by the organisers were intended to keep 
the marchers in line, arguing that they could “serve only to provoke disorder”.201 In September 
Askin called for a total boycott of the second Moratorium:  
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If all political parties – excluding of course the Communist Party - and law-abiding people 
boycotted the demonstration, it would be a ‘fizzer’ – and this would be in the best interests of 
democracy and the people of this state.202 
Support for ‘Law and Order’ was presented as an attempt to safeguard the democratic rights of 
the majority against a minority intent on disrupting the civil life of the community. 
Opponents of the bill also mobilised democratic ideals in support of their position. They 
argued that the bills were an undemocratic imposition on freedom of speech and the right to 
dissent. The NSW Council of Civil Liberties and a number of Unions argued that the bill was 
“repressive”, “undemocratic” and an “assault on civil freedom”.203 The Age’s editorial warned 
that too-strict laws were at least as capable of destabilising democracy as violent protests, and 
that current police powers were sufficient to deal with protesters. It even went as far as to say 
that students claiming wrongful arrest was “cause for disquiet”. The paper concluded that 
[t]he maintaining of “law and order” without undue interference to individual liberty is a 
democracy’s great juggling act: there have been signs of fumbling in Victoria over the past 
few days.204 
In another editorial the paper acknowledged that “the community must be protected from the 
excesses of the wild young men who have occupied private and public buildings and disrupted 
postal services and normal business,” but concluded that current penalties were sufficient for 
managing demonstrators, and that the proposed amendments could “bend the law so far that 
peaceful citizens would consider their elementary rights in danger”.205 The Herald concluded that 
the “law and order” debate was prone to “exaggeration ... or incipient hysteria” and that 
“governments must deal very firmly with violence and intimidation, but must be scrupulously 
careful how they do it”.206 The ‘Law and Order’ debates became debates over the democratic 
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balance between the appropriateness of setting limits on dissent and the assumed inviolability of 
civil liberties. 
During this debate, all sorts of citizen behaviours began to be articulated as ‘rights’. In early 
August, the national president of the Returned Services League, Sir Arthur Lee, argued that 
protest demonstrations “should ... not restrict the free movement of citizens going about their 
normal business. ‘The capacity of dissenters to stop the work of a city should be denied’”.207 
Democratic Labor Party Senator McManus argued on behalf of the party executive that “these 
demonstrators claim rights above everyone else” and that “people had been denied the right to 
use the streets and shops had been denied the right to trade”.208 The Prime Minister argued that 
the protesters’ practice of “invading public places and private property” was intended to 
“interfere with the rights of citizens or to threaten and intimidate other citizens”.209 The Attorney-
General appeared on This Day Tonight to debate the new federal bill with students, he said that 
“he would like to call [the bill] ‘the Law for the protection of rights’” and that “the proposed 
legislation was needed to preserve the rights of the majority against the mindless violence of a 
minority”.210 By the day of the Moratorium, members of the public were also making the same 
argument. The Courier-Mail published a lengthy letter from a Brisbane lawyer which asked   
What about the right of every innocent individual, whether university students or not, to be 
protected from violence, and the guilty ones prosecuted for breaches of the law? ... What about 
the right of every citizen to be governed and protected by the parties democratically elected to 
Parliament ... and the right to change laws by normal procedures and not by violence?211 
By claiming that to go about one’s day unimpeded by disruption was a democratic right, Lee, 
McManus, Gorton and Hughes were arguing in support of the contention that the new legislation 
would protect democracy rather than curtail civil liberties.  
The ‘Law and Order’ debates of late 1970 represent the peak of anxiety about radical and 
violent protest during the Vietnam War. Supporters of ‘Law and Order’ shifted into the language 
of ‘rights’ in part because protesters had used that vocabulary to argue against the real or 
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imagined curtailing of street protest. The language of rights had shaped the development of the 
anti-conscription repertoire before 1966, and the question of the ‘right to dissent’ had gained 
some traction at the time of Johnson and Kỳ’s visits. In this way, the ‘Law and Order’ debate 
was a response to the protesters’ articulations of the ‘right to protest’. Instead of arguing that 
violence would endanger citizens or their property, as Premier Bjelke-Petersen had done during 
the Springbok tour, several public participants in the ‘Law and Order’ debate instead talked 
about the citizen’s “right” to go about their business unimpeded. This played on the 
Moratorium’s own claim to be a political strike against ‘business as usual’. By shifting into the 
language of rights, the ‘Law and Order’ debates made an argument about protest into an 
argument about democratic citizenship. 
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Chapter 5: Lawbreaking and the Right to Protest 
Between mid-1968 and the election of the Whitlam Government in November 1972, Australian 
protesters developed a new vocabulary of lawbreaking as political protest. Although they were 
the centre of public concern over ‘Law and Order,’ anti-war and anti-conscription protesters did 
not shy away from public assertions of their right to break an immoral law. Though acts of 
targeted disorder were willfully misconstrued by newspapers and conflated with the violent 
students who hurled stones at embassy windows, the underpinnings of Australian lawbreaking 
were quite distinct from the iconoclastic confrontation attributed to the Marxist New Left. After 
the 1966 election and the subsequent rhetoric of the ‘noisy minority’ or ‘hard core’ of 
provocateurs made it impossible to maintain the claim to represent the public, Australian 
protesters looked for a new way to justify their dissent. To do so they drew on the liberal 
individualism that drove anti-conscription protest and fused it with notions of moral lawbreaking 
drawn from the international counterculture. Protesters in the early 1960s had argued that the 
moral rightness of dissent came from the public’s rational capacity. Now, sundered from the 
public, they argued that the laws they opposed were objectively immoral. By the time of the 
Moratorium Campaign, Australian protesters had re-framed organised dissent as participatory 
democracy, and the ‘right to protest’ became a justification for the repudiation of the state’s 
authority to regulate the lives of its citizens. 
Unlike student radicalism, the historiography of Australian protest is almost silent on the 
development of peaceful lawbreaking during the Vietnam War. Hamel-Green’s and Scates’ work 
on Australian Draft Resistance outlines some elements of the practice but are selective and far 
from comprehensive.1 Saunders’ work on the Moratorium and Strangio’s biography of Jim 
Cairns both engage with Australian protest in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 However, as yet 
no history of Australian protest has focused on the emergence of a coherent philosophy of 
lawbreaking in the context of anti-war and anti-conscription campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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This chapter will argue that far from a sudden emergence in 1968, the Draft Resisters as well as 
the Moratorium Campaign developed as part of longer history of activism in Australia. 
The chapter examines three protest campaigns that unfolded alongside the events detailed in 
the previous chapter: the campaign against bylaw 418 in early 1969, the activities of the 
Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (CDNSA) in NSW and Victoria from mid-
1969 to 1970, and the establishment of Australian Draft Resistance organisations from 1968 
onwards. Though there was disagreement among participants as to its aims, the campaign against 
bylaw 418 was interpreted as a straightforward protest against restrictive laws that threatened 
civil liberties. By contrast, the CDNSA’s ‘Statement of Defiance’ took pains to make deliberate 
lawbreaking central to its program. The development of Australian Draft Resistance is an 
example of the long-term experimentation and adaptation of transnational protest practice, in this 
case the logic of moral lawbreaking by way of an American anti-conscription practice. The 
examination of its critical adaptation and adoption by Australian activists indicates that 
Australian protesters developed a sophisticated vocabulary of moral lawbreaking and resistance 
to state authority. This shift represented a significant change in Australian protest practice as 
involvement in the Vietnam War drew to a close. 
 
From Civil Liberties to Conscientious Lawbreaking  
On the same day as the violent protests outside the US Consulate in Melbourne in July 1968, a 
thousand students marched peacefully in Brisbane in support of “civil liberties”. The liberty in 
question was the right to hand out pamphlets without a police permit, following the submission 
of a case for amending traffic regulation by the University of Queensland’s Student Union to the 
Queensland Government.3 In keeping with the contemporary anxieties around student protest, the 
Courier-Mail predicted violence in the days before the march, but it passed without incident.4 
Taking place two years prior to the institution of new laws relating to dissent and the ‘law and 
order’ debates surrounding them, the Brisbane march was the first in a series of protests 
                                                 
3 “Those fiery, young fellows have a point,” Courier-Mail, July 5, 1968, 2. 
4 “Making a point,” Courier-Mail, July 3, 1968, 2; “Uni. fear of shambles in Civil Rights march,” Courier-Mail, July 3, 
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throughout 1968 and 1969 that targeted existing laws that activists argued curtailed their right to 
dissent. 
In the same period, men of conscription age began to experiment with new ways to protest the 
National Service Scheme by breaking the law. This took place in the context of changes to the 
operation of the National Service Scheme. In late 1967 Melbourne conscript Daniel Monaghan 
had obtained Conscientious Objector status on the grounds of his objection to the Vietnam War 
in particular, rather than on the basis of life-long pacifism. He toured Sydney advising conscripts 
on how to make a similar case.5 In May 1968 the National Service Act was amended, making 
future exemptions like Monagahan’s impossible. Garfield Barwick, then chief justice of the High 
Court, ruled in August that: 
[t]o my mind, the section calls for the existence of a present compulsive and complete 
conscientious aversion to military service of any kind including non-combatant service at any 
time ending in any circumstances, even in the country’s defence in the direst circumstances. 
Murphy argues that by removing extant ambiguities from the exemption process, Barwick’s 
ruling produced “a move towards more active defiance of the conscription system”.6 This 
entailed active refusal to register for the Scheme, the deliberate evasion of penalties for such 
refusal, and the bringing together of non-compliant young men into ’Draft Resisters’ Unions’. As 
Tony Dalton explained the shift in 1992, “we had moved from non-compliance to total draft 
resistance. This involved collective acts rather than individual ones.”7 
These acts of refusal were initially termed ‘conscientious non-compliance’, but activists soon 
began to refer to it as ‘Draft Resistance’. The practice emerged from an American Catholic anti-
war organisation in Boston and New York in late 1966.8 Scates dates the beginning of Australian 
Draft Resistance to January 1967, when Michael Matteson and Chris Campbell from NSW and 
Errol Heldzingen from Victoria wrote to the Minister for Labour and National Service outlining 
                                                 
5 “Visit to Sydney by David Monaghan,” SOS Sydney Newsletter (October 1967), 3. 
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their intention not to register for the National Service Scheme.9 In February the following year 
Victorian activists initiated an organisation called the Draft Resistance Movement. The 
organisation travelled to Sydney in April 1968 to stage a ‘freedom ride’ and sit-in outside 
Holsworthy military prison in support of conscientious objector Denis O’Donnell, who was 
imprisoned there.10 In late 1968 some Sydney non-compliers formed an organisation called “the 
Unconscriptables”.11 In September 1969 there was a national draft resistance conference in 
Melbourne.12 By 1970 established peace organisations began to operate draft counselling and 
draft resistance services in support of young men who refused to comply with the Scheme.13 
By the time of the Moratorium, advocacy for lawbreaking as protest was widespread in 
Australian activist networks. These two threads –civil liberties and deliberate lawbreaking – 
came together during a protest campaign that began in January 1969 in Melbourne. On the 25th 
Melbourne University Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) members began handing out a 
leaflet on the GPO steps, titled “Why Register for National Service?” The leaflet advocated that 
young men refuse to register for the National Service Scheme. The Crimes Act made incitement 
to break a Commonwealth Law, such as the National Service Act, illegal. The SDS leaflet 
included the text “by handing you this leaflet I am risking arrest and imprisonment”.14 Six 
students were arrested by Melbourne City bylaw officers for breaking Council bylaw 418, which 
forbade the handing out of leaflets in Melbourne for purposes other than commercial.15 Because 
the arrests were made under the bylaw, they diverted attention from SDS’s initial aim for the 
protest, which was to break the federal Crimes Act. As a result of this jurisdictional overlap, over 
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the following months, the lawbreaking intent of the protest would be drowned out by claims that 
the bylaw was an undemocratic infringement of civil liberties. 
SDS sustained the campaign over the next few weeks. The arrested students had intended to 
break the law and were not dissuaded by the charges laid against them. Five of the students, 
including the former president of the Melbourne University Labor Club Michael Hamel-Green, 
went straight from the court to the GPO to begin handing out the same leaflets.16 Over the next 
two days, several more students were arrested by bylaw officers17 This time the students were 
charged for a variety of offences, including refusal to give names to police and incitement to 
breach a Commonwealth law, as well as their breach of by-law 418. Despite some protesters’ 
efforts, over the following months the focus of the campaign began to shift from the federal law 
to the council bylaw. 
The overlap between federal and council jurisdictions made the job of explaining the aim of 
the protest difficult for SDS. Hamel-Green tried to make it clear to reporters that the students had 
intended to breach the Commonwealth Crimes Act, even though the January 25 arrests were 
made under the bylaw.18 The campaign continued to build, with a protest of 1700 students at the 
GPO in March making the front pages of the Melbourne dailies. Unlike the original five 
arrestees, the organisers argued that the bylaw “stifled the right of people to dissent against the 
Government’s policy on the Vietnam war”. The protest involved a march from Melbourne 
University down Swanston Street; 24 more students were arrested for handing out pamphlets.12 
Though the campaign began in defiance of the Crimes Act, it was waged against the bylaw. 
After the Melbourne students’ protest became nation-wide news, older and more high-profile 
activists began to attach themselves to the developing campaign. On the 1st of April, Jim Cairns 
gave a speech to a crowd of students in Hobart in which he argued that he had been “urging and 
inciting people not to render themselves for military service,” and given the interpretation of the 
Crimes Act used to arrest some students, he was also liable for arrest. In front of State and 
Commonwealth Police Cairns said: “I’m saying exactly what’s in the pamphlet, and I’m 
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committing a crime under the Crimes Act”. In the same speech, Cairns “attacked by-laws in 
Australian cities which prevent people from handing out leaflets”.19 On the 2nd the City Council 
voted not to amend the bylaw, and Sir Maurice Nathan, city Councillor, called on police to 
enforce it regardless of who was breaking it.20 The next day, Cairns and SOS secretary Jean 
McLean were among fourteen people arrested on the steps of the Town Hall for handing out a 
new leaflet, written by Cairns to request the repeal of the bylaw.21 
A similar campaign of deliberate lawbreaking began in mid-1969 in NSW, this time focusing 
on the illegitimacy of National Service rather than the legal regulation of the right to dissent. In 
June 1969 two University of Sydney professors - Charles Birch, prominent Christian thinker, and 
Charles Martin, religious philosopher - spoke at an SDS meeting at the University in support of 
young men who refused to register for National Service. By inciting others to break a 
Commonwealth law, the professors noted that they were in breach of section 7 of the 
Commonwealth Crimes Act. In support of the professors, the AICD formed an ad hoc committee 
known as the Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (CDNSA) and planned to 
formalise their lawbreaking as a protest practice.22 The CDNSA drew inspiration from SDS, but 
was mainly composed of older, off-campus activists. The Chairman was Ken Thomas, a 
company director and convener of the Australian Peace Institute, and the Vice-Chairman was 
Murray Sime, a Barrister. Sime had achieved some public notoriety when the Sydney Morning 
Herald reported in March that he may have been subject to disciplinary action under the Public 
Service Act as an attempt to prevent him taking part in a July 4th protest he had helped 
organise.23 Ken McLeod, the CDNSA spokesman, was a student who was also the Secretary of 
both the AICD and the NSW Vietnam Moratorium Committee. The Committee’s executive also 
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included Simon Townsend, former conscientious non-complier, and Les Waddington, secretary 
of the Ex-Services Human Rights Association.24 
The Committee’s protest was based around a “Statement of Defiance” which framed their 
lawbreaking as a collective act of defiance against the National Service Scheme. The Statement 
had a clarity and reach that the Melbourne SDS students had struggled to achieve in March. It 
read: 
Those young men whose principles will not permit them to register under that present 
National Service Act and who refuse to be coerced into any war which they believe to be 
immoral and unjust, have my wholehearted support, encouragement and aid. 
If I were required to register under present conditions, I would refuse. Therefore, while young 
men may serve two years’ gaol because they have the courage to defy conscription and oppose 
the Vietnam war, I am compelled to stand with them.25 
On July 3rd, the Committee held a press conference at the Sydney Town Hall, at which a brief 
press statement explaining the CDNSA’s rationale was read out. Following this, 72 people 
described by the Secretary of the Committee as “responsible citizens” signed a copy of the 
“Statement of Defiance,” thus breaking the Crimes Act in front of the collected press reporters.26 
According to the press statement, signatories “felt themselves obligated to challenge a law 
established by due parliamentary process” and acknowledged that “[t]o deliberately break the 
law of a democratic country is no minor act, but there are times when such action becomes 
necessary in defence of the principles of democracy and freedom themselves”. By breaching the 
Crimes Act, which mandated a maximum penalty of one year in gaol, the ultimate aim was to 
“risk a similar penalty” as men who refused to register for National Service and thus “stand with 
them”.27  
The CDNSA intended for their protest to be more than symbolic, and did everything to make 
sure that the signatories were charged and sentenced. “The core of the Committee’s activities,” 
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according to the Secretary’s report in 1970, was “the actual prosecution and conviction of 
signatories who volunteer”.28 Thus in September Simon Townsend “laid informations” against 
38 of the original signatories, which meant reporting them to a Clerk of the Court rather than the 
police as a method of initiating criminal proceedings. Those 38 had consented to being charged 
by Townsend with breaching the Crimes Act. Though a member of the Committee, Townsend 
had not signed the Statement himself in order to leave him able to perform this role. Geoff 
Mullens laid informations against a second group in early November. In November and 
December, the Committee in NSW staged protests outside the Commonwealth parliamentary 
offices in Martin Place at which a new group would sign the Statement, followed the next day by 
a volunteer laying informations against that group.29 By June 1970 the practice had spread to 
Victoria, where it took on a form much like the SDS GPO leafleting protests of early 1969. As 
Melbourne CDNSA activists distributed leaflets that breached the Crimes Act, the Reverend Stan 
Moore, a veteran of anti-conscription protest and member of the Committee, questioned them 
and took their names in preparation for reporting them to a Magistrate’s Court.30 By early 1970 
most of the peace committees’ resources were diverted to the organisation of the Moratorium 
march, but in January the AICD hired several speaker-equipped cars to drive through the Sydney 
CBD broadcasting an appeal to young men not to register. The cars were all stopped within 50 
meters by police.31 
SDS’ leafleting campaign outside the GPO in Melbourne in January 1969 and the CDNSA’s 
Statement of Defiance were both attempts bring those not subject to the National Service Act 
into solidarity with conscientious non-compliers. The CDNSA’s first press conference made this 
motive clear:  
These 50 citizens have decided that now is the time for real action: they wish to stand up and 
be counted among those young men who have the courage to go to gaol for two years because 
they conscientiously refuse to perform National Service.32 
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One aim of the lawbreaking strategy was to use exposure to prosecution and punishment to 
create a community of activists. This community was evident in the Melbourne ‘fill in a falsie’ 
campaigns of 1970, during which participants would register fictional characters, pets, deceased 
relatives, or even members of the Liberal Federal Government for National Service in an attempt 
to disrupt the Scheme. ‘Falsie’ writers would also call the Department’s National Service hotline 
to keep the line engaged and employees busy.33  
In March 1971, McMahon withdrew another thousand troops from Vietnam, and in August 
announced the final withdrawal of all Australian regular army troops, with only the original 
‘advisers’ of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam to remain.34 Nonetheless, conscription 
remained government policy, and opinion polls continued to show majority support for National 
Service.35 As anti-war protest dwindled from the peak of the May Moratorium, the spectacle of 
individual Draft Resisters’ acts of defiance continued to capture headlines. In September, four 
Draft Resisters from three states, Michael Matteson, Michael Hamel-Green, Tony Dalton and 
John Scott took over the Melbourne University Union building along with three hundred other 
protesters.36 Barricading the building’s entrance with chairs, they broadcast via the Union’s 
transmitter as a pirate radio station – “Radio Resistance 3DR” – for three days until a raid by 
over a hundred police ended the occupation.37 The four resisters escaped capture. 
Two months later Matteson appeared on the ABC current affairs program This Day Tonight. 
He was interviewed in the Sydney studios while the Attorney-General, Ivor Greenwood, was on 
a live cross from Canberra. Though the police were ordered to apprehend him in the studio, 
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Matteson escaped the studio through a window.38 Matteson’s career as provocateur continued in 
April the following year, when he was apprehended by two Commonwealth Police just outside 
Sydney University. He had been sitting in the back seat of a friend’s car at lights, when he was 
handcuffed by a policeman on either side. Dragging them into the car, his friend drove into the 
University, where he was promptly surrounded by a large group of students. Some students 
produced bolt cutters and Matteson was freed and spirited into the crowd.39 Matteson was the 
most visible of a number of Draft Resisters who, supported by established peace organisations 
and networks of activists throughout Australia, ‘went underground’, hiding in a network of 
safehouses for months at a time. Those activists who were not draft resisters themselves 
continued the less spectacular work of anti-conscription campaigns, such as the ‘Summer 
Offensive’ of 1972.40 Between the end of the Moratorium in 1971 and the end of the Scheme in 
1972 following the election of the Whitlam Government, protest against conscription relied on 
an evolving repertoire of lawbreaking.  
 
The Long Transnational Lineage of Australian Lawbreaking  
Australian lawbreaking in the late 1960s took inspiration from a transnational tradition of 
peaceful resistance originating from the collective compulsions of conscience, which they placed 
in a lineage with Martin Luther King Junior in the US and ultimately Gandhi. As well as their 
previous engagement with British models of non-violent direct action in the anti-nuclear 
campaigns of the early 1960s, Australian activists attempted to make common cause with King 
in the United States as a widely-recognised proponent of non-violent resistance. In May and 
September 1967, the Vietnam Mobilisation Committee wrote to King, inviting him to address the 
Sydney Mobilisation, and when he could not, they asked for a taped message to be played at 
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their October protest.41 A leaflet produced in 1970 by the CDNSA connected King with anti-
conscription protest, Christian pacifism and Gandhi when it exhorted readers to “Follow the 
principles which guided Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Dr. Benjamin Spock in 
disobedience for conscience. Refuse to register for National Service!”42 The principles they 
referred to were perhaps most clearly articulated in King’s 1961 “Letter from a Birmingham 
Jail”: 
One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept 
the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, 
and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.43 
The Committee produced a booklet titled The Dynamics of Moral Protest which consisted of six 
documents intended to present “a general picture of contemporary draft resistance in Australia”. 
The booklet characterised the Committee’s work as “a pattern of direct non-violent action,” 
echoing both the British Direct Action Committee and the American Student Non-violent 
Coordinating Committee.44  
The campaign against bylaw 418 was a translation of lawbreaking in the American Civil 
Rights model. Like desegregation sit-ins or Rosa Parks’ famous refusal to sit in the designated 
black section of the bus, activists protesting the bylaw broke the law they intended to have 
repealed. In contrast, SDS’ attempt to breach the Crimes Act in order to protest the National 
Service Act required a leap of logic. The activists in the campaign argued that because the 
National Service Act was an immoral piece of legislation, it was moral to urge others to break it. 
Because the Crimes Act and bylaw 418 made such incitement illegal, the logic of lawbreaking 
meant that they were conscientiously compelled to breach the Crimes Act. Thus on the 29th the 
Age quoted an SDS spokesperson as saying “yesterday’s protest was a challenge to the police 
                                                 
41 Lawes to Martin Luther King Jr., May 10, 1967; King Jr. to Lawes, June 19, 1967; Beer to King Jr., September 22, 
1967, all in Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 1(3),” Box 41 (74), PND Records. 
42 CDNSA, “Conscription – There are Alternatives,” [1970], in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records. 
43 King, Jr., “Letter From a Birmingham Jail” (1963), The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute at 
Stanford University, accessed October 27, 2016, 
<http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html>. 
44 CDNSA, “The Dynamics of Moral Protest,” (pamphlet) [1968?], unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records. 
168 
 
and the State Government to prosecute members of the organisation under the Crimes Act.”45 
Hamel-Green told the Melbourne Herald that the students “were not demonstrating against the 
council by-laws” but about the arrest of two of their fellows the previous Saturday under the 
Crimes Act.46 These statements were an attempt to keep reporters’ focus on the breach of the 
Crimes Act rather than the by-law. Despite their best efforts, the overlapping legal jurisdictions 
the students were charged within meant that the bylaw, not the Crimes Act, became the focus of 
the protest. Another five members of the organisation were arrested by state police for refusing 
to give their names to two city bylaws men. These five were liable to a fine for handing out 
leaflets under by-law 418. The council’s juridical apparatus moved quickly; the five were fined 
within two days and proceeded straight from the steps of the magistrate’s court to another 
leafleting protest, anchoring the protest to the bylaw and not the Crimes Act.47 
The mainstream press also identified Gandhian traces in a number of Australian protests in 
the late 1960s. The Age had noted in an editorial in July 1968 that “the Australian public … has a 
tender enough conscience to look with tolerance on protesting groups which follow the Gandhian 
path of non-violent resistance - particularly when they are young, ardent and debarred from 
voting”.48  The paper also noted the tactic of “passive resistance” at the SDS protest – a phrase 
owing its origin to the developments of satyagraha used in anti-nuclear and Civil Rights protests 
in the UK and US.49 The British influence on the SDS protest was also apparent in the statements 
of an SDS spokesperson to the Age and the Melbourne Herald in the days following the July 25th 
protest who told reporters outside the Magistrate’s court that the five students charged under the 
by-law “would go to gaol rather than pay the fines.”50 Hamel-Green had previously been gaoled 
for failure to pay a fine resulting from a protest outside the Lodge in Canberra in May 1968. 
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When questioned about his decision, he explained that he was refusing to pay the fine as a matter 
of conscience.51  
 While some activists involved in the campaign argued that breaking the Crimes Act was a 
statement about the legitimacy of the National Service Scheme, others preferred to explain their 
protests in the terms of the long-standing debate about the right to use the streets for political 
protest. In contrast to Hamel-Green’s appeal to conscience, one of his co-defendants told 
reporters outside the court that the use of the by-law was “an incursion into the people’s rights to 
disseminate views opposed to those of the Government” while another claimed that the protest 
was necessary because “[t]he Government has all the news media tied up”.52 These members of 
SDS made the same assumptions about protest as anti-nuclear, peace, and anti-war protesters had 
done in the early 1960s: namely, that the role of protest was to represent public opinion, that this 
connection to the public afforded activists legitimacy, and that visibility in the media was the 
best measure of the effectiveness of protest.  
Though Jim Cairns’ involvement in the campaign raised its profile, his presence served to 
anchor the protest to the bylaw. When he joined the Melbourne protest on April 3rd, he was 
handing out a new pamphlet he had written that demanded the repeal of by-law 418 and did not 
mention the Crimes Act.53 Cairns was not yet ready to take on the Commonwealth, possibly 
because he could be disqualified from Parliament if he was sentenced under a State or 
Commonwealth law to a year of prison or more.54 As the bylaw carried no such penalty and was 
in a different jurisdiction, it was safe for Cairns to be arrested under it. Cairns’ protest was 
organised by a new coalition of older activists including Methodist clergy and trade unionists, 
who were agitating against the bylaw specifically. When interviewed by reporters, participants in 
the campaign attempted to position the protest both as a defence of the ‘right to protest’ and as 
Gandhian resistance to the bylaw. Cairns’ arrest, along with 12 other activists by city by-law 
officers on April 3rd made the front page of the Australian and the Melbourne Herald. Cairns 
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argued that the bylaw was “a deliberate attempt to prevent democratic criticism of the 
establishment,” and that the Councillors, elected on a “limited property franchise,” had exceeded 
their democratic authority in enforcing it.55 Cairns, Joan Coxsedge and Jean McLean of SOS 
were quoted as saying they would refuse to pay the fines, going to gaol if necessary, and Cairns 
said he would continue to protest the bylaw despite his arrest. Although Cairns gestured towards 
an imagined public when he said “I am certain a majority agree that this council law is 
undemocratic,” the language these activists used to interpret their protest rested on the same 
conception of conscientious lawbreaking that Hamel-Green had outlined after his arrest outside 
the Lodge in May 1968.56 When asked about her decision to go to gaol rather than pay the fine, 
Coxsedge said “I don’t want to, but if it helps our cause and is necessary, I will probably go”.57  
By contrast, reportage of the protests excluded discussion of lawbreaking, preferring to 
concentrate on the ‘right to dissent’. The Melbourne Herald gave the campaign better coverage 
than other dailies, publishing two editorials and several stories in opposition to the bylaw. The 
paper argued that “[w]here leaflets are not obscene, and do not urge law-breaking,” handing 
them out “should not be curtailed”.58 Even though the original pamphlets in question did 
encourage law-breaking, “other laws are adequate to control ... seditious or objectionable 
material”.59 Arguing that the neither the conservative Council nor the small group of city 
ratepayers were representative enough to justify the effect of the bylaw, the paper called it a 
“threat to freedom of expression” and a reminder that “all restrictive rules should face challenge 
if they do not clearly meet a community need today”.60 The bylaw was repealed on April 9th, 
giving the Herald a neat end to the story that made sense in terms of contemporary assumptions 
about protest: the protesters had made a legitimate point, the media had supported them, and the 
council had responded by removing the offending law. Democracy and the public had worked as 
intended, and no uncomfortable engagement with the idea of conscientious lawbreaking was 
required. The Herald’s support of the by-law campaign demonstrates that in mid-1969, in an 
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atmosphere of anxiety about violence, public discussions of the right to protest were less fraught 
than unpacking the logic of National Service. 
The CDNSA clearly presented their protest as moral lawbreaking, with none of the muddiness 
of SDS or the bylaw 418 protests. The Committee’s program was outlined in a 1969 press 
conference:  
These 50 citizens have decided to break the law and demonstrate their deep and abiding 
opposition to the National Service Act, a law they believe to be immoral in its present form.61 
The choice to target Section 7 of the Crimes Act, which featured in the CDNSA’s ‘Statement of 
Defiance,’ stemmed from Melbourne SDS protests, but also from the experience of Professors 
Birch and Martin, who breached the Act at a Sydney University SDS protest.62 From the outset 
the CDNSA combined their moral critique of National Service with the existing activist language 
of responsible citizenship. In doing so they characterised the compulsions of conscience as an 
unimpeachable moral justification for citizens to engage in politicised lawbreaking. 
The Committee drew on examples from the United States. In 1967 an organisation of 
American academics had circulated a statement called the “Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” 
among prominent citizens for their signature. The resulting lists of names were published along 
with the text of the “Call to Resist” in the New York Review of Books and the New Republic in 
September 1967. The statement was signed by prominent figures such as Benjamin Spock, 
Herbert Marcuse, Alan Ginsberg, Daniel Berrigan, William Sloane Coffin Jr., Howard Zinn and 
Noam Chomsky. According to Michael Foley, the statement acknowledged signatories’ intention 
to counsel and assist Draft Resisters, and was thus a breach of Section 12 of the Selective Service 
Act.63 The “Call to Resist” became the most widely known of the complicity statements 
circulating in the United States, and the authors of the document formed an organisation called 
Resist to continue support for Draft Resisters. The initial form of the CDNSA’s campaign – a 
complicity statement that was published as an advertisement in newspapers – bore similarities to 
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the American ‘Call to Resist’. The question of the legitimacy of the state’s authority also 
dovetailed with later explanations of the ‘right to protest’. 
Committee members were careful to characterise their actions as deliberate. In July, the 
CDNSA sent a deputation to Attorney-General Bowen, asking if he would initiate action against 
the original signatories under the Crimes Act. Bowen replied that the matter was being 
considered, but that his “preliminary look at the document indicated that it had been very 
carefully drawn ... in order to ensure that any prosecution launched upon it would fail”.64 In 
response to Bowen’s “innuendo,” the Committee re-stated its objectives in a press release in 
August, stating that the Statement had been “drafted with the intention that it would be in breach 
of the Crimes Act, Section 7a,” and that the Committee had “obtained legal advice that the 
Statement is as clear a breach of the Crimes Act as possible”. The Sydney Committee also 
printed posters and hired speaker-equipped cars to broadcast incitements not to register. The 
press release noted that “[t]hese other activities have all been in breach of the Act, but no action 
has been taken”.65 The press release for one of the speaker car protests noted that this action was 
in defiance of a police ban and that the Police Commissioner had said the permit had been 
withheld because “by issuing a permit, he would be allowing legal facility for a breach of a 
Commonwealth Law (Crimes Act, Section 7)”.66  
The Committee had expected the kind of criticism Bowen had offered. Townsend wrote to the 
signatories prior to the July 3 press conference in which he anticipated criticism of the 
Committee: 
If we are accused of a put-up job, a stunt, a gimmick, I think we should reply: ‘This is indeed a 
put-up job’, in as much as it is a new method of non-violent protest. It is a stunt in as much as 
it is a legitimate, planned political act. The National Service Act is a bad law. We want it 
changed. To this end, we are using the resources of the law to influence this change.67 
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The solidarity that the Committee was trying to establish with draft resisters was made 
meaningful by the threat of prosecution. Therefore part of the Committee’s program was to 
ensure that the signatories were charged and sentenced: “The core of the Committee’s activities 
is, of course, the actual prosecution and conviction of signatories who so volunteer”.68 After each 
public signing, committee members who had not themselves signed the Statement “laid 
informations” against the signatories – a legal term for reporting a crime to the clerk of the court 
in order to commence criminal proceedings, analogous to a citizens’ arrest.69 The first group of 
Sydney signatories were convicted and fined in mid-October, and all but one refused to pay the 
fine, becoming liable for 25 days in gaol.70 The second group were convicted and fined in late 
November, with one fine being paid anonymously on behalf of a signatory who then participated 
in the third public signing in Sydney.71 By the time informations were laid against the third 
group, the Clerk of the Special Federal Court “decided to refuse to issue process on the grounds 
that the action was ‘vexatious, collusive, and an abuse of the processes of law’”.72  
The CDNSA planned to use the “resources of the law” to force the Government’s hand. After 
the Clerk’s refusal to issue warrants for the arrest of the first group of signatories, Townsend 
went to the NSW Supreme Court under the advice of a Queens’ Counsel, and obtained a court 
order – an Order Nisi –  asking the Clerk to “show cause why he should not be instructed to issue 
warrants for the arrest of those signatories who have been convicted, have refused to pay their 
fines, but have not been apprehended.”73 Failure to show cause would prompt the issue of a Writ 
of Mandamus, which would force the Special Federal Court to issue the warrants. Geoff Mullen, 
a draft resister who laid informations against the second group of signatories, also applied for a 
Writ of Mandamus through an Order Nisi.74 Though there was a hearing scheduled for June 1970 
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on the matter of the Writ of Mandamus, the Committee’s surviving papers do not confirm 
whether one was ever issued.75  
The prosecutions allowed the CDNSA to use the courtroom as another site of protest. Rather 
than using the public or public opinion to legitimate their protests, the Committee used the law 
itself. This was made clear by a second deputation, this time to the new Attorney-General, Tom 
Hughes, in November 1969, led by Whitlam and including then President-elect of the ACTU, 
Bob Hawke. The deputation argued that as “equality before the law is a cardinal principle of 
democracy,” unless Hughes was prepared 
to enforce the court’s judgement against these citizens and imprison them for non-payment of 
fines, he should immediately order the release of non-compliers Brian Ross and Gordon 
Reisenleiter, presently serving two years gaol, cease all current and pending prosecutions 
under the National Service Act, and repeal the Act itself.76 
This interpretation of equality before the law was based on the CDNSA’s imagined solidarity 
with draft resisters, and through it the Committee’s aim was to represent National Service as 
illegitimate and anti-democratic. 
The clarity of the CDNSA’s explanation meant that the press was in no doubt about what the 
Committee was trying to achieve. No press outlet gave the Committee’s claims more publicity – 
or scrutiny – than the Sydney Morning Herald. The paper had given considerable coverage to the 
initial protest by Professors Birch and Martin in an editorial that argued that the requirement to 
keep the army sufficiently staffed to manage Australia’s defence commitments overruled the 
questions of conscience they raised.77 The paper published a response from Birch and Martin 
with an accompanying editorial, and then a reply two weeks later.78 The paper refused to run the 
Statement as an advertisement, arguing that this would have put the paper in breach of the 
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Crimes Act, but still reported the intent and substance of the CDNSA’s protest, printing it in full 
as part of reportage on the CDNSA rather than as advertising.79 
Though the CDNSA complained the Herald “was completely closed to the Committee in 
Defiance” and was only “creating the appearance of a public debate on conscription,” this claim 
did not pay due acknowledgement to an equivocal editorial the paper published in mid-
November.80 In it, the Herald demonstrated a firm grasp of the logic underpinning the CDNSA’s 
protest. Echoing Townsend’s claim that the Committee was using the resources of the law to 
effect protest, the paper explained that the signatories were “acting politically, in a convenient 
legal context, to embarrass the Government and draw public attention to their protest”. It also 
called the protest “legitimate and, so far, effective”. On the other hand, it noted that the Attorney-
General was playing “the same political game” and “playing for time”. The paper stepped back 
from endorsing the campaign, pointing out that “their only contribution in legal terms has been to 
illustrate the undesirable vagueness” of the Crimes Act.81 Though the Herald’s editorial line 
opposed the legitimacy of deliberate conscientious lawbreaking in the Gandhian model, its 
coverage articulated the Committee’s own logic of protest more clearly than any other public 
outlet. As well as ongoing coverage from major dailies, the Committees in various states also 
placed advertisements in newspapers.82 Reportage, editorials and advertising in the press made 
the logic of Australian protest lawbreaking legible for a wider public. 
The CDNSA’s protest began to shift tactics in the light of the refusal of some courts to 
prosecute. At the outset of the Sydney campaign in mid-1969, Townsend had been careful to be 
identified as a protester when he laid informations against the Sydney group. He was 
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anxious to avoid any confusion in the public mind; that is, we don’t want the public to think 
that someone has righteously taken action against some signatories. We want the public to 
realise that what we are doing is executing a political act.83 
In November, CDNSA prosecutors began to pretend to be ordinary citizens, unrelated to the 
activist organisation. When asked by a Sydney Morning Herald reporter, John Rozentals, who 
charged the third group of signatories, claimed that he was “not acting on behalf of the 
Committee of Defiance” despite being instructed by the CDNSA to report the signatories.84 By 
the middle of 1970 in Melbourne, the Reverend Stan Moore was happy to be mistaken for a 
righteous bystander when he questioned his confederates. While the Herald editorial had 
identified Townsend as “a fellow protester” who was prosecuting the signatories privately, the 
Melbourne Herald ran a story about Moore under the headline “Minister stirs anti-NS group”. 
The paper repeated Moore’s own claim that “I am doing this in my capacity as a private citizen 
with a duty to uphold the law”.85 The 22 people that he charged with breaching the Crimes Act 
came before a magistrate on the 27th who dismissed the charges, arguing that Moore’s 
prosecutions were “an attempt to use a court as a public forum for the views of some of those 
charged with the offence”. He called Moore out as “an informant who is working in cahoots with 
the charged people,” despite Moore’s protestations in court that this was slander.86  
This shift was evident in the behaviour of several Melbourne activists involved in the 
campaign. After their case was thrown out of the Magistrate’s court, the 22 defendants staged an 
“impromptu sit-in”. One defendant burnt a registration form outside the courthouse, while 
another occupied the magistrate’s chair in a clear show of contempt for the court’s authority.87 
On August 1st, another GPO protest turned violent when some protesters attempted to stop 
Commonwealth Police reaching a speaker who was inciting passers-by not to register for 
National Service.88 In the context of the ‘law and order’ debates and the looming Summary 
Offenses Act, the Age’s coverage of the CDNSA’s activities concentrated on activists’ rowdy 
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courtroom behaviour. The paper reported that during the trial of Allan Dowsley, a school 
teacher, activists in the courtroom heckled and laughed in the public gallery. The Magistrate 
asked the police to clear the court, and in response the demonstrators and the defendant linked 
arms and refused to move. Dowsley made comments questioning the legitimacy of the court – 
that his trial was a “foregone conclusion,” that the magistrate and the police were “just puppets 
of the regime,” and that the magistrate’s order to clear the court was illegitimate because “this is 
a public open court, they can’t do this”.89 The following week Dowsley refused to call witnesses, 
claiming that “you can’t get any justice in these courts anyway,” refused to swear on the bible as 
he had “no religious beliefs,” and refused to leave the court once he was found guilty.90 In 
September the trial of Earl Ingleby proceeded in a similar fashion. Ingleby refused to stand for 
the Magistrate and explaining that “to stand for the court is to show a mark of respect for the 
court; I have no respect for the court”.91 Ingleby argued that the case against him was not “bona 
fide” and was instead an effort to intimidate him. He argued that others had not been charged 
despite also committing the same offence.92  A week after Ingleby’s court case, Cairns “helped” 
two Draft Resisters burn a court summons while standing on a loudspeaker car at the second 
Moratorium. The burning of legal documents at rallies – popularised by anti-conscription 
protests before 1967 with registration certificates – had become recognisable enough that the Age 
described it as “ritual,” and symbolised the liberal repudiation of the State’s authority over its 
citizens.93 In this regard, the CDNSA’s model of lawbreaking as a democratic act was part of a 
broader reappraisal of the relationship between the dissenting citizen and the state.  
 
Participatory Democracy, the Right to Protest, and the Right to Break a Bad Law  
According to Paul Strangio, Cairns’ most recent biographer, Cairns began to outline a new 
interpretation of the relationship between democratic citizenship, the right to protest, and the 
imperative to break immoral laws in a series of public pronouncements in March and April 
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1970.94 He argues that by mid-1969 “a clear connection existed in Cairns’ mind between the 
right to protest and the wider ideal of a vibrant, participatory democracy”.95 Cairns’ statements 
also affirmed that the citizen’s right to protest was the same thing as the conscientious imperative 
to break bad laws, even though he drew a distinction between lawbreaking and violence. In an 
article published in the Apexian during the campaign against bylaw 418 he had argued that along 
with other state and local regulations such as the bylaw, the Crimes Act’s prohibition on 
incitement to break laws made legal protest impossible in Australia. He also published a paper in 
Broadside in which he characterised the moral right to break a bad law as an act of conscience.96 
In April he made another speech, this time to students from Melbourne University, where he 
outlined his thoughts on the relationship of street protest to parliament: “The argument that 
things should be left to Parliament ... is the argument of those who want to stultify and quieten 
the essentials of democratic action.”97 He also claimed that although the marches would be 
“reasonable, peaceful, inoffensive and dignified”, there were to be no guarantees that they would 
be lawful, and he reaffirmed his previous statements on the citizen’s right to break an 
objectionable law.  
Cairns’ speech ignited a two-day parliamentary debate about the role and limits of extra-
parliamentary protest in a democracy. The debate was opened by Hughes, the Attorney General, 
who argued that “In a parliamentary democracy any attempt to change the law should be made 
within the framework of the law. Any other path to change is potentially anarchical”. Billy 
Snedden, Minister for Labour and National Service continued on the same theme, arguing that 
“The place to make political points is in the forums established under the Constitution for that 
purpose”.98 In response, Cairns offered his clearest articulation yet of his argument that street 
protest was a legitimate part of the political process. A “whole generation”, he argued, was 
beginning to believe that: 
Parliament is not democracy. It is one manifestation of democracy and it can become a most 
important manifestation of democracy if people are prepared to come out of their apathy and 
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do something about it. ...Democracy is government by the people, and government by the 
people demands action by the people. It demands effective ways of showing what the interests 
and needs of the people really are. It demands action in public places around the land.  
In this passage, he specifically tied membership in a democratic citizenry to public action, and 
framed occupation of public space as the legitimate acts of an engaged citizenry. Cairns summed 
up the link between this conceptualisation of democratic citizenship and the Moratorium, stating 
that: 
the Vietnam Moratorium is an example of government by the people; it is an example of 
people taking action about issues that are important to them, actions which they believe will 
be influential in the making of national decisions in the ways that are open to them, and in the 
ways in which they can make their decisions effective.99 
For Cairns, ‘the people’ was the sovereign democratic entity, and an irrepressible democratic 
force that alone should shape the nation’s destiny. Parliament was only one possible expression 
of its desires. It could do the people’s bidding, or it could try to repress them, but it could never 
usurp the people’s sovereign democratic power.  
Cairns continued developing his thoughts on the democratic right to protest and the moral 
compulsion to break a bad law in a photographic essay on the first Moratorium called Silence 
Kills. The book argued that protest was just one among many legitimate uses of public space, 
citing ANZAC Day and the Queen’s visit as examples of other such uses. It acknowledged that 
“if any person takes up space in a public space he may be found guilty of obstruction,” but 
countered that “[t]here can be no claim in conscience for a right to perform a wrong act”.100 It is 
in the space between morality and the law that Silence Kills found justification for civil 
disobedience. In Silence Kills, Cairns acknowledged that the law had some moral force, but 
argued that it was trumped by the individual’s right to disobey a law “if obeying it would be 
denying their deepest convictions.”101 Silence Kills argued that should protest stop completely, 
“parliament will soon do little more than give effect to its own will or to the will of the few 
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people privileged to be able to influence it.”102 By May 1970, in Cairns’ model of participatory 
democracy, dissent in the form of street marches like the Moratorium was a legitimate and 
desirable political act. The absence of dissent was a symptom of a dysfunctional democratic 
system.  
According to Malcolm Saunders, Cairns’ speech in Parliament became a “manifesto of 
dissent,” and Cairns a “mouthpiece” for the Moratorium.103 Certainly the ideas he gave form to 
were already circulating through the Campaign. By late 1970 the question of the Moratorium’s 
assumed democratic legitimacy based in the ‘right to protest’ underpinned a confrontation 
between the Sydney VMC, Police Commissioner Norm Allan, the Minister for Agriculture, and 
the Mayor of Sydney. Arguing “that citizens should only have to consult the authorities, rather 
than gain their permission to use the streets for political demonstrations”, the NSW VMC passed 
a motion in mid-August “[t]hat the Moratorium Committee communicate in no way with the 
commissioner of police in connection with the culminating activities in the city on Friday, 18th 
September”.104 Over the first two weeks of September, a tense conversation ensued between 
these public officials and the Moratorium organisers in Sydney. The City Council rejected the 
Moratorium’s application to use Hyde Park for a week-long anti-war festival, and the Minister 
for Agriculture refused permission to use the Domain for the Moratorium rally. The Mayor 
argued that the ban was to protect the “hard-earned midday rest” of city workers from “extremist 
minority groups” who “invariably” chose to hold their “noisy, controversial or disturbing 
meetings” during the lunch hour.105  The New South Wales Moratorium Committee responded in 
a press statement that framed the refusal as a deliberate effort to prevent the exercise of the 
democratic right to protest, and possibly even to force the Moratorium into illegal activity.106 The 
Minister eventually agreed to grant permission for the use of the Domain if the Moratorium 
organisers first obtained the permission of the police commissioner.107  
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The VMC refused to engage with Commissioner Allan unless the meeting could be held on 
the assumption that permission to march was not required. No permit had been required for the 
first Moratorium, so the organisers felt secure in repeating in the Herald that “the committee was 
not prepared to ask permission to exercise a democratic right”.108 In an interview with the Herald, 
Allan also mobilised the idea of ‘rights’ and the law, arguing that the organisers were attempting 
to place themselves “above the law” and that the law was there to protect “the rights and 
liberties” of other members of the community.109 Two days before the march Allan agreed to 
meet with the Moratorium Committee as long as they applied for a permit first. The New South 
Wales Moratorium Secretariat held a hurried meeting, and agreed to ask for a permit and to 
withdraw the request to use the Domain. The meeting reaffirmed their belief that their right to 
protest was being infringed, arguing again that “citizens should only have to consult the 
authorities, rather than gain their permission to use the streets for political demonstrations,” but 
that “faced with inadequate access to the mass media” and thus no way to “convince the public 
of our principle”, the organisers had decided to seek police permission”.110 Allan did not approve 
the permit until two hours before the march was scheduled to begin, and stipulated that the VMC 
must change the route, marchers remain on the footpaths, and that the planned sit-down 
occupation of the street be abandoned.111 The Committee agreed.  
There were similar negotiations in other states. In Victoria, the Town Clerk of the Melbourne 
City Council wrote to the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, noting that the organisers had not 
asked for a permit and that any procession at the Princes Gate Plaza would thus be in breach of a 
council bylaw. Though the Town Clerk said that the letter was not a ban as the council could not 
enforce such a ban, Cairns apologised for the lack of a permit and requested the one-month 
notification period be waived. He was quoted as saying that “it was of great importance that we 
did everything possible to see that there was cooperation with the police, the council and the 
people”.112 Unlike in NSW, the council did not make any effort to change the route of the march 
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nor the time of the demonstration.113 In Queensland the Police Minister refused permission for a 
sit-down and for the use of Queen Street by marchers. The Committee Secretary claimed that 
given the previous use of Queen Street for parades, this was a reversal of government policy.114 
In South Australia there was a confrontation between Premier Don Dunstan and Police 
Commissioner John McKinna, where Dunstan, sympathetic to the Moratorium, asked the police 
chief to divert traffic away from the sit-down in Adelaide. McKinna rejected the suggestion as it 
might “deny the general public the rights to which they are entitled”.115 Though most agencies of 
government that the various state committees negotiated with preferred to speak in terms of 
permits, some elevated the assumed desire of members of the public to go about their day 
unimpeded by protest to the level of an inalienable political right which superseded the right to 
protest. 
Newspapers offered their own interpretations of where street marches fitted into the 
constellation of political rights. The Australian repeated phrases from the Moratorium 
Campaign’s own campaign material, though framed protest as a liberty not a right:  
It is a moratorium on ‘business as usual’ at home while a disastrous war continues in Vietnam, 
a harsh reminder of the facts the Australian Government would prefer forgotten; an exercise of 
democratic freedoms to express strongly-held convictions with due force.116 
Almost every other publication preferred to draw attention to the disruption that even non-
violent lawbreaking caused to law-abiding citizens. The Age reported on Cairns’ March press 
statement on the front page under the headline “hold up”.117 The Melbourne Herald argued that 
the “democratic right of protest emphatically does not include attempts to disrupt the life of 
Melbourne and to prevent other citizens going about their lawful business”.118 The Courier-Mail 
called Cairns “wildly irresponsible” and also emphasised that street protest “den[ied] the right of 
others who do not hold with Dr. Cairns’ beliefs ... to go about their own daily lives as they want 
to”.119 A year later, the federal Attorney-General noted that “[a] growing number of Australians 
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believed there was a civil liberty to disobey the law” and that “[r]ights cannot be exercised in 
ways which destroy the rights of others”.120  
The Sydney Morning Herald offered the most equivocal engagement with protesters’ ideas 
about citizenship, lawbreaking, protest and conscience. The paper ran an editorial on Cairns’ 
speech at Melbourne University titled “Dr. Cairns and the law” in which it acknowledged that 
“by definition no citizen has the legal right to break the law” but “he may have a moral right”.  
Taking up Cairns’ argument, the editorial noted that individual conscience was the “only guide” 
for deciding when a law was objectionable. Though this position affirmed Cairns’ arguments 
about citizenship and conscience, the editorial stopped short of agreeing that the moral rights of 
the citizen outweighed the responsibility to abide by the structures of representative democracy. 
It ended with a statement that  
[t]his is a parliamentary democracy, which provides machinery for debating and amending the 
law. When Parliament decides that a law is objectionable, it will presumably repeal it. Until 
then the first duty of a citizen is to obey.121 
The Herald’s equivocation continued when it published opinion pieces by two academics in 
August. Dr. Ilmar Tamello from the Law faculty of Sydney University, and Dr. D. G. Boland 
from a Seminary in Toongabbie, which outlined two different views of the politics of breaking 
bad laws.  
Both articles refuted the right to break unjust laws. Noting that “the question whether unjust 
law IS law has recently become a conspicuous issue in the battle of political ideas in Australia,” 
Tamello argued that “any form of political chaos produced by a large-scale defiance of existing 
’law and order’ is a precarious way to social and political change.” Just as Snedden and Hughes 
had argued before the May march, reform of the law was best left to the functions of the 
democratic state. Tamello spoke in favour of the right to dissent, as long as it remained within 
the law:  
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It is deemed to be fair that even these outsiders have a reasonable opportunity to voice their 
dissent or criticisms ... and to campaign for a change of government on the corresponding 
issues in the next election or through other legitimate procedures.122 
Boland took issue with Tamello’s argument. Citing Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Marcuse, 
Boland argued that “[t]he proposition that unjust law does not have the character and force of 
law still holds and must be insisted upon,” and that “no law ... can oblige the individual person to 
forsake his rights or neglect his obligations. One is obliged not to obey such a law, whatever the 
cost”.  Despite agreeing with Cairns’ claim that unjust laws did not overrule individual 
conscience, Boland maintained that the individual may be obliged “to ‘obey’ unjust laws in order 
to avoid bringing ‘the law’ into contempt, or to avert civil disorder. ... We are obliged, then, ‘to 
suffer injustice for justice’s sake’.” While he asserted that the principle Cairns had articulated 
was a sound moral principle, he argued that: 
We must not be led ... to abandon our principles to those who would use them without 
scrupling about means. The fault lies not in the principle which denies validity or character to 
unjust laws, but in the making of this an excuse for active and even violent resistance to 
authority, and the provocation of civil disorder.123 
For Boland, the Moratorium used individual conscience as an excuse rather than a justification 
for lawbreaking. Like the hard core of extremists at the heart of violent protest or Communists at 
the heart of the peace movement, he argued that the principles that the Moratorium claimed to 
represent were a smokescreen for a more nefarious agenda. 
In this way, Cairns’ calls for peaceful lawbreaking were conflated with the feared ‘hard core’ 
of violent students. The Melbourne Herald likened Cairns to the “raw and reckless student 
fringe”.124 The Sydney Morning Herald referred to Cairns’ reputation in its headline: “Cairns tells 
students they may break law”. It equivocated by stating that “Dr. Cairns cannot encourage 
students to break the law and then blame police for trying to prevent them”.125 The Melbourne 
Herald’s editorial was titled “Dr. Cairns is wrong again” and claimed that he invited “anarchy” 
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and that the protest would be little more than “a bid by juveniles to make themselves martyrs of 
police action”.126 In the context of press preoccupation with the figure of the disruptive and 
disobedient student, Cairns’ ideas were reinterpreted as justifications for violence. Prominent 
Federal parliamentarians argued that Cairns was using high-minded rhetoric to offset the 
impotence of being part of a parliamentary opposition. The Age reported that following Cairns’ 
press statement, Gorton’s response argued that Cairns and the Labor Party were irresponsible, 
and called on Whitlam as Opposition Leader to “clear this matter up”.127 In this characterisation, 
the Moratorium became an electoral stunt. Gorton interpreted Cairns’ leadership of the VMC as 
an indication that it was an adjunct to the ALP in opposition. The Australian reported that 
Hughes made a similar rhetorical move when he said during the debate that  
[t]o be in Parliamentary opposition to a democratically elected government must be at times 
galling and frustrating ... but this affords no excuse for resorting to or encouraging activities 
based simply on the naked physical power of the mob...128 
The Courier-Mail drew attention to the disconnect between Cairns’ position as a law-maker and 
his advice that citizens need not follow the laws he represented and made. Agreeing with Hughes 
and Snedden, it concluded that “The way to change policies is to prevail upon people to change 
Governments.” The paper also drew attention to Cairns’ position in opposition, pointing out that 
“This Dr. Cairns’ party has, for 20 years, failed to do”.129 Though they had become widespread 
within activist circles, the idea of breaking a ‘bad law’ as an act of conscientious protest was 
contested by opponents of the Moratorium, and never gained mainstream acceptance. 
 
Draft Resistance 
Australian Draft Resistance developed in parallel with notions of lawbreaking as a legitimate 
protest practice. Unlike conscientious objection, which involved individual conscripts attempting 
to gain exemption through the provisions of the National Service Scheme, Draft Resistance was 
based in a refusal to comply with the law that administered the National Service Scheme. The 
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Draft Resistance Movement that formed in Melbourne in 1968 noted that its aim was not to 
oppose conscription but “to wreck it” by “making conscription as ineffective as possible” 
through a variety of strategies, including “encourage[ing] people not to register”.130 Draft 
Resisters had some common practices with the CDNSA, and the attempt to “wreck” conscription 
through collective refusal was influenced by the burgeoning rhetoric of resistance to authority. 
The practice originated in the United States. Foley dates the beginning of radical refusal of the 
draft in the United States to December 1966, when SDS members at the University of Chicago 
began circulating the ‘We Won’t Go’ pledge, and publishing signed copies as advertisements in 
local newspapers. The language of the pledge drew on the articulation of individual freedoms in 
the Port Huron Statement, the urtext of the global New Left. Although signatories of the pledge 
repudiated conscription, it “did not commit the signers to action or even a clearly defined 
strategy of resistance”.131 Because the American draft card identified the bearer, Foley argues 
that burning one “essentially destroyed the evidence of one’s protest and greatly minimised 
personal risk”.132 According to Foley, American Draft Resistance was an attempt to replace the 
“individual cathartic action” of burning draft cards with the “pragmatic efficacy” of widespread, 
collective resistance to the draft.133 In January 1967, the US journal New Left Notes published a 
leaked memo written by the Director of the Selective Service Scheme, General Hershey. It 
became known as the “Channelling Memo” because in it Hershey explained the use of student 
deferments and “punitive reclassification” to hold the threat of military service over the heads of 
students and thus channel them into the most productive pursuits. The memo described this as 
“the American or indirect way of achieving what is done by direction in foreign countries where 
choice is not permitted”. According to Foley, this convinced activists that the government and 
Army were “engaging in the kind of social engineering practiced by America’s totalitarian 
enemies”.134 In the context of this revelation, American Draft Resisters looked for ways to 
identify themselves to the authorities. By October of 1967 they had settled on the draft card turn-
in, asking draft resisters to turn their cards into the Justice Department en masse rather than burn 
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them.135 The ‘Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority’ that had been one of the blueprints for the 
CDNSA’s activity was handed in with the Draft Cards at that first turn-in. 
Australian Draft Resistance developed in a different direction to the American model. 
American Draft Resisters broadly understood Draft Resistance as a Gandhian act, complete with 
the expectation of punishment. Most Australian Draft Resisters attempted to evade capture and 
punishment, remaining at large.136 Like the courtroom acts of refusal by CDNSA activists, Draft 
Resisters aimed to characterise the state as impotent and therefor illegitimate. Only a few Draft 
Resisters turned themselves in to police. Sean Foley arrived at Mosman Police Station in January 
1969 after a warrant was issued for his arrest. The stunt was performed for the benefit of 30 anti-
conscription protesters; Foley made light of the arrest, announcing his intention to use his time in 
prison to study for a Physics exam.137 Michael Matteson turned himself in in November 1972. 138 
Draft Resistance may have been an American practice, but Australian activists adapted it to 
make sense in their own political context. 
Because their identifying data was kept in Canberra, Australian draft card burners never faced 
the problem of anonymity that Americans had to solve with the turn-in. News reports suggest 
that Commonwealth Police did not struggle to identify registrants who burnt their cards and that 
draft card burners did not attempt to hide their identity.139 Australian protesters struggled with a 
different problem – without the Hershey system of punitive reclassification and in the context of 
the conscription lottery, there was no guarantee that young men opposed to National Service 
would get the chance to become conscientious objectors. Thus Matteson, Campbell and 
Heldzingen deliberately breached the National Service Act to make themselves subject to 
punishment, by advising the Minister that they would refuse to register. Refusal to register 
carried a penalty of between $20 and $100, increased to between $40 and $200 in the 1968 
amendment to the Act. It was not until that amendment passed that failure to comply with a call-
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up notice had a federal gaol term attached to it, and even then, it was only after the defendant had 
refused further compliance.140 A letter written by Stephen Bock to the Minister and published in 
September 1969 in the SOS Newsletter outlined the logic of Australian Draft Resistance, stating 
his refusal to be conscripted in terms of the logics of lawbreaking and liberal conscience: 
I sincerely believe the National Service Act to be immoral, and because of this I cannot 
comply with it in any way. I cannot recognise the right of any government to compel any 
young man to act contrary to the dictates of his conscience. 
I believe that when an individual is faced with something which is immoral, he must do all in 
his power to correct it. I do not consider opting out to be enough. I intend to devote all my 
energies to the repeal of this act and the cessation of the aggression in Vietnam. If this 
involves spending any amount of time in prison, I am prepared to do so as my duty to 
mankind.141 
The acts of public letter writing that initiated Australian Draft Resistance was an attempt to 
achieve similar goals to those Foley accorded to the American draft card turn-in: it “combined an 
act of moral witness with a new practical approach to ending the war”.142  
Australian Draft Resisters adopted other American processes, reinterpreting them in light of 
local political conditions. The Arlington Street Church in Boston became the first American 
‘draft sanctuary’ when it offered shelter to an American Draft Resister in mid-1969. When US 
Marshals came to arrest him, the priest delayed them on the stairs, telling them that they were 
about to “violate a moral sanctuary,” though offering no physical resistance to the marshals 
beyond the impediment of the crowd.143 In Australia in September 1970, the DRU asked 
organisations and unions opposed to conscription to provide “draft sanctuaries” to resisters, 
using similar language as their American counterparts.144  
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The idea of the ‘draft sanctuary,’ was adapted by Australian activists for use in universities. 
The occupation of the Melbourne University Union building in September 1971 was in part an 
attempt to turn it into a ‘sanctuary’. The idea of sanctuary also underpinned Matteson’s flight 
onto Sydney University campus, and his freeing by a crowd of students on the front lawns. This 
translated practice played into a long running debate about whether Australian police could enter 
university campuses uninvited. In March 1969, the Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University was 
asked by students to inform them when police came on campus, and students suggested that they 
could “get together and keep an eye on them” as a “check” on police behaviour on campus.145 
The Daily Telegraph noted in a report of that meeting that “apparently there is an undergraduate 
belief that policemen have no legal power to set foot on university property”. The paper rejected 
the concept of the sanctuary, stating that “[s]tudents have no right to any special immunity from 
laws other people have to obey”.146 Two months later students on the same campus claimed that 
if regular army personnel were on campus out of uniform, they were there illegally.147 Prior to 
the second Moratorium, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Queensland circulated a memo 
that stated that “the law runs within the university, which cannot claim exemption from it on any 
rational ground,” and that “[p]olice may enter the campus without permission of the university 
administration in various cases specified by law”.148 Barry York notes that changes to applicable 
laws in 1965 had recategorised universities from private property to public places, and thus 
granted police “unrestricted powers of entry and arrest”.149 After the siege of Melbourne 
University’s Union Building, the Melbourne Herald hinted that the idea of campus-as-sanctuary 
persisted amongst both administrators and students, arguing that the violence on campus was a 
result of the behaviour of both “radical minorities” and failures of the university authorities to 
prevent student preparations for the siege. For the Telegraph, universities were “entitled to no 
more immunity than the ordinary citizen’s back yard,” and the editorial concluded that “It is the 
right and duty of the police to uphold the law [on campus]. A university is not a vacuum or 
sanctuary”.150  
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The adoption of the American vocabulary took place alongside the adoption of practice. SOS 
preferred the term ‘conscientious non-compliance,’ to describe the new form of protest, but 
‘draft resistance’ began to creep into stories in the Newsletter. In August 1967 a news item 
described the still-new Australian practice under the heading “other forms of objection” as 
“refusing to register in protest against conscription”.151 In September the Newsletter reprinted 
excerpts from a New York Draft Resistance brochure that used the term ‘Draft Resistance’ to 
denote specifically American practices.152 In February 1969 the newsletter used the term ‘draft 
resister’ to describe Australian activists for the first time.153 CDNSA material on Draft Resistance 
spoke in terms of both ‘draft evasion’ and ‘draft resistance,’ a dichotomy borrowed from the 
United States.154 Though American Draft Resisters understood evasion as less effective than 
resistance, Australians used it to refer to conscientious objection as opposed to conscientious 
non-compliance. The CDNSA articulated both as legitimate tactics, as well as speaking both in 
terms of ‘non-compliance’ and ‘draft resistance’.155 The SOS Newsletter listed “Non-compliance 
and Draft Evasion” alongside “Conscientious Objection” as two objects of draft counselling, and 
understood ‘non-compliance’ as one strategy of ‘draft resistance’.156 The American term spread; 
by July 1972, then opposition leader Gough Whitlam used the term in the Australian to refer to 
the young men he promised to pardon and free should he win office at the impending Federal 
Election.157 Activists never stopped using the term ‘conscientious non-complier,’ but the term 
‘Draft Resister’ took precedence by mid-1970.  
Australian Draft Resisters overlaid the American vocabulary onto existing local practice. The 
writing of letters refusing to register under the Scheme was termed ‘non-compliance,’ and 
because of the long-standing use of conscientious objection cases as a method of evading or 
protesting conscription, Australian activists at first understood non-compliance as a different 
form of conscientious protest based in liberal individualism. Thus Brian Ross argued that “the 
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individual must be free to control his own destiny as long as he recognises the equal rights of 
others”.158 Geoff Mullen gestured towards the sovereignty of the liberal citizen when he argued 
that conscription “destroys what is finally the essential human faculty, the ability to make 
important decisions for oneself”.159  
Because they shared a repertoire of conscientious lawbreaking, older activists in the CDNSA 
and other existing organisations like SOS lent their support to Draft Resisters. In September 
1969, the CDNSA suggested the establishment of “a continuing draft resistance and counselling 
service”.160 In July 1970 the AICD, CDNSA and SOS put on a Draft Resistance and counselling 
School in Sydney, with the participation of Queensland, Victorian and South Australian 
activists.161 Among those attending was the Reverend Stan Moore, who had attended the 
National conference in Melbourne in September 1969 and acted as the prosecutor for the 
Melbourne CDNSA protest in June, and had worked in America as a Draft Resistance counsellor 
in mid-1969.162 The Draft Counselling School succeeded in establishing Draft Resistance Unions 
and counselling services in South Australia and Queensland, alongside the ones already 
operating in NSW and Victoria. The meeting also attempted to coordinate a national Draft 
Resisters’ Union.163 By 1971, The AICD Annual Report noted that Draft Resistance had become 
associated with the Moratorium Campaign.164 Throughout 1970 and 1971 older activists from 
established peace groups in Melbourne conducted the ‘Don’t Register’ campaign alongside Draft 
Resistance Union members. ‘Don’t Register’ involved the by-then familiar practice of handing 
out leaflets at the GPO that breached the Crimes Act and urged young men not to register for 
National Service. Melbourne activists were inventive in the strategies they chose to support 
conscientious non-compliers. While not explicitly lawbreaking, the ‘Fill in a Falsie’ and phone 
disruption campaigns of 1970 and 1971 provided a practice through which Draft Resisters and 
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women and older activists not subject to the National Service Scheme could join together in 
productively disrupting the Scheme’s operation. 
The main goal of Draft Resistance was to make individual young men into public symbols of 
the ineffectiveness of both the National Service Scheme and the Commonwealth Police who 
attempted to enforce it. The Victorian Draft Resisters’ Union asked anti-war organisations in 
September 1970 to help “[e]stablish an underground for draft resisters on an interstate basis,” 
and that those sympathetic to draft resisters “openly declare their willingness to hide draft 
resisters from the authorities”.165 Citizens sympathetic to the Moratorium lent their houses to 
young men on the run from the Commonwealth Police.166 Tony Dalton recalls that among the 
people who hid him were academics, CPA members, a publisher, the superintendent of a public 
hospital and his girlfriend.167 Some fled to the country; John Wollin recalls a short stay with 
“some sympathetic nuns in the Mallee”.168 The DRU also asked that Draft Resisters be given 
forums to “appear and speak on the reasons for their resistance”.169 Michael Hamel-Green recalls 
that during one of the Moratorium marches in Melbourne, four draft resisters spoke to the crowd 
from the back of a truck. Afterwards the crowd shepherded the Resisters to Melbourne 
University, helping them avoid Commonwealth Police.170 Individual draft resisters became 
infamous, as demonstrated by the example of Michael Matteson, whose escapes from the 
Melbourne University Union building, ABC studios and Sydney University’s front lawns were 
well-publicised. They congregated rarely; most Draft Resisters on the run recall solo travel and 
periods of stress.171 The largest group of Draft Resisters reported in the press was the four 
involved in the Melbourne University siege. This game of cat and mouse with Commonwealth 
Police was central to Australian draft resistance until the end of conscription in 1972. These 
activists were no longer engaged in Gandhian protest; rather than submitting themselves to 
punishment they aimed to evade it. 
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The Fairlea Five 
The gaoling of five members of the anti-conscription organisation Save Our Sons in Melbourne 
in 1971 demonstrates the extent to which Australian protest practice was reshaped between 1969 
and 1971, and highlights the ways that the development of lawbreaking was entangled with the 
debates about violence and law and order. Like most existing protest organisations SOS was 
caught up in the changing trends in Australian protest. The organisation’s Melbourne and Sydney 
branches were involved in the campaign against bylaw 418 and Draft Resistance respectively. 
Joan Coxsedge’s willingness to be gaoled during the bylaw 418 campaign shows that by mid-
1969 members of SOS had started to abandon the notion of maternal respectability in favour of 
conscientious lawbreaking. In April 1971, five women from the Melbourne branch of SOS were 
arrested for handing out leaflets in the foyer of the Ministry for Labour and National Service. 
Both Joan Coxsedge and Jean MacLean were among them. The women were tried under the new 
Summary Offences Act, which had been enacted to deal with violent student protest.172 The 
women’s imprisonment in Fairlea Women’s Prison earned them the moniker ‘the Fairlea Five,’ 
and they became the subject of a campaign to have them freed. 
In keeping with the notion of submission to illegitimate authority, their legal representation 
said that they were “all very determined to see out their prison term” and that they would not 
appeal the decision.173 The Saturday after their imprisonment, 800 protesters began a vigil 
outside the prison. The meeting agreed to further lawbreaking, in the form of “a series of 
deliberate trespasses” against the women’s incarceration.174 The protest outside the prison 
decided to mount a continuous vigil - a venerable staple of SOS protest - until the women were 
freed, and staged a motorcade to the Government House to demand their release. Cairns 
addressed the crowd, speaking in now-familiar terms. He noted that only “the people’s 
resistance” could prevent the slide into a “police state,” and that “the continuance of civil rights” 
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required “enough people refusing to be intimidated by such laws”.175 Another speaker invoked 
the right to dissent, arguing that the women had been imprisoned for “doing no more than 
exercising their basic democratic right of peaceful protest”.176 A third continued in the same vein, 
arguing that the Bolte government continued to “attack and destroy essential civil liberties of 
individual citizens”.177  After their release the five women sipped champagne as they told an 
open-air reception in City Square that they were prepared to be arrested for the same offense in 
future.178 The Australian argued that the women were only imprisoned because “Australian 
governments over-react to threats to ‘law-and-order’,” arguing that the laws rather than the 
protests they targeted were the instigators of disruption.179 The campaign in support of the Fairlea 
Five shows that the notions of participatory democracy, the moral right to break a bad law, and 
the right to protest circulated throughout existing Australian protest organisations, 
complementing rather than supplanting existing practice. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined significant shifts in Australian protest practice across the Vietnam 
period, beginning with the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s and concluding with the 
Draft Resistance and Moratorium campaigns of 1972. Its focus has been the unfolding 
conversation between activists, representatives of the state, and the media around conscription 
and Australian involvement in Vietnam. It has largely focused on contemporary explanations of 
protest events, arguing that protest is a meaning-making exercise. It has drawn together activists’ 
own explanations of their actions, taken from activist publications, correspondence, minutes, and 
ephemera. Rather than treating opposition to the Vietnam War as a monolithic, homogenous 
‘movement,’ this thesis has analysed the continual development and evolution of a repertoire of 
protest practice shared across several discrete ‘movements’ in Australia in the 1960s. It has 
shown that there was an evident tension in Australian protest practice between the conception of 
protest as the representation of public opinion, and protest as the exercise of a morally sovereign 
individual right. The struggles between these different formulations of protest, and the tactics 
that flowed from these different philosophical principles, shaped much of the history of peace, 
anti-nuclear, anti-war, anti-conscription, and anti-Apartheid activism in Australia throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s.  
The idea of public protest as a representative activity informed Australian protest throughout 
the Vietnam period. Protest organisations attempted to position themselves as representatives of 
broader public opinion, and to present the evidence of this public opinion to politicians, 
bureaucrats and the media as a way of legitimating their ideas. This practice underpinned the 
anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, where it was most apparent in the design of the 1962 
relay march to present a petition to Whitlam in Canberra. Anti-war protesters also argued that 
they represented widespread and potent anti-war sentiment in the electorate. Geoff Anderson, 
secretary of the NSW Peace Committee, framed “informed and active public opinion” as “the 
weapons which democrats have by inalienable right”.1 The result of the 1966 election made this 
claim unworkable, made it clear that majority opinion supported the war, and allowed politicians 
and the media to represent anti-war protesters as a ‘noisy minority’. While in subsequent months 
                                                 
1 CICD, Annual Report 1965 (c. December), Folder “16 (b) YCAC - the Committee,” Youth Campaign Against 
Conscription Collection, MS 10002, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne. 
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the idea of an underlying anti-war public opinion continued to animate public protest, it was 
evident to many protesters that new strategies, practices and philosophical rationales were 
needed to sustain their activism. 
This new context fostered the growth of an alternative conception of protest, one that argued 
that individual citizens possessed a moral right to protest against the state, even one led by a 
popularly elected government. The idea of the sovereign individual nourished several different 
protest organisations. At first the idea was something Australians observed only from afar. They 
encountered ‘direct action’ through correspondence with the British Committee of 100, which 
communicated frequently with the NSW Peace Committee. The Port Huron Statement of 1962 
circulated through transnational student networks, and prioritised the sovereignty of the 
individual in democratic societies. Liberal individualism influenced anti-conscription protesters 
in particular, as Conscientious Objection rested on the exercise of individual conscience. The 
idea of conscience disconnected from religion emerged most clearly in the anti-conscription 
rhetoric of the Young Labor organisation Youth Campaign Against Conscription, which 
expressed its opposition to National Service in liberal individualist terms. In 1968 and 1969, 
students began to experiment with ideas of moral lawbreaking, and the idea of the individual’s 
right to break a bad law began to gain traction amongst Australian activists. Rather than drawing 
its legitimacy from a rhetorical connection to significant if uncountable democratic numbers, the 
concentration on individual sovereign rights made an appeal to an objective moral principle.  
These two traditions of Australian protest practice were combined in pursuit of the gigantic 
Moratorium Campaigns. In the wake of the first Moratorium, which mobilised large crowds, 
activists began to speak in terms of participatory democracy, a fusion of liberal democratic 
rights, moral lawbreaking and the notion of protest on behalf of the public. This fusion of the 
liberal conception of rights and the democratic notion of mass underpinned the NSW 
Moratorium Committee’s refusal to apply for a permit for the second Moratorium march in 
Sydney, arguing “that citizens should only have to consult the authorities, rather than gain their 
permission to use the streets for political demonstrations”.2 In the context of the ‘Law and Order’ 
                                                 
2 NSW Vietnam Moratorium Committee, Sponsors’ meeting minutes (August 17, 1970), Folder “Sponsors’ 
Committee,” Box 38 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney 
(hereafter PND Records). 
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debates of mid-1970 these ideas prompted a public discussion of the right to break a bad law. By 
the time of the National Anti-War Conference of February 1971, the idea of a democratic 
majority was resurgent, re-imagined in more radical, Marxist terms as a mass consciousness-
raising project.  
This thesis thus offers a detailed examination of protest during the Vietnam War as a debate 
over rights and obligations in relation to Australian citizenship. The liberal individualism of 
Australian protesters set them at odds with the public culture they inhabited. From the earliest 
days of the National Service Scheme, arguments for conscription were based in a sense of duty 
and obligation to the nation, as well as a sense that military service would make young men into 
better citizens.3 Older protesters immediately began to organise around the idea of individual 
conscience, but the young men they supported overwhelmingly chose to articulate their refusal to 
serve in liberal individualist terms. These two arguments – and later debates over the right to 
break an immoral law versus the citizen’s duty to obey – line up with Oldfield’s characterisation 
of liberal citizenship as a “status,” or the state of “being” a citizen. This is contrasted with 
republican citizenship, which is a “practice,” or the act of “doing” citizenship.4 Part of the liberal 
critique of conscription, evident in Australian protest in the 1960s, was a refusal of the idea that 
for young men, military service was a duty “associated with their very identification of 
themselves as citizens; not to fulfil them is to cease to be a citizen.”5 If protest is a meaning-
making exercise, then anti-war and anti-conscription protest offered Australians new ways of 
thinking and talking about their place in the nation. 
This sudden and brief flowering of liberal individualism cannot be explained without 
reference to the transnational networks that Australian activists found themselves implicated in. 
Though a transnational reading of 1960s protest is no longer a radical intervention into the 
historical literature, this analysis has traced the movement of ideas across national borders to 
explain the vocabularies that Australian protesters used to explain their actions. Civil 
disobedience, lawbreaking, and draft resistance were all developed locally in relation to overseas 
                                                 
3 Christina Twomey, “The National Service Scheme: Citizenship and the Tradition of Compulsory Military Service in 
1960s Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 58:1 (2012): 74-76. 
4 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 
1990): 1. 
5 Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?” The Political Quarterly 61:2 (1990): 181. Emphasis in original. 
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examples. The question of whether Australian anti-war activism was genuine or an imitation has 
plagued discussions of Vietnam-era protest since the 1960s. Curthoys noted Gerard Henderson’s 
1969 criticism that the Australian anti-war movement was “purely derivative, nothing but an 
imitation of the American movement, somehow not an indigenous Australian political 
movement, but something imported from outside”.6 York notes contemporary concern with “the 
derivative nature of much of the protest activity in Australia”, characterising this attitude as an 
activist “cultural cringe”.7 Terry Lane recalled in 1992 that “The word Moratorium, the concept 
Moratorium, and even the symbol … were all imported from America. We were not terribly 
original and did tend to copy things happening there.”8 York and Lane’s memories are supported 
by contemporary sources. At the time of the first Moratorium march, the Sydney Morning Herald 
argued that the campaign was an “assiduous … imitation of its US model”.9  
This thesis also offers a way out of the genuine/derivative bind evident in the literature, by 
arguing that Australian activists were constantly engaged in a critical dialogue with their 
overseas counterparts through a range of channels, and carefully and critically adopted only 
those practices that were of use to them. Australian activists received letters from British and 
American activist organisations, such as the Committee of 100 and the Berkeley Vietnam Day 
Committee. They sent letters asking for assistance and guidance, like the NSW Peace 
Committee’s letter to Martin Luther King Jr. They brought material and experience back to 
Australia from overseas, like Dave Nadel with the Port Huron Statement or the Reverend Stan 
Moore with Draft Resistance.10 More importantly, Australian activists repeatedly demonstrated 
that they did not adopt activist praxis uncritically. Anti-nuclear protesters did not adopt civil 
disobedience in 1961 despite a clear request to do so. Unlike their American counterparts, 
Australian Draft Resisters prioritised the evasion of Commonwealth Police over submission to 
punishment. This thesis has demonstrated that Australian engagement with transnational 
                                                 
6 Ann Curthoys, “The Anti-war Movements”, in Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle eds., Vietnam: War, Myth and Memory: 
Comparative Perspectives on Australia’s War in Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992): 105n7. 
7 Barry York, “The Australian Anti-Vietnam Movement: 1965-1973,” Melbourne Journal of Politics 15 (1983-84):  
25. 
8 Terry Lane (protester and religious minister), interview with Greg Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent: Vietnam 
and the conflict on the Australian Home Front (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992): 144. 
9 “Violence,” SMH, May 8, 1970, 2. 
10 Kate Murphy “‘In the Backblocks of Capitalism’: Australian Student Activism in the Global 1960s,” Australian 
Historical Studies 46:2 (2015): 261; “Draft Resistance conference,” SOS Sydney Newsletter (September 1969), 5. 
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networks of activists did not produce simple mimicry. Rather, Australian protesters were 
nourished and energised by a critical dialogue with their overseas activists. The resulting 
repertoire of practice was neither wholly original nor wholly derivative, but a synthesis that 
responded to the specific demands of Australian political culture in the 1960s. 
In comparison to American protest, the absence of veteran involvement in Australia is 
marked, suggesting an interesting avenue for future research. There was no equivalent in 
Australia to the American organisation Vietnam Veterans Against the War, who staged the 
“Winter Soldier Investigation’ into American war crimes and prominently threw their medals on 
the steps of Congress. There is some evidence of veteran involvement in Australian protest but it 
was on the periphery and never an integral element of the broader movement. Gary Guest recalls 
protesting wearing both a return-from-active-service badge and a Moratorium badge.11 The Ex-
Services Human Rights Association was active in anti-war protest and consisted of veterans of 
the Second World War who opposed Australian involvement in the Vietnam War.12 Christina 
Twomey has argued that broad acceptance of National Service overwhelmed refusal to serve, 
indicating an Australian comfort with military service. Similarly, Ham’s history of Australian 
involvement in the war draws on veteran memoir to argue that protesters and veterans clashed in 
the years following withdrawal.13 Unknown graffitists daubed the word ‘peace’ and a CND logo 
on the columns of Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance just prior to ANZAC Day 1971.14 
Because of local attitudes to service and remembrance, Australian Veterans and protesters 
struggled to find common cause, and this in turn shaped the adoption of protest practice by 
Australians. A historical inquiry into the relationship between ANZAC and protest in Australia 
in the 1960s could further develop the ideas in this thesis about the obligations, rights and 
privileges of Australian citizenship in the 1960s. 
This thesis has not made any attempt to measure the ‘success’ of anti-war or anti-conscription 
protest, or the extent to which it hastened the end of National Service or the withdrawal of 
Australian troops from Vietnam. As the Age asked in June 1970, at the waning of the 
                                                 
11 Gary Guest (Vietnam Veteran and protester), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 132-133. 
12 Les Waddington (Secretary, Ex-Services Human Rights Association), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of 
Dissent, 56-7. 
13 Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2007): chap. 42. 
14 “Police query several about Shrine,” Age, April 24, 1971, 1; “The colonel, 75, explodes: ‘I’d shoot Shrine 
desecraters’,” Age, April 24, 1971, 3. 
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Moratorium Campaign and with withdrawal a fait accompli, “is today’s march really necessary? 
… Surely the white-heat has gone out of the Vietnam issue.”15 Though it is impossible to 
measure the extent to which protest affected attitudes towards Australian involvement in the 
Vietnam War, it is clear that the demonstrators established new political interpretations of 
Australian engagement with Asia, America, and the Cold War. Their most obvious critical 
intervention into Australian public political life was the unsettling of the logic of commitment. 
At the beginning of Australian involvement, the war was clearly represented as one front in a 
global conflict in which the forces of international communism were united against the United 
States and her allies, and as a Hanoi- or Peking-led Communist guerilla insurgency rather than a 
conventional internal conflict between North and South Vietnam. By the end of 1972, the war 
had been reconstituted as an unnecessary and possibly imperialist intervention into an ongoing 
civil war. Through their careful articulation of protest as a democratic process and an individual 
right, and their sustained presence in public conversations about commitment and conscription, 
Australian protesters helped to change the meaning of the Vietnam War in Australian public 
political life. 
 
  
 
                                                 
15 “On the march again,” Age, June 30, 1971, 9. 
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